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I. Introduction  
   
Recent tragedies in Bangladesh and Pakistan have led to greater public attention on the garment and 
textile industry.  Hence, this study is timely and provides insights into the current working conditions, 
organizing efforts, and the changing organization and structure of the industry in question.  Our central 
question in this study is the extent to which worker organization can improve monitoring and 
enforcement of labor standards in subcontracted and home-based work in the garment and textile 
sectors in Brazil, China, India, and South Africa.  Existing research literature suggests that in at least 
some cases of informalized and casualized work, formation and mobilization of worker organizations can 
do much in this regard.  The research has particularly pointed to the importance of innovative and 
alternative forms of organization that depart from standard trade union models—in line with the 
departure of whole sections of the world of work from standard forms of work organization.  While 
suggestive, this literature has been dominated by cases of a single organization in a single country, or in 
some cases convenience samples of organizations from one or a range of countries.   
 
This report thus makes two distinctive contributions.  First, it spotlights a set of specific sector-country 
combinations that have received limited attention at best in previous research.  Second, it assembles a 
systematic comparison of organizing activities in a single sector (apparel and textile) across four 
countries with very different economies, institutional structures, and histories.  This comparison points 
to some possibilities for generalization to a broader range of countries. 
 
At the same time, the study design, itself centered on case studies, builds in important limitations.  The 
four countries in question range in size from large to very large, including the two largest countries in 
the world by population, China and India.  The garment and textile sector, as the conjunction “and” 
signals, combines a variety of economic units and activities ranging from huge, highly automated textile 
mills producing standardized outputs to individual home-based seamstresses carrying out custom work.  
Narrowing the focus to subcontracted and home-based work limits this variety somewhat, but as we will 
see in all four countries, given the current pervasiveness of subcontracting in this industry, it is not a 
major narrowing.  At the same time, the case study nature of the research, and its limited scale and 
duration, necessitates a focus on a small number of organizations in countries where organization is 
relatively advanced (India and South Africa), or on a single productive region in countries where 
organizations are still at an early, experimental stage (China and Brazil, though in the latter case we 
were able to supplement the in-depth regional study with a look at organization in a different region as 
well).  The organizations and regions are chosen because of their importance as distinctive examples, 
and because in their entirety or in key aspects they have remained understudied in previous research.  
The resulting cases are valuable in their own right, but degree of generalizability across the full clothing 
and textile sector and the full countries in question is unknown.  
 
 
1. Commonalities and differences identified through fieldwork 
 
Through the research we were able to identify common characteristics of subcontract work in the 
apparel and textile sector across the four countries.  The research also presented some characteristics 
that were distinct to each.  
 
In brief, several characteristics of subcontracted garment and textile work are typical across the cases.  
The work does not involve large-scale capital investments and its products are easy to ship, so the 
activity is geographically mobile.  Such work is in large part informal.  It preferentially employs young 
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women, though in all the countries there is a gendered division of labor in which men occupy certain 
jobs.  Worker organizations seeking to organize and assist these workers face a number of challenges, 
including difficulty in locating them, worker disinterest or even fear toward organizing given their 
isolation and vulnerability, and the dual worker-entrepreneur status of technically self-employed home-
based workers.  In many cases, formal trade unions are reluctant to organize such workers, often 
viewing them as unorganizable or even as not truly workers.  Labor laws often fail to cover home-based 
and in some cases subcontracted workers, and when the laws do cover such workers, governments 
often lack the capacity or the will for rigorous enforcement. 
 
Aside from the first commonality of mobility, which is a well-known aspect of apparel production 
globally (see, for example, Rosen 2002), the other commonalities merit a brief preview, and we touch on 
each in the sub-sections below. 
 
a. Subcontract work in the informal economy 
 
Increase in the need for flexibility and cheap labor has resulted in subcontract work to become 
informalized.  Across all four countries, subcontract work falls within the informal sector.  There is a 
structure to the production of garments and textiles that is generally comprised of levels or tiers.  At the 
top is a formal production entity, which delegates work to small factories or workshops, which in turn 
delegate aspects of production to even smaller workshops or home-based workers.  For instance, 
researchers in China identified a four-tier system where the large factories contract out to the second 
tier, which is comprised of small factories.  These small factories then delegate work to even smaller 
garment workshops, which then contract out to home-based workers.  Similarly, in South Africa, there 
are few large factories (full-package manufacturers, FPMs) with most of the apparel production spread 
out across medium-sized, micro factories, and survivalist operations (Cut Make and Trims, CMTs) and 
home-based workers.  It is a similar scenario in Brazil where there are fábricas, fabrícos and facções.  
The fábricas tend to be formally organized but the latter two groups in general tend to be informal.  In 
India, textile and garment production is mostly informal, with only a small percentage of permanent 
workers (considered formal workers).  
 
b. Workers in formal enterprises 
 
While formal top-tier factories constitute the most structured link in the production chain, it is evident 
through the literature and our fieldwork that even many workers in this top tier are routinely denied 
their basic rights.  In China, fixed-term contract workers (considered formal workers) in the first tier 
large factories and second tier mid-sized factories are often times not asked to sign a contract, or are 
not given a copy of a signed contract.  Sometimes workers are not even aware that they are entitled to 
such an agreement.  This makes it difficult to prove that there is an employer-employee relationship.  In 
India, permanent workers in factories are considered formal workers, but as we found in our research, 
this group of workers is regularly denied basic rights.  Additionally, their employment is often 
terminated without cause or notice.   
 
South Africa’s FPM workers, who are generally unionized and are paid according to minimum wages set 
by labor-management Bargaining Councils, also voice concerns of low-wages, bad working conditions, 
and irregular pay, among other grievances.  The larger, more established CMTs are registered with 
Bargaining Councils, thus formal in the South African framework, largely match pay and conditions of 
top-tier enterprises, but more commonly enforce policies such as the "no work, no pay" rule (workers 
are not paid for time out sick or for periods where there is no production).  Home-based and survivalist 
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CMTs, whether registered or not, much more commonly fail to provide the range of benefits to which 
workers are entitled as set out in Bargaining Council collective agreements.  
 
In Brazil, as in South Africa, employees of garment and textile subcontractors are nominally subject to 
the same laws and labor standards as those at fully formal integrated producers, but many 
subcontractors simply function under the radar or disguise employment as self-employment, rendering 
traditional modes of labor standards monitoring and enforcement extremely challenging. 
 
c. Female workers 
 
It is important to note that most workers in the garment and textile industry tend to be women. Women 
remain particularly concentrated in Brazil’s self-employed and unpaid family worker categories.  In 
South Africa, women of color are overrepresented in the most marginalized forms of subcontracted and 
home-based work.  India’s contract workers tend to be rural women, often from the lower castes, and 
home-based workers generally tend to be women as well.  However, in China the larger factories are 
comprised of young female migrant workers, while mostly men are employed in small workshops.  
Factory owners tend to hire young women from rural areas because they are viewed as more docile and 
less likely to protest.  
 
d. Challenges in organizing subcontracted and home-based workers 
 
Our research found that trade unions are resistant to organizing subcontracted and home-based 
workers, or if they do attempt to organize, they face many challenges. 
 
In the case of India, traditional, politically-affiliated labor unions have long resisted organizing informal 
workers because they have not viewed them as "real workers."  Such unions often depict informal labor 
as a threat to their economic and social role.  The state’s overt sanctioning of informal labor and the 
changes in the global production structure(s) are perceived as a direct attack on traditional unions.  
Despite the change in the production structures and proliferation of informality, such unions continue to 
make traditional demands for formal workers (wage increases, insurance and pensions, etc.).  To the 
extent that some are trying to organize informal workers, they continue to demand that these workers 
become formalized under existing state laws.  However, independent unions (not politically-affiliated) 
and worker organizations have arisen that are beginning to employ innovative new strategies to 
organize informal workers and seek demands that are more clearly aligned with the workers’ needs and 
suit the new production structure. The most well-known Indian success story in this regard is the Self-
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), which is recognized as a trade union federation (indeed, India’s 
largest) but uses alternative forms of organization, such as cooperatives and associations of producers. 
 
In South Africa, the South African Clothing and Textile Union (SACTWU) has attempted to organize 
informal garment workers, however it has encountered major challenges.  First, small workshops can 
easily pick and up move to another location in order to evade unionization attempts.  Secondly, there is 
a blurring of the employer-employee relationship.  Third, home-based workers resist unions because 
they believe they are better off working from home because they do not have to pay taxes and travel 
costs.  Lastly, workers are mobile.  They may work in one workshop for a week and another the next 
week, making it difficult to locate them.  These survivalist workshops are difficult for inspectors and 
trade unions to locate. The South African Self-Employed Women’s Association (SASEWA) and a 
predecessor organization, SEWU, have attempted to fill this gap by organizing self-employed women 
along the lines of SEWA in India, but their achievements to date have been limited. 
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Brazilian unions belonging to a number of competing federations have had some important successes in 
organizing informal and even home-based garment and textile workers, notably in three cases in São 
Paulo State reviewed in the Brazil section of the report, the Ibitinga Needle Workers Union, the National 
Confederation of Garment Workers and the, Seamstresses’ Union of São Paulo and Osasco.  Still, the 
unions have had great difficulty gaining purchase in subcontracted and home-based work for many of 
the same reasons as in other countries.  Brazilian unions have thus supplemented traditional organizing 
with support of cooperatives, close cooperation with government inspectors, and regional development 
strategies to help garment and textile industries upgrade but also offer workers other options to stem 
the survivalist influx into home-based and subcontracted work. 
 
In China, there is a single labor union federation, which is tied to the party-state and typically works 
closely with management and strives for harmonious labor-capital relations, rarely advocating strongly 
for workers. There are increasing numbers of independent labor NGOs that attempt to assist workers, 
but are blocked from actively organizing by state strictures.  Indeed, stringent state control is the main 
challenge faced by labor NGOs.  In order to avoid being shut down, they mostly focus on the provision of 
services and organizing educational activities that help workers build a community.    
e. Lack of labor law enforcement  
 
One of the key findings is the lack of government labor protection for informal workers—by definition, 
since we have defined informality as the absence of such protection.  The country cases show an overall 
lack of funding to hire enough inspectors to monitor working conditions and defend workers’ rights in 
the sector.  Brazil’s federal government increased funding of labor inspections, but it only tackles the 
worst labor conditions, such as child labor and forced labor.  In South Africa there are hardly enough 
Bargaining Council staff and Department of Labor inspectors to find the many different, highly mobile, 
survivalist CMTs and ensure that they are registered and in compliance with the Labor Relations Act 
(LRA) and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA).  In the city of Hangzhou, China, where there 
are about 100,000 workers, the Jiubao Labor Supervision Team (JLSS) has only 6 staff members to 
conduct inspections and follow up on worker complaints.  Due to inadequate financial support, such a 
small JLSS is handicapped in its ability to effectively monitor working conditions and enforcement of the 
Labor Law and Labor Contract Law. In India, the Ministry of Labor’s budget has shown a steady decline 
since the early 1990s, and the result has been a consistent decline in the number of labor inspectors. 
 
However, it’s not just a matter of resources.  In most cases (with a limited recent counter-trend in Brazil), 
policy shifts toward neoliberalism have deliberately relaxed legal protections for workers.  Moreover, 
again with the partial exception of Brazil, there is evidence that enforcement is not pursued vigorously 
for these jobs. In India, while labor laws do exist, state power and proclivities to enforce the laws have 
waned during the past two decades. The Chinese Labor Law and Labor Contract Law both apply to all 
employees, including home-based workers.  However, demonstrating the existence of an employer-
employee relationship is always the first step for a worker in order to legally challenge the employer for 
labor law infringement.  Thus, garment workers without contracts and home-based workers who often 
cannot prove the existence of this relationship are not able to gain protections under the existing labor 
laws.  Under the Labor Law, inspectors have authority under to investigate worker issues in workshops 
but this is a rare occurrence.   Inspectors play a reactive role and do not educate workers about their 
rights.   
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South African and Brazilian employers easily evade labor regulations and there is the same issue of lack 
of enforcement as in India and China.  South African employers are required to register with Bargaining 
Councils, which set and enforce minimum labor standards, but they often do not.  When employers 
know inspectors are coming, they can pack up their small workshops and relocate somewhere else.  In 
Brazil, as noted above, subcontracting moves much work outside the influence and often even the 
knowledge of regulators.  Thus, though trade unions and other worker advocates have pushed for 
formalization of subcontracted workers, in most cases this is an uphill battle. 
 
In this environment, support for informal workers, rather than an attempt to shift them to formal status, 
may prove more viable.  For example, in India informal workers’ unions, such as the Self Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA), have been able to win the establishment of Welfare Boards.  These 
tripartite, sector-specific, institutions, implemented by state governments (so far only in some of India's 
states, and only in some sectors) are funded by contributions from employers, workers and government. 
Rather than monitoring working conditions or defending workers’ rights on the shop floor, the Welfare 
Boards provide social insurance and benefits to informal workers and their families.  They are funded 
through state contributions, revenue from taxes (from the employers) and membership dues (from the 
informal workers). 
 
 
2. Report structure 
 
Due to historical differences, varying political contexts, and the differences in the structure of industry 
and labor, it is crucial to have a historical lens and structural analyses in order better understand the 
current conditions and contexts.  Some reports, to wit India and China, delve deeper into the history 
than others.  The India case study provides a thorough background on the garment and textile industry 
starting with the colonial era.  The industry in question served as an engine of economic growth and 
industrialization for India before and after independence.  Hence, how the industry has evolved, 
especially with India’s move towards liberalization of its economy, plays an important role in 
understanding the current organizing efforts or lack thereof, by trade unions and other worker 
organizations.  However, in the case of China, the textile and apparel industry has become more 
significant relatively recently in comparison to India.  Thus, the report on China delves deeper into the 
spatial and social organization of production as influenced by China’s policies for economic growth 
through an increase in exports.   
 
After the historical and structural analyses in each country report, the researchers present their findings 
from their fieldwork, supplemented by relevant information from the literature.  In these sections we 
learn about labor standards and regulations, the role of trade unions, and alternative forms of 
organizing of subcontracted and home-based workers.  Lastly, each report concludes with some insights 
into what strategies are being employed to organize subcontracted and home-based workers and what 
potential opportunities are there to protect workers’ rights in each country.  The final section of this 
report is a comparative analysis and synthesis of the findings across the four countries.  
 
In the order of chapters and in discussion in the Conclusion, we have ordered the countries in 
descending order by Gross National Income per capita, except that China’s political economy is so 
distinctive that we moved it from third to last.  The order is thus Brazil, South Africa, India, and China.  
Thus, we have placed analysis of countries that are in some sense economically similar next to each 
other.  Following the detailed country cases, the Conclusion synthesizes findings and suggests some 
broader conclusions and hypotheses.
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 II.        Brazil:  Active unions, supportive government, limited results 
 
Principal authors:  Carlos Salas, Marcelo Manzano, and Christian Duarte 
With the help of Lucas Kerr 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with home-based workers in the Brazilian garment and textile sector and illustrates 
the challenges faced, and efforts undertaken, by workers and their advocates to improve worker 
protection.  Brazil is an interesting and important case because it has one of the largest textile and 
clothing sectors in the world, unions with a long history of militancy and innovation, and a national 
government that, since 2003, has taken concerted policy steps to improve the situation of workers.  The 
Brazilian needle trades are also notable in that in recent years about one-third of the sector’s workforce 
has been home-based (though this proportion declined during as the economy slowed, as we will 
describe below). 
 
The particular needs of Brazilian workers vary from region to region, and these differences will be 
explored in this chapter.  But there is also a fundamental commonality:  the unregistered nature of 
home-based and subcontract work – in particular, its placement outside the government labor 
inspection and social pension systems – is perhaps the unifying obstacle to achieving adequate worker 
protections. Because of the very nature of home-based work, there is a lack of contact with other 
workers and many times, no connection with unions or other workers’ organizations.  Thus, worker 
organization efforts in Brazil have sought to move home-based workers into the formal sector of 
garment production as their primary strategy, either through the heightened enforcement of the labor 
law that regulates wage labor, through the use of other legal forms aimed at incorporating self-
employed workers into social protection schemes, or by registering small workshops in a simplified 
taxation regime.  
 
In this chapter we will discuss two case studies, the garment cluster at the Caruaru region in 
Pernambuco and the garment sector in São Paulo state.  This is done so as to underline the impact of 
different economic and social contexts on the possibilities of organizing home-based workers.  The 
metropolitan area of São Paulo concentrates the largest agglomeration of production, distribution and 
service units in Brazil.  Thus there are many economic alternatives available. In contrast, the Caruaru 
cluster is located in an isolated and poor area in the remote Northeast of the country, where few 
economic alternatives are available.  Thus, these case studies were selected to illustrate the variety of 
social and economic contexts where home-based workers in the garment sector carry on their jobs.    
 
Organizing and protecting home-based workers requires an approach that takes into account the variety 
of contexts.  For example, in Caruaru production takes place in family-owned or very small firms that sell 
their products at regional bazaars called Feiras.  These small units are not necessarily working as 
subcontractors for large firms, and home-based producers are more likely to see themselves as small 
entrepreneurs than as workers for whom unionization would be appropriate.  Thus leading strategies of 
worker organizations involve formalizing small and micro enterprises through enforcement linked with 
supports and assistance that serve as inducements for small entrepreneurs to formalize.  Other places, 
where subcontracting is the basic relationship among home based workers and firms, require different 
organization approaches, exemplified here in the São Paulo case study.  In São Paulo State, 
subcontracted and home-based production is more often linked into supply chains that end in brands 
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with market power and thus “deep pockets.”  Here worker organizations more often rely on pure 
enforcement (via union organization or mobilizing the labor inspection system) or on pressing the 
brands at the top of supply chains to require formalization by their subcontractors. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows.  First we examine the relevance of the textile and garment industry 
in Brazil, mainly in terms of its contribution to job opportunities, in particular, for home-based workers.  
The next section deals with the role of worker organizations in monitoring labor conditions and the 
enforcement of labor law in the garment sector, again in particular among the home workers.  Then we 
proceed to present the results of our in-depth fieldwork in the Caruaru Cluster, which included 
interviews with key actors in the formalization process of home-based workers, a process that was 
initiated by the Departamento Intersendical de Estatistica e Estudos Socioeconômicos (DIEESE), a multi-
union research entity.  For São Paulo, we present findings derived from an extensive interview with the 
current President of the National Confederation of Garment Workers, supplemented by key literature.  
We close with conclusions and policy recommendations for better labor protection schemes in the 
Cluster and in the São Paulo garment sector. 
 
 
2.    The garment industry in Brazil 
 
Brazil ranks among the world’s top producers of textiles and apparel, though this sector largely serves a 
domestic market (Vilasboas 2012; ABIT 2013).  According to data from PNAD, the textile and apparel 
sector is the second largest generator of manufacturing jobs in Brazil (PNAD 2011). In terms of imports, 
China is the major provider. In the case of exports, the Mercosur countries are Brazil´s major trade 
partners.  As Chinese imports gain a greater market share, the very existence of a Brazilian garment 
industry is jeopardized.  Recently exports to the United States and the European Union have declined, 
probably due to two different but simultaneous reasons.  First, the recession in both areas diminished 
their demands.  Second, Chinese exports to these areas have grown quickly, displacing other garment 
suppliers like Brazil. 
 
The textile sector was a major one when Brazil was first industrializing in the beginning of the 20th 
century (Abreu 1986).  It has lost importance through the 21st century.  Due to lack of investment, little 
access to credit, and absence of administrative and technological progress, this sector lost dynamism 
until the 1970’s.  Its structure had been very heterogeneous since its composition, with many small and 
micro enterprises.  So in the 1970’s, a period known as the “Brazilian economic miracle,” the economy 
was restructured and it seemed that dynamism would be achieved overall.  Yet, stagnation in the 1980’s 
led to the maintenance of heterogeneity in the sector and incapacity to overcome the previous limiting 
elements. 
 
Garment activities are greatly concentrated in the South and Southeast of Brazil and, surprisingly, 
employment in the sector has grown since the 1980’s. However, the expansion was led by a growth of 
low quality/low price production, and powered by business attempts to reduce costs, particularly social 
security costs (Coutinho and Ferraz 1994).  Thus entrepreneurs of this sector have attained certain 
dynamism by means of what is known as flexibilização.1 In the textile industry, this means outsourcing, 
home-based work, long workdays, and informality.  As Coutinho and Ferraz point out, it is interesting 
how most home-based work was extinguished by the emergence of modern industry and yet returned                                                         
1 An increase of flexibility achieved by outsourcing, transfer of activities and social costs. 
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many years after because of low costs and lack of fringe benefits.2  The return of home-work also 
implies reduced worker control of the labor process, precarious conditions, and fewer formal job 
openings. 
 
Representative statistics on subcontract work are difficult to obtain.  But two related measures—the 
incidence of home-based work and possession of the carteira de trabalho, the government-sanctioned 
work registration card—are collected regularly by the Brazilian statistical bureau and provide useful 
information about worker characteristics and experiences.  The data presented in the tables below helps 
us to understand better the current situation of the labor market in the garment sector in Brazil.  In 
recent years there is evidence of an important shift in the structure of employment in the sector.  
Recent years have seen growth in wage employment in larger companies, and to a lesser extent in 
microenterprises (Table II.2.1).  At the same time there is a significant decrease of jobs subject to higher 
instability (self-employed and home workers).  A significant reduction in the number of employers, 
particularly in 2011, is also important since it may suggest a process of concentration in the garment 
sector with probable elimination of Brazilian companies that act as intermediaries in the production 
process as well as some more precarious jobs.   
 
The overall labor market improvement was due in part to the global commodities boom, which 
simultaneously fortified consumer demand and expanded alternative opportunities for low-wage 
workers.  In addition to economic growth, the Brazilian labor market has benefited from a policy of 
raising the minimum wage, greater monitoring of compliance with labor legislation, and heightened 
trade union negotiations and pressure, as well as a set of important changes that were not immediate 
consequences of economic growth, but stemmed from the political relations established between 
workers, employers and government in various institutional bodies, as expressed in policies and actions 
such as the major expansion of income transfer programs (notably the Bolsa Familia conditional cash 
transfers to very low-income families) (Baltar et al. 2010).   
 
It is worth noting that, to bolster the domestic garment industry, the Brazilian government has recently 
adopted some trade protection measures.  As these measures more directly benefit companies that are 
already formal and well structured, they contribute to a process of relative strengthening of larger, more 
formal, and well-capitalized segments of the sector at the expense of more precarious ones. 
 
The Brazilian garment sector falls into three main types of organization (Veras 2011).  Fábricas are the 
production-units that are based in facilities outside the home.  Fabrícos, on the other hand, are the 
home-based or family production units; but they may have dozens of informal laborers (who may even 
receive salaries).  Facções are the most precarious form of organization and are the ones that are sub-
suppliers of the Fábricas and Fabrícos.  The three forms of enterprise may be informal or hire informal                                                         
2 Under Brazilian law, formal sector employers must incur the following monthly charges for each employee, that 
form the set of legally-required fringe benefits and are levied on the gross monthly wage:  8% for the Guarantee 
Fund for Employees - FGTS (forced savings, similar to unemployment insurance, that the employee can withdraw if 
the employer fires him/her); 8% of the month´s payment to contribute to an additional month wage, to be paid at 
the end of the year, 20% contribution to social security, 2.5% for financing the employer´s responsibilities for 
training the company's workforce, 8% relative to annual mandatory holidays; 2.67% as an additional holiday 
allowance, and other minor charges. It is important to note, however, that tax loopholes have been created in the 
last 15 years that release firms from the full payment of all payroll taxes. Currently, depending on the annual 
turnover of the company and the business sector in which it operates, much of the social charges can be replaced 
by a single payment, of a lower amount, which is based on the firm´s presumed profits. 
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workers, but the more precarious the organization, higher the probability of being so.  The latter are 
generally informal, whilst the fábricas tend to be registered and formally organized.
11  
Table II.2.1.  Count/Percentage of workers in textile and garment industry by employment type  
(and micro business) and home-based work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 
Large and 
Medium 
Companies 
Employee 833,632 901,138 899,957 927,497 992,379 966,894 1,034,738 
27.7% 27.3% 27.0% 28.5% 28.1% 28.1% 39.3% 
Employer 93,036 97,166 117,221 94,428 142,593 106,607 65,964 
3.1% 2.9% 3.5% 2.9% 4.0% 3.1% 2.5% 
Micro 
Business* 
Self-
employed 
1,013,766 1,133,202 1,132,720 1,082,075 1,158,072 1,161,155 786,981 
33.7% 34.3% 34.0% 33.3% 32.8% 33.8% 29.9% 
Employer 62,657 53,987 66,727 60,499 90,947 69,103 41,047 
2.1% 1.6% 2.0% 1.9% 2.6% 2.0% 1.6% 
Home-
based work 
Male 43,894 53,106 59,484 61,752 68,529 63,809 46,812 
1.5% 1.6% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 
Female 961,121 1,062,743 1,058,526 1,022,684 1,081,202 1,070,467 656,641 
32.0% 32.2% 31.7% 31.5% 30.6% 31.1% 24.9% 
Total 3,008,106 3,301,342 3,334,635 3,248,935 3,533,722 3,438,035 2,632,183 
* Fewer than six employees 
Source:  Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS) — Anuário estatístico (MTE) 
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Women do the great majority of home-based work.  They combine working at home for pay with 
household chores.  These are key elements for the reproduction of the labor force.  Women’s conditions 
in most sectors are customarily worse than men’s, a fact that creates a link between sexual division of 
work, domestic work and home-based work. 
 
Unions fought to curb home-based work because of its associated bad working conditions, occupational 
diseases, and long work hours; unions also saw the prevalence of home-based work as associated with a 
decrease in job openings in factories.  Other elements that make home-based work problematic are the 
lack of control over working hours and lack of visibility:  it is very difficult to regulate.  In the 1970’s, this 
type of work grew significantly in Brazil, because it is a very efficient way to reduce costs via outsourcing 
(but again, the most recent data from the textile and apparel sector suggest that it is once more 
retreating in the last few years).  This type of work is usually paid by the piece (in the case of the textile 
and garment industry).  It is interesting to notice that the progress of technology increased the capacity 
to incorporate home-based work, stimulating growth of this type of informal work. 
 
2.1. A closer look at home-based labor in the garment industry:  São Paulo and the Caruaru Cluster  
 
Table II.2.2 profiles Brazil’s ten largest apparel clusters, including the São Paulo and Caruaru clusters we 
visited in our fieldwork, which we have highlighted with bold type.  A complete table of Brazilian 
garment clusters appears in the Appendix. 
 
Table II.2.2.  Brazil’s ten largest apparel clusters by employment 
 State Cluster City or cities  Employees, 
registered 
firms 
Registered 
firms 
1 São Paulo Polos de 
Confecções 
do Brás e 
Bom Retiro 
São Paulo 163,700 19,188 
2 Santa 
Catarina 
 
Blumenau Brotuverá, Brusque, 
Camboriú, Doutor Pedrinho, 
Garpar, Guabiruba, Ibirama, 
Ilhota, Indaial, Itajaí, 
Ituporanga, Lontras, Luiz 
Alves, Navegantes, 
Pomerode, Rio dos Cedros, 
Rio do Sul, Rodeio, Timbó, 
Agrolândia, Apiúna, Ascurra, 
Balneário Camboriú, 
Benedito Novo, Blumenau 
148,079 8,487 
3 Ceará 
 
Polo de Moda 
do Ceará 
Fortaleza 67,532 4,896 
4 Minas Gerais 
 
Juiz de Fora / 
São João 
Nepomuceno 
Astolfo Dutra, Bicas, 
Cataguases, Descoberto, 
Guarani, Guarará, Juiz de 
Fora, Mar de Espanha, 
Maripá de Minas, Rio Novo, 
27,202 1,824 
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Rio Pomba, Rochedo de 
Minas, São João 
Nepomuceno 
5 Pernambuco Polo de 
Confecções 
do Agreste 
Agrestina, Belo Jardim, Brejo 
da Madre de Deus, Caruaru, 
Cupira, Gravatá, Passira, 
Pesqueira, Riacho das Almas, 
Santa Cruz do Capibaribe, 
Surubim, Taquaritinga do 
Norte, Toritama, Vertentes 
24,449 3,458 
6 Goías 
 
Goiânia Goiânia 24,166 3,700 
7 São Paulo 
 
Americana Americana 23,624 1,102 
8 Bahia Moda do 
Estado da 
Bahia 
Feira de Santana, Amélia 
Rodrigues, Coração de Maria, 
Conceição da Feira, Santo 
Estevão, São Gonçalo dos 
Campos, Conceição do Coité, 
Santa Luz, Serrinha, 
Tanquinho, Santo Antonio de 
Jesus e Jequié 
23,305 946 
9 Mato Grosso 
do Sul 
 
Campo 
Grande 
Aparecida do Taboado, 
Carapó, Campo Grande, 
Dourados, Glória de 
Dourados, Naviraí, Nova 
Andradina, Paranaíba, Ponta 
Porã, Sidrolândia, Três Lagoas 
21,474 508 
10 Rio de 
Janeiro 
Nova Friburgo Cantagalo, Cordeiro, Duas 
Barras, BomJardim, Macuco e 
Nova Friburgo 
20,540 1,746 
Source:  (SEBRAE Pernambuco 2013) 
 
Data in Table II.2.2 refer to registered establishments, but, by means of the National Household Sample 
Survey (PNAD), we can get a glimpse of the relevance of home-based workers in the two garment 
concentrations where the fieldwork was conducted. 
 
Table II.2.3 shows the total number of workers and home-based workers in the textile and garment 
industries in the states of Pernambuco (where the Caruaru Cluster is located; data are not available for 
the cluster itself) and São Paulo.  Although the absolute number of workers in São Paulo is higher during 
the 2004-2011 period, Pernambuco shows faster growth in the employed population when 2011 is 
compared with 2004, both in total workers (87% as opposed to 3%) and in home-based workers (52% as 
opposed to -15%). 
 
Table II.2.4 shows the proportion of home-based workers in the total of textile and garment workers. 
Both states showed a quite similar decrease in the number of home-based workers in this sector 
(approximately 19% when comparing 2011 with 2004).  Next, we locate conditions in the garment 
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industry in these two states within the context of national-level Brazilian labor regulation, labor relations, 
and economic and labor policy. 
 
Table II.2.3.  Textile and garment workers by state and place of work 
Year 
Pernambuco São Paulo 
Total 
Home-based 
workers Total 
Home-based 
workers 
2004 79,525 33,985 547,292 161,766 
2005 89,953 38,674 628,566 222,924 
2006 85,860 31,574 663,086 215,552 
2007 90,415 35,240 617,763 201,272 
2008 101,121 41,278 686,360 227,149 
2009 84,243 27,651 644,543 221,114 
2011 148,979 51,610 566,261 136,862 
Source:  National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) 2004-2011 
 
Table II.2.4.  Home-based workers as a percentage of all garment and textile workers by state 
Year Pernambuco São Paulo 
2004 43% 30% 
2005 43% 35% 
2006 37% 33% 
2007 39% 33% 
2008 41% 33% 
2009 33% 34% 
2011 34% 24% 
Source:  National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) 2004-2011 
 
 
3. Monitoring and enforcement of labor standards:  Existing systems and the role of worker 
organizations in Brazil 
 
This section contains a general description of the legal and practical context in which workers’ 
organizations act.  We begin with a general description of labor law and the role of labor inspection, as 
well as the prevailing rates of unionization. Then we proceed to examine several national level initiatives 
for organizing informal workers. In the final subsections, the case studies of the Caruaru Cluster and São 
Paulo are presented. 
 
3.1. Overview of government inspection and union organization 
 
3.1.1. Brazilian labor law and the labor inspection system 
Among the emerging countries, labor regulation in Brazil stands out in terms of its reach (it has a single 
national code) and of the mechanisms to supervise and enforce compliance with the law.  Since 1943 a 
national labor law—Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas (CLT)—governs labor and capital relations for 
almost all waged Brazilian workers, except domestic service and civil service workers.  Since 1939, Brazil 
has had a Labor Court, a branch of the judiciary with the task of ensuring compliance with labor rights in 
the country, helping to arbitrate labor law disputes, and enforcing labor law in registered enterprises.  
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The garment sector companies have to comply with the CLT, and are under this Court’s jurisdiction. 
Under the CLT, companies that outsource part of their activities to other companies share responsibility 
for the obligations of labor rights of the workers in subcontracted firms.  This means that even 
contractors must comply with labor legislation verbatim, with enforcement in practice primarily through 
larger firms’ pressure on smaller suppliers to ensure compliance. 
 
Due to the extensive character of the Brazilian legislation and the intrinsic difficulty of supervising all 
firms and diversity of work activities, enforcement of labor laws and regulations is primarily driven by 
complaints that are forwarded to the relevant bodies.  Both the Regional Labor Inspection (directly 
subordinate to the Ministry of Labor), and the Public Labor Ministry (the body whose duty is to 
investigate and report possible breaches of legislation) act promptly on potential offenders, fining and 
referring contentious cases to the labor courts (Maciel 2010). Moreover, according to the Brazilian law, 
any worker can directly access the Labor Court to claim his/her labor rights, both in the case of a current 
employment relationship, as well as in the case of any that has occurred in the last five years.  Over 90% 
of complaints that end up in the Labor Courts have decisions favorable to the worker (a consequence in 
part of the Principle of Protection that guides labor standards in Brazil).  The demonstration effect of 
labor legislation enforcement has advanced in recent years, particularly due to the maturing of the 
institutions that were created or reinforced in the 1988 Constitution.  Furthermore, the environment of 
renewed economic growth (since 2004) and gradual reduction of surplus labor appears to be 
contributing to a reduction of precarious work in the country.  
 
Thus, in spite of the fact that Brazil has fewer than 3 labor law inspectors per 100,000 workers, a level 
that is both low in absolute terms and relative to its Latin American neighbors (Schrank and Piore 2007), 
the inspection process has been able to target an average of a third of the total number of workers in 
Brazil (MTE 2013). The Workers’ Party administrations of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, in power 
from 2003 to currently, have added resources to labor inspection, although part of the added resources 
has been used to target the worst labor abuses, notably forced labor and child labor (ILO 2010).  In the 
garment sector in particular, literature to be cited below points to some successful use of inspections to 
bring subcontracted and even home-based workers jobs back into formality and compliance with basic 
Brazilian labor laws in São Paulo state (see for example Pires 2008 and Cardoso and Lage 2005). 
 
One recent regulatory innovation is the creation of the Microenterprise Individual Entrepreneur (MEI) 
category of business.  MEI is a new legal status, created in 2009 in Brazil, that allows any independent 
contractor (a house painter, cleaner, gardener, independent publisher of books, etc.) to be registered as 
a regular business.  In return for an individually determined monthly contribution of up to US$ 18 that 
replaces all other taxes or charges, the entrepreneur gains access to social security, including the right to 
retirement, and may also hire a single employee engaged in the same activity. Since 2009 about 3 
million MEI´s have been created in Brazil.  Expansion of MEIs has the potential to allow many of the self-
employed to register as businesses, which increases the odds that inspection and enforcement agencies 
will be aware of their existence. 
 
3.1.1. Organization of workers in the apparel sector 
The organization of the apparel industry, which was discussed above, imposes a series of restrictions on 
worker organization or access to social protection schemes (in particular, labor rights and pension 
programs).  Even under these conditions, unionization rates in these sectors are not far from the overall 
rates. Unions, organized in several large, competing union federations, put in a great effort to increase 
their membership, but as outsourcing is a common strategy in the production chain even of large 
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apparel firms, two issues arise.  The first is the difficulty of organizing (or even detecting) home-based 
workers.  The second is how to devise effective schemes of social protection for the self-employed.  
 
In spite of the lack of a nation-wide inventory of efforts to organize or formalize apparel workers, the 
following group of examples shows the diversity in existing strategies.  
 
Table II.3.1.  Unionized workers as percentage of total employment in the sector, Brazil 2004 to 2011 
  2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2011 
Textile and garment 13,49 14,94 15,27 13,12 12,16 12,97 
All sectors 17,97 18,36 18,59 18,16 17,75 17,16 
Total count in 
textile and garment 2.4m  2.6m  2.6m  2.8m  2.7m  2.3m  
Total employment 84.4m  86.9m  88.7m  92.4m  92.8m  93.5m  
Source:  National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) 2004-2011 
 
3.2. New national level initiatives 
 
3.2.1. Worker cooperatives and the role of UNISOL  
Worker cooperatives in Brazil were inspired by the ideals of collectivism or the “solidarity economy,” 
and are very common nowadays in the country.  In these coops, the employees themselves or are 
owners of the means of production, so the entire surplus is divided equally among workers.  Many 
municipalities have responded positively to the emergence of local cooperatives and offered support by 
creating Coop Incubators—an advisory and organizing group of people—whose purpose is to organize 
groups of workers and raise funds to provide the productive infrastructure for cooperatives.  The 
emergence of numerous cooperatives in Brazil, especially after the 1990s, is driven by worker pursuit of 
alternative employment and income generation against a backdrop of crisis experienced by the country 
as a result of liberalizing policies (Lima 2002).  Because of their bottom-up nature, cooperatives are 
applicable to workers in subcontracting firms and even groups of home-based workers, without regard 
to whether labor laws or unions reach these workers. 
 
The Federal government has also established entities to support cooperatives.  The first Lula 
government (2003-2007) instituted National Secretariat of Solidarity Economy (SENAES), under the 
Ministry of Labor and Employment, based on the perception that cooperatives constitute a positive way 
of generating economic and social progress (Singer 2004).  However, a law taking effect early in 2011 
eliminated SENAES as a separate agency, relocating its functions to a new Secretariat of Micro and Small 
Business.  The Network of Alternative and Solidarity Economy Networks (REAS) denounced the 
reorganization as signaling a reduction of government support for solidarity economy programs 
(including cooperatives) (REAS 2011) but it is early to draw definitive conclusions about the outcomes of 
the change. 
 
The UNISOL federation of cooperatives, founded in March 2000 in São Paulo State, was initiated by 
cooperatives created with the institutional support of the United Steelworkers of Sorocaba and Santo 
17 
 
André, São Bernardo do Campo and São Caetano (ABC), and the ABC3 Chemical Workers Union, among 
others—all unions affiliated with the Unified Workers Central union federation (CUT).  After several 
years of growth in São Paulo state, the UNISOL Cooperatives and unions decided in 2004 to expand 
UNISOL into a nationwide federation of social enterprises and cooperatives, to carry out a project of 
economic and social inclusion, democratization in workplaces, equity and income sharing (UNISOL 2013 
and ND).  Thus, UNISOL now promotes the formation of cooperatives at the national level, making those 
cooperatives part of the Social Economy Networks supported by SENAES and its successor agency. 
 
Currently 700 cooperatives with 50,000 cooperative members are affiliated to UNISOL, including Justa 
Trama, a successful example of a group that includes the entire productive chain of apparel, from the 
production of cotton to the final product.4 
 
In 2000, the national-level CUT also launched an overlapping initiative, the Solidarity Development 
Agency (ADS-CUT) to carry out campaigns to organize and promote local development of coops and 
more broadly worker-controlled aspects of the solidarity economy in the various regions of the country 
(UNISOL 2013). 
 
3.2.2. National Labor Forum 
By initiative of the Lula government, a National Labor Forum was created in 2003.  The Forum created 
standard tripartite labor-business-government working groups in seven of eight sectors (Almeida 2007).  
They organized an eighth working group to address the informal economy, and departed from the 
standard tripartite structure to include associations of subcontractors and varied worker and small 
producer organizations including cooperatives, associations, and movements as well as trade unions.  
Though the Forum did not directly lead to reforms, participants from informal worker groups stated that 
simply being recognized as legitimate worker organizations was tremendously important, as this allowed 
more visibility to the workers’ organizing efforts (Sanchez 2012).   
 
3.2.3. DIEESE 
The Inter-Union Department of Economic and Social Studies (DIEESE) is an organization established in 
1963 by all the union federations in Brazil, as a research and training center to advance the unions' 
bargaining processes and capabilities in defining strategies to enhance workers' labor conditions. 
 
In 2009, DIEESE started a major project named “Reducing Informality through Social Dialogue.” The 
project began as an effort to bring together local actors and government agencies, in order to protect 
informal workers, or workers with no access to social protection and without labor rights.  Under the 
notion of Social Dialogue, this project seeks to articulate a system of networks of local and national 
actors so as to discuss the problems of the workers involved in the specific activities selected, and to 
find solutions to those problems, with special emphasis on social protection issues.  The long-term goal 
is to expand the process to include regional (Latin American) actors also. 
 
The general project started with five local projects, designed to test a two-part intervention model.  First, 
the mobilization of social actors, through awareness-raising visits in selected locations, followed by 
                                                        
3 ABC is the acronym of a set of major municipalities that surround São Paulo city:  Santo André, São Bernardo do 
Campo and São Caetano. It is a region where the manufacturing activities flourished in the 1950s and currently is 
still an area where many big firms, mainly in the metallurgical and auto parts sectors, are located. 
4  Please see http://www.unisolbrasil.org.br/2011/09/27/trama-de-algodao/.  
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workshops to identify their demands and issues and to develop an Action Plan for social intervention 
and monitoring. 
 
The initial projects were: 
 
• Street vendors in Porto Alegre, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul; 
• Construction workers in Curitiba, Paraná; 
• Apparel in Pernambuco (Caruaru; our fieldwork explored this initiative and we discuss it in some 
depth below); 
• Agribusiness Sector in Rural Morrinhos, Goiania; 
• Family Farming in Rural Sector at Ituporanga, Santa Catarina 
 
These pilot projects were selected because they have a high incidence of informality, capacity for social 
mobilization and conflict resolution, as well as already existing inter-institutional cooperation.  In Section 
3.4, we present the apparel sector project in Pernambuco and the results of our field work on this 
initiative in one cluster, Caruaru. 
 
3.3. São Paulo case 
 
Our first regional case of the textile and apparel sector is São Paulo State.  This state is Brazil’s industrial 
heartland, and São Paulo State and in particular the metropolitan area of the city of São Paulo have a 
strong presence in national garment production.  This is the result of a long historical process whereby 
the City of São Paulo became a production center for the whole country.  As Da Silva (2008) shows, in 
the City of São Paulo apparel production is concentrated in certain areas of the old downtown, where 
garment activities have evolved from minor family workshops and small factories to a complex set of 
large firms, intermediaries, family workshops and home based work.  This case encompasses both 
relevant literature and field research.  Due to time and budget constraints, we decided to restrict our 
fieldwork in São Paulo to a very long exchange with the leadership of the CNTV, Conferação Nacional 
dos Trabalhadores do Vestuário, a major national-level textile, garment and shoe production union 
federation.  The CNTV brings together more than 22 unions.  In this São Paulo case narrative, we first 
characterize sectoral conditions in the region, then review two important cases from the literature in 
which unions have successfully organized home-based workers, and close with findings from fieldwork. 
 
Subcontracting and home-based work have been present in São Paulo City and State since its inception, 
but recent trends have intensified those patterns.  Since the eighties, a two-tier complex of firms and 
workers has characterized apparel in São Paulo.  A profitable group of fashion firms with outlets in 
shopping malls or with brand name stores coexists with a mass market of standardized products.  There 
is a striking technological and organizational divide between the two subsectors, as the high priced 
clothes are designed according to international fashion patterns, using the best available technologies 
that the other, low cost, sector is lacking.  Nevertheless, they have in common an outsourcing process 
that very often ends in unregistered firms or in the homes of women working under precarious 
conditions.  In addition, garment industries use illegal migrants as to minimize labor costs (Centro 
Gaspar García 2012).  Da Silva (2008) likewise emphasizes that the garment industry in São Paulo city 
restructured in the 1990s, increasing subcontracting and leading to an increase in small workshops and 
home-based work. 
 
Subcontractors also recruit undocumented Bolivian migrants to fill the jobs, under harsh labor 
conditions (Centro Gaspar Garcia de Dereitos Humanos 2013).  One dramatic description of this process 
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appears in an interview published as an appendix to Sanchez’s (2012) dissertation.  A consultant to 
Brazil’s Labor Inspection Department commented on the situation of home-based workers in apparel 
(pp.175-77).  He described women doing home-based work in São Paulo, attaching labels to clothes for 
large department stores (through chains of subcontractors—chains so long that “at the end of the day, 
nobody knows where the work is being done, or at least that’s what they pretend”).  Undocumented 
migrant women from Bolivia were working in conditions he labeled “urban slavery,” but he added, “they 
put up with this because they don’t want to return to Bolivia,” suggesting that the “slavery” is more 
rhetorical than literal. Even so, Illes et al. (2008) similarly report that in São Paulo, undocumented 
migrant women from Bolivia have been found working in conditions that can be labeled as forced labor, 
as they work long hours, have low pay and no social protection, and sometimes live in the same 
premises where they work and have restrictions on leaving their jobs. 
 
3.3.1. Organizing and registering home-based workers:  Ibitinga Needle Workers Union 
The Ibitinga Needle Workers Union emerged in 1988 from a previous organization founded one year 
earlier to help mostly female workers improve labor conditions and to register them at the Ministry of 
Labor in order to get their labor cards (Leite 2009).  In her study of the formation of the INWU, Leite 
emphasizes the importance of workers organizations in decreasing home-based work and bringing 
businesses into compliance with the laws, a process that lies at the roots of the Ibitinga union’s vigorous 
growth in recent years. 
 
A very important thing that stands out in the case of Ibitinga is that the workers themselves initiated the 
organization of the union, although later on they had the support of other unions and federations. Over 
a period of years, the union consistently conducted consciousness-raising of home-based workers 
themselves and the general public about the problems of home-based work and the status of home-
based workers, taking advantage of every possible public forum.  At the same time, they pressed 
employers for union recognition and better conditions, and pressed government officials to recognize 
them as workers, certify the union, assist in getting a union contract, and carry out inspections.  In 2001, 
by mobilizing support from the Labor Courts, the union signed a collective bargaining agreement with 
local employers that ensured even home-based workers and those in outsourcing firms would be 
granted labor cards, and gave the union the right to oversee conditions in all these workplaces.  Even 
after winning the contract, they worked with local inspectors and the national Ministry of Labor to 
ensure adequate inspections and enforcement of the contract.  Thus, the Ibitinga union is an example of 
how workers organizing themselves were able to demand labor rights, for those working in firms as well 
as for those home-based workers who took part in the same production process, as suppliers for those 
firms (Leite 2009). 
 
3.3.2. Monitoring and uncovering labor rights abuses:  Seamstresses’ union of São Paulo and Osasco 
Leite (2004) discusses the evolution and activities of the Seamstresses’ Union of São Paulo and Osasco.5 
This union was established in the 1940s and has since been active in the organization of seamstresses in 
São Paulo City and Osasco (a neighboring city). They actively organize home-based workers.  During 
2012, through their local networks they helped to identify and denounce two firms (Zara and Gregory, 
the latter better known in Latin America than in the US) that used outsourced production from units 
where Bolivian and Peruvian workers labored under extremely harsh conditions. As their journal 
Vestuario reports in the January 2013 issue:   
                                                         
5 For further information, see http://www.costureirassp.org.br/index.asp.  
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“…We helped to discover work-shops that provided services to the internationally known Zara 
brand. The employees from Bolivia and Peru were under a scheme where they had to work up to 
16 hours a day, with limited individual freedom and workshops outside basic safety standards. In 
addition, the salary paid was just 1 US dollar per piece sewn.” 
 
“Our work continued this time involving another renowned designer. The Group to Combat 
Forced Labor, from the Regional Superintendent of Labor and Employment of São Paulo 
(SRTE/SP) inspected and found serious violations of the rights of the employees in four 
workshops that provided services for the of women’s clothing brand Gregory. The team freed 23 
Bolivian workers who worked under precarious conditions, including debt bondage, excessive 
work-days, poor safety standards and even evidence of human trafficking. The owners of those 
workshops were charged with ethnic discrimination against indigenous Quechua and Aymara 
workers, because according to the evidence, they were more mistreated than other workers. The 
Gregory firm may be included in the “dirty list” of slave labor, a register maintained by the 
Federal Government which gathers companies caught using forced labor. Those responsible may 
also be subject to a criminal inquiry” (Vestuario 2013, 18). 
 
3.3.3. São Paulo State as a whole:  An apparel union perspective 
In May 2013 we conducted a long interview with Francisca Trajano, president of the National 
Confederation of Apparel Workers (CNTV, as noted an association of 22 unions) on the challenges faced 
by CNTV in the organization and protection of workers in the garment sector in São Paulo.  Trajano 
stressed two major developments in the sector, the huge inflow of garments imported from Asia and 
the current economic situation in Brazil. 
 
On the first issue, she stressed the need for a trade protection policy to guard the sector against price 
manipulation and uncontrolled importation of cheap, low quality products.  Last year, the Finance 
Ministry set up tariffs against certain garment products, because of evidence of price manipulation by 
exporters to Brazil.  Competition with imports has forced a segment of firms to upgrade their processes, 
a situation that has led to growing concentration in the garment production market.  
 
Second, as the economy grew steadily from 2003 up to 2008, there was a sustained growth of minimum 
wage, increases in average wages, and reduced poverty.  Unemployment fell also, as new job 
opportunities grew (Baltar et al. 2010).  Because of an increase in job opportunities and income, many 
families exited poverty, and so the need for a job, no matter how precarious, has been reduced for 
many women. 
 
Over the same period, worker organizations along with labor inspectors in São Paulo have been able to 
reduce some of the worst abuses in the garment workshops.  Firms that use forced labor, or do not 
abide by labor laws, if they are discovered, must pay heavy fines.  This also applies to subcontracted 
labor, as Brazilian labor laws make the main firms co-responsible for labor law violations in the 
subcontracted units. 
 
In particular, this law has been used to protect home-based workers who go to the CNTV to ask for 
counseling.  The confederation president is at the same time the president of the Seamstresses’ Union 
of São Paulo and Santo Andre, and so has participated in information campaigns to inform the home-
based workers of their labor rights.  Nonetheless, Trajano acknowledged how difficult is to fight against 
the exploitation of household work in the sector. 
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3.3.4. Closing thoughts on São Paulo State 
The São Paulo case points to five strategies for improving subcontracted and home-based jobs in the 
state’s textile and apparel sector.  The first two are broad national policy directions.  A first option is 
trade protection of the sector against dumping or “social dumping” in which low import prices are based 
on production under conditions where core labor standards are not in force.  Such protection does little 
to promote better jobs in the long run, but it blunts the incentive to slash labor costs, and provides 
space for innovation and upgrading.  Second, national policies that raise the labor standards “floor,” 
such as minimum wage increases and increases in income support alternatives for the poor such as the 
Bolsa Familia, can reduce the influx of desperate job-seekers and downward pressure on wages and 
conditions. The Ibitinga example points to a third strategy, worker self-organization that combines 
education of home-based workers, pressure on government officials to intervene, and direct negotiation 
with employers.  The Seamstresses’ Union of São Paulo and Osasco used a fourth strategy:  targeting 
visible brands at the top of the supply chain with government inspections, financial penalties, and bad 
publicity in order to reduce their reliance on highly precarious home-based workers in the supply chain.  
The CNTV union has used a more comprehensive strategy combining aspects of the previous two:  
allying with government agencies and inspectors to educate and reach out to home-based workers, 
including migrants from other countries, to convince them to stand up for their rights, affiliate with the 
union, and if necessary make complaints to labor inspectors. 
 
These last three approaches to ameliorating conditions in home-based and subcontracted work depend 
crucially on the role of worker organizations—self-organized informal workers, unions that seek to 
organize informal workers, and state- and national-level unions that advocate for and attempt to 
represent informal workers.  For that matter, the first two national policy shifts have resulted in part 
from the political clout of the national union federations, notably the CUT, with its close ties to the 
Workers Party that has controlled the presidency since 2003. 
 
3.4. The Caruaru Cluster 
 
The Caruaru Cluster of the clothing and textile industry in Pernambuco state is of interest precisely 
because it offers an instructive contrast with São Paulo.  Caruaru is a rural area where the textile and 
apparel sector is for the most part not linked via supply chains to major brands and retailers, but instead 
dominated by family workshops serving a regional market.  A larger part of the sector is characterized by 
home-based work and precarious working conditions.  In this case study, we profile the Caruaru Cluster 
and describe an important initiative by the Inter-Union Department of Economic and Social Studies 
(DIEESE), a research and technical assistance body, to upgrade and formalize apparel and textile jobs in 
the cluster.  The fieldwork builds on meetings with eight organizations (including unions, government 
officials, a local chamber of commerce, and DIEESE itself) and eight in-depth interviews with key 
individuals in the region (details can be found in the Brazil Methodological Appendix at the end of the 
report.) 
 
The decision to sample a garment cluster in rural Pernambuco (made up of the municipalities of the 
Caruaru region:  Caruaru, Bezerros, Gravatá, Santa Cruz and the Capibaribe Toritama) is because of its 
peculiar dynamic economic development.  It differs from other garment clusters existing in Brazil 
because of a high degree of informality and precariousness of labor relations and the predominance of 
the family production units, along with some small and medium enterprises that make up the base of 
the productive structure.  Veras (2011) uses the notion of social economy to frame a chapter describing 
and examining this cluster, which has also been called Polo de Confecções do Agreste Pernambucano.  
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The state –much like the whole Northeast of Brazil – is remarkably poor and its inland areas have a great 
problem with the dry season. Before the cluster6 emerged, the region was profoundly poor. 
 
To understand the particularities of the case in question we need to go back to some of its historical 
determinants. 
 
Figure II.4.1.  Map of the state of Pernambuco, showing the location of Caruaru 
 
 
3.1.1. Historical context 
The production of textile products began in the 1950’s, when locals of Santa Cruz do Capibaribe started 
to take fragments scraps of fabric and produce low quality clothes for sale at “fairs,” regional outdoor 
markets.  Due to their low quality, these fairs became known as “Feira de Sulanca7.”  The initial 
production was all home-based, as the families had sewing machines and could do this to complement 
their agricultural work.  Eventually every member of the family started to work within home-based 
textile production, since offered greater income than other activities.  Due to the aridity of the region, 
agriculture (mainly cotton production) is very difficult, and had shrunk in the 1940’s. 
 
This initial rise in low value added production was followed by the expansion of production within Santa 
Cruz and beyond to other cities such as Caruaru and Toritama.  Veras (2011) argues that, because of the 
marginality of the city where it started, its development cannot be associated with any governmental or 
external initiatives.  The first initiative by a national bank to finance the acquisition of industrial low-                                                        
6 It is not completely appropriate to call it an industrial cluster, but it seems the most apt term to describe what 
the region has become:  a full employment, specialized production region. 
7 Sulanca:  inferior quality and low price. 
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rotation machinery took place only in 1960.  Rather than external forces, the reasons for the Cluster´s 
development arise from the need to survive, the persistence, and even stubbornness of the people.  But 
what other choices were there for them?  This process led to the possibility for residents to stay in the 
region (not migrate south or east) and even to return from other places. 
 
Therefore, despite the great specialization that occurred in the region, its productive structure is still 
very heterogeneous.  The majority of entrepreneurs still rely on their tacit knowledge and intuition 
rather than on modern techniques of administration and business.  Furthermore, the productivity of the 
labor is low, and likewise capital-intensity, even in the fábricas.  Hence, the normal workday of the 
workers is quite long.  So it becomes very evident that, although the region has developed significantly, 
many social problems persist, even at full employment levels. 
 
The region grew so significantly over the second half of the 20th century that the cities were absorbing 
all the labor coming from a rural exodus motivated by both the hard conditions of the land and the 
attractive opportunities in the cities.  The growth has created conditions for significant capital 
accumulation, and that is what is interesting about the Polo in the present moment:  one part of its 
enterprises is becoming capitalist8 and the other part remains as primitive as it was 30 years ago.  There 
has not been any movement to organize a proper cluster, for what remains intrinsic to the region’s 
entrepreneurs seems to be the capacity for autonomous growth.  Therefore, even when the 
government provides support, via SEBRAE (Brazilian Support Services for Entrepreneurs), this service is 
not greatly welcomed by the owners of the family enterprises. 
 
A very interesting evolution process is currently observed, as household work and family-owned firms 
interact with larger firms.  Labor conditions have not, as some theories have proposed, changed 
significantly with these developments:  there has not been a general movement towards formality.  
What will emerge from the interaction between the two sectors in the region is still unclear. 
 
The Caruaru Cluster is located in a transition area between the Zona da Mata (the wetter coastal zone) 
and the rugged semi-arid zone of Northeast Brazil.  The municipality of Caruaru is rightfully known as the 
“capital of the Cerrado” or “gateway of the Sertão” (the name used by the local dwellers to designate 
the semi-arid region). 
 
Since the sugar mills (production units similar to southern U.S. plantations) settled between the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the Zona da Mata, poor whites and mestizos, who found no 
place in the mills (whose workforce consisted mainly of black slaves), moved inland, towards the semi-
arid area, developing subsistence activities, notably rising cattle and goats. 
 
Caruaru provided a gateway into the Sertão backcountry.  It grew around trade activities, becoming sort 
of a warehouse where inland settlers traded livestock products (beef jerky, leather, milk products) for 
other food products and manufactured goods coming from Zona da Mata and the port city of Recife 
(capital of the state).  Given this economic configuration, the Caruaru Fair, the largest outdoor market of 
Brazil, operating once a week, arose in the city´s center.  The Fair attracted an inflow of thousands of 
people interested in buying locally produced goods.  Their potential demand stimulated people at 
Caruaru and surrounding towns to produce goods for sale at the Fair.  Thus, the Fair was transformed 
from a low-cost-low-quality one to a city full of businesses, even major retailers and national suppliers.                                                         
8 In the Marxist perspective:  an enterprise that seeks only to accumulate more capital, expand its accumulation via 
the expansion of its activity, concentration and centralization of capital. 
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In spite of this transformation, there are still a great number of vendors in fairs, mainly informal, outside 
the center (Veras 2011). 
 
Today, about 500,000 people live in cities that make up the cluster and most directly or indirectly derive 
their income from apparel production.  Despite the undeniable dynamism that garment activities 
brought to the Caruaru cluster, the sector’s productive structure is quite fragile.  This results from the 
fact that its main comparative advantage over other clusters around the country is low production cost 
due to abundant low-wage labor.  This is driven in part by low levels of capital, geographic isolation and 
few alternative economic opportunities, and bolstered by the prevalence of extremely precarious labor 
relations.  For example, in the municipality of Toritama, where most of the jeans are made, it is 
estimated that 90% of workers are informal, and most work within their own homes with discarded 
equipment rented out by the same individuals who purchase the jeans.   
 
According to a SEBRAE report (SEBRAE Pernambuco 2013), in the Caruaru Cluster, on average, 80% of 
the production units are informal –i.e., not registered- while 20% are formal.  Across municipalities, the 
share of informal productions varies from 67% to 89% of total units.  Outside of the two extremes, the 
results for the other municipalities are all very close to the overall average.  The information used to 
classify a unit as formal or informal was registration in the CNPJ, the National Register of Legal Entities of 
the Finance Ministry.  The fact that a small firm has a CNPJ card does not mean necessarily that it uses 
registered workers in its production process.  As a result, the numbers of non-registered workers have 
to be estimated by indirect means. 
 
The use of family labor is one of a number of factors that explain the persistence and growth of informal 
production in the Garment Cluster in Pernambuco.  Production often involves many members of the 
family, from children to the elderly, without any social security coverage or institutional support. 
Moreover, according to our interviews, since the prevalent form of compensation in garment activities is 
payment by piece, daily working hours often exceed twelve or even fourteen hours.  
 
The lack of registration and the absence of a minimum set of social protection rights are also among key 
issues.  As the SEBRAE (2013) report states:  “To date, the Cluster has lived and expanded largely 
because businesses pay few taxes and respect even fewer rights and labor obligations. This situation has 
endured for 30 or 40 years, but in the long run it is unsustainable.”   
 
This unsustainability is universally recognized in the region.  In response, the Inter-Union Department of 
Statistics and Economic and Social Studies  (DIEESE, a multi-federation think tank and technical 
assistance organization) in partnership with the worker organization Nova Central,9 a new union 
federation founded in 2005 independent of the CUT and Força Sindical, the two largest and most 
established federations) led an effort to contribute to modernizing the region and improving social 
dialogue.  As the region goes through a modernization process, family units will become unable to 
compete with middle-size and large firms.  Those firms are now under closer supervision of state and 
federal agencies (the taxation and labor protection agencies).  As a result, the use of unprotected labor 
will become more and more difficult to sustain.  The modernization process will also bring to fore the 
need for a higher-skilled labor force.  As it stands now, low educational levels as well as the general low 
skills of workers will be a hindrance for new firms.   
 
3.1.2. DIEESE and Nova Central:  Reducing informality through social dialogue                                                         
9 Please see http://www.ncst.org.br/. 
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Pilot project development 
Since March 2010, DIEESE has been conducting a series of meetings with key actors in the Garment 
cluster of the Caruaru region.  The goal is to deepen dialogue on the importance of formalization as a 
way to reduce the precariousness of working conditions found in the region.  Among the actors and 
segments that have participated in this process are:  labor unions and the employers, the executive 
branch of the three levels of government (federal, state and local), universities, associations, networks, 
and technical education institutions.  These actors were selected to be representative of all the social 
forces acting in the region, through an initial research process. 
 
An initial workshop was held in Caruaru, Pernambuco in March 2010 (DIEESE 2010).  In this DIEESE-
coordinated workshop, participants discussed a number of key issues identified by each major group of 
actors:  employers, government and workers.  The topics chosen by each express the most important 
problems faced by them in apparel production.  For the employers, the most pressing problem was the 
lack of trained workers, including sewing machine operators and others.  For the government officials, 
there was a need for technical support in the area of administration and management, as family-owned 
firms need training in management.  The government officials also raised the issue of how to register 
workers, stressing the need for an awareness program about the need for workers and employees to be 
registered.  The third issue raised was that of developing policies to support and extend the life of the 
economic units to foster their growth and sustainability.  Examples include public policies for subsidized 
credit with long-term payment schedules and provision of infrastructure to the area (energy, water, etc.).  
The workers stressed the need for an awareness campaign on the value of becoming registered workers 
(with a labor card).  Another point discussed was the need to create partnerships between the Ministry 
of Labor, the National Institute of Social Security, local government, and professional associations. 
Worker representatives also demanded the training of workers in the clothing sector, a process they 
believe has to be accompanied by a rise in the average schooling level. 
 
The points identified by the groups indicate the possibility of convergence between the proposals and 
suggest the feasibility of a common agenda.  Currently, all those proposals continue to be discussed, 
with the goal of producing a common project. 
 
After the first meetings, DIEESE listed a set of objectives that were pointed out by several participants as 
relevant for achieving the project´s general goals.  Among the main ones are: 
 
• Discussing fair trade policies; 
• Seeking social and environmental responsibility; 
• Working on a formality culture; 
• Raising awareness of the importance of social security; 
• Creating a seal of quality; 
• Developing educational techniques to train parties in bargaining and business creation; 
• Providing technical support for production and marketing; 
• Ensuring access to finance and credit; 
• Increasing the presence and legitimacy of the state; 
• Increasing the level of formal/professional quality; 
• Increasing workers’ political and social awareness; 
• Encouraging formation of cooperatives and entrepreneurship; 
• Modernizing the productive sector.  
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The next steps in the project schedule are to be a discussion of how to reach those goals, including a 
timetable for each goal to be completed.  
 
Evaluation of the pilot project:  Our field work 
Three years on, the pilot program “Reducing Informality through Social Dialogue” is still under 
development.  Because of the specific economic, social and cultural context of the Caruaru region, the 
creditable purpose of the project will certainly take a few years to achieve tangible results.  In a March 
2013 visit made by us to talk with key actors in the region (a list of groups met with and interviewees 
can be found at the end of the Brazil section of this report), we found that, on the one hand, there is a 
clear recognition of the importance of the project.  On the other hand, it is recognized that there are 
huge challenges ahead in the process of formalizing labor in economic activities revolving around the 
garment sector. 
 
Respondents reaffirmed the widespread practice of using informal workers who operate primarily 
in their homes or in the homes of relatives or acquaintances.  Personal ties are the first step 
toward the establishment of labor relations.  They did note certain industry segments, such as 
industrial laundries, which, because of greater technical specificity of routine work, the presence 
of more sophisticated machinery and chemical complex, require the predominance of formal 
workers.  They deemed government regulation of labor standards in firms of all sizes in the 
Caruaru regions as very rare, and generally considered enforcement actions to be for the most 
part ineffective. By coincidence, the week we were visiting the area, there had been an 
investigation conducted by the Ministry of Labor, in order to monitor the working conditions in 
garment manufacture.  This action was undertaken because of evidence of a great number of 
unregistered workers in small factories.  State and federal Labor Ministry officials denounced 
“conditions analogous to slavery” in some enterprises, shut down a number of businesses, and 
made a publicity splash (Folha de São Paulo 2013; Globo 2013).  However, these inspection efforts 
seemed to be focused on the worst abuses rather than overall labor standards and the attendant 
publicity would seem to confirm the unusual nature of this inspection push.  Concern is 
widespread that rigorous enforcement of labor laws would lead to large-scale job loss, and even 
union leaders from Nova Central believe that the practical result of enforcement action would be 
a wave of dismissals of “two hundred workers per day.” 
 
At the same time, unions and other social movements advocating for workers were viewed as weak and 
fragile in the region.  It is very difficult to identify a specific cause to explain the weakness of trade 
unions in the region of Caruaru.  According to Milena Prado of DIEESE and Aurora Duarte, the President 
of the Pernambuco State Union of Seamstresses, most obstacles to organize workers in the Caruaru 
Cluster result from the lack of registration of the companies themselves.  This makes it very difficult for 
union organizers to approach workers, and also makes it difficult for workers themselves to be aware of 
their organization rights.  Aside from these problems, a number of other factors contribute to the 
precariousness of labor relations in the region.  Among them, we can list the following:  reduced 
presence of public institutions; economic culture associated with subsistence activities; informality of 
market relations; employment relations permeated by kinship relations, limited presence of large 
companies, low average education of workers; and predominance of productive activities with low 
added value.  
 
Among the few mentions of worker organizations, one notable example is DIEESE itself.  The 
organization is recognized as an important institutional actor that lately has been focused on the 
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subject of informality.  Our respondents also cited state and municipal departments, usually 
linked to social assistance—the Department of Women and the Department of Social 
Participation—which have begun to take steps to strengthen support and awareness networks of 
the region’s workers.  It should be noted that the initiatives are still very embryonic and facing 
opposition within their own local governments, since often the political class of the region´s cities 
is identical to the class of small entrepreneurs in the garment sector. 
 
Because of the enormous challenges faced by the interviewed practitioners, they see the greatest 
hope in a long-term process that would have as its main thrust the education of new generations.  
In the last decade there has been a large increase in educational facilities in the area:  there are 
now, in addition to public elementary and schools, a university and several federal technical 
education centers.  They opined that the transformation of the region's social structure would 
only be possible to the extent that there is an improvement in the education level of the general 
population in the Cluster.  The presence of teachers and researchers that has accompanied this 
process of expansion of the public education is also seen as a promising contributor to social 
dynamics, especially in Caruaru proper, where educational resources are concentrated. 
 
When asked if there are efforts to develop worker cooperatives or the solidarity economy, only 
one respondent, a member of a women´s association, gave an affirmative reply.  She referred to a 
cooperative of women working with crafts, “Women of Clay,” which with the support of an NGO 
is organizing a cooperative of women producing clay handicrafts—but with non-registered 
workers.  
 
We also inquired about the use of the Microenterprise Individual Entrepreneur category (MEI, 
which allows independent contractors to register as businesses and meet tax and social insurance 
responsibilities through a single small monthly payment) to formalize home-based workers.  
Despite the creation of several million MEIs across Brazil since the status was initiated in 2009, in 
the Caruaru Cluster there is no formalization process grounded in the MEI category.  We found 
that very little is known about this new category in the region, and there is no major initiative to 
expand this type of individual enterprise in the Cluster cities. 
 
Underpinning limited activity to formalize subcontracted work in the region is a set of ingrained 
worker attitudes.  Respondents described a low awareness of workers—especially home-based 
ones—of the importance of formalization of work, social security, and union organization or even 
of the state protection.  Our interlocutors suggested that, in general, rather than contemplating 
the formalization of their work, the workers of the region wish to become owners of a fábrica (a 
company that manufactures products by contracting households to make specific parts for the 
garment production process), following the path of those who employ or purchase from them 
today. In other words, the dream of becoming an entrepreneur tomorrow acts as a great 
motivator of those who live today under poor working conditions in manufacturing activities.  
 
In general, the region´s workers see the state more as a threat to their income (through the 
collection of fees and taxes or through inspections that threaten to eliminate their means of 
survival) than a provider of social security or as a promoter of decent working conditions.  
Workers are not seen as concerned about expanding social protection (pension, unemployment 
insurance, and industrial accident insurance).  Nevertheless, respondents cited the widespread 
confidence that even under conditions of informality the state will provide social protection in old 
age (through a safety net program in place since 1971, the Programa de Aposentadoria Rural, 
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Rural Pension Program).  Nor is the opportunity to sell to large, image-conscious companies a 
stimulus for formalization.  Unlike what happens in other regions of the country’s garment 
production, in the Caruaru cluster, there is no presence of large companies as buyers that would 
eventually demand more rigid contractual relations and therefore less precarious working 
conditions.  So neither workers nor entrepreneurs perceive economic benefits that would justify 
the formalization of working conditions or production.  With state agencies under suspicion and 
the absence of pressure from corporate buyers, worker organizations (including unions as well as 
labor-based technical bodies like DIEESE) are perhaps the most likely institutional source of 
pressure and support for formalization and upgrading in the region—but for the same reasons it 
is an uphill battle for such organizations. 
 
The increasing requirement of fiscal invoices for tax purposes has had an unintended result of 
stimulating the formalization of all participants in the garment supply chain.  The fiscal invoice 
requirement originates at the tip of the trade that lies in big cities, but it has effects on the rest of 
the supply chain of trade and production, to the extent that vendors at the tip increasingly need 
to demonstrate, for tax and accounting purposes, where the goods sold come from and where 
their money goes.  Thus, even small suppliers have to register, so their employees are also 
registered.  This process is closely related to the introduction of computerized systems and 
equipment inspection for the collection of taxes that are being deployed by state governments 
throughout the country. 
 
We closed our interviews by asking our practitioner informants how they think the region and its 
garment cluster will look in ten years.  Among the speakers we interviewed, the majority believe 
that the future of Caruaru cluster, and of the workers who derive their income from it, depends 
primarily on its possibilities for diversification of the productive structure, with the development 
of other industries and economic activities.  In fact, according to some reports, the strong 
development of the region in recent years (Caruaru´s GDP has grown over 7% per year) has 
supported the development of a set of city-based service activities (health, education, 
entertainment, hospitality, banking, etc.) that will gradually bring some diversification to the local 
labor market, with new possibilities for social development.  However, as some of our 
interlocutors warn, if the goal is to continue growth driven by the garment sector, it seems hardly 
feasible to imagine a broad formalization of labor relations in the region, largely because the 
profitability of producing garments in the region depends mainly on the extremely low level of 
salaries of local workers. 
 
Some considerations derived from our work in Caruaru 
From our fieldwork and analysis, the expansion of labor bargaining processes and of a generalized 
formalization of labor relations in the Caruaru region, depend fundamentally on major economic and 
social transformations.  Therefore one should not expect there to be some short-term solution for the 
massive job insecurity that exists in the region, especially in household units operating in the small 
villages around Caruaru.  However, despite the enormous challenges, we present below some 
conclusions and recommendations that we believe will help both the actors who are involved in the 
“social dialogue” led by DIEESE, as well as other institutions, researchers and social actors wishing to 
address the challenge of reducing the precariousness of labor relations. 
 
We identify several important structural and economic limits that block the effort to formalize the 
working relationships in the Caruaru garment cluster: 
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a. The vast majority of the Cluster´s enterprises consist of micro and small enterprises that have 
intensive use of labor as the fundamental form of income generation. In addition, the 
equipment used in production is old and technologically obsolete, therefore economic units 
have very low productivity levels. 
b. This production complex has very limited ability to autonomously launch an upgrading dynamic 
that would boost value added. 
c. The Caruaru region’s only current comparative advantages are a low cost workforce and the 
presence of regional centers of trade in products for low-income consumers. 
d. The Caruaru region is relatively distant from the dynamic axis of Pernambuco (which extends 
between the new Port of Suape, Recife and the Goiania municipality). 
e. Although there is a strong tradition of subsistence farming in the region, poor soil fertility and 
climatic conditions typical of Brazil’s semi-arid Northeast are factors that depress farm income 
and, therefore, on the one hand, push up the cost of reproduction of labor power and on the 
other, results in an excess supply of skilled labor. 
f. The absence of large enterprises connected to major centers of production and consumption in 
the country is also a factor that weakens the local economy.  This regional isolation results in a 
lack of external stimuli for strategies to increase value added, such as product differentiation, 
the exploitation of niche markets, or even selling abroad.  Local production caters mainly to 
regional demand and so is limited to a traditional consumer goods market, and very susceptible 
to economic cycles in the region.  For example, in 2013, due to a severe drought, there was a 
drop in farm income, which translated into a reduction in sales of the apparel cluster. 
g. Another limiting factor is the fact that the labor legislation in Brazil (as codified in the 
Consolidation of Labor Laws – CLT), while appropriate and applicable to typical capitalist 
ventures, is very difficult to apply in cases of marginal enterprises or livelihood strategies, as is 
the case of most productive units in the Caruaru region. 
 
In addition to the strong and meritorious work of “social dialogue” that has been launched by DIEESE, it 
seems imperative that the government and other institutions of civil society in the Caruaru region and 
the state of Pernambuco work to stimulate and foster development of other sectors of production that 
are not supported by the current low level of incomes.  At the same time, they must ensure the 
dynamism of the region, in order to sustain and take advantage of the rich fabric of trade and services 
that characterizes Caruaru.  Of course, this is not a simple task and it does not seem to be viable through 
market forces alone.  Given the mentioned structural weaknesses of the region, it is inescapable that the 
public sector must conduct and coordinate investments in public facilities and services throughout the 
region.  This involvement must not only ensure a greater supply of goods and quality services, but also 
must be able to absorb some of the local workforce, especially the younger generation with more 
education, who are not willing to submit to the degrading working conditions that still prevail. 
 
As a transitional instrument able to mitigate the medium-term effects of the informality of the existing 
garment workforce, it seems that a more feasible and simple next step would be to seek first the 
formalization of home-based workers through the formalization of enterprises.  Two distinct models of 
formalization seem possible: 
 
a. Formalization of home-based workers through the establishment of Individual Economic Units 
(MEIs).  This type of formalization is not optimal, because it transforms the relationship between 
capital and labor into a legal seller-customer contract that leaves the worker-owner unprotected 
from occupational and market hazards.  However, it is a measure that at least allows workers to 
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be incorporated into the pension system and opens to them the opportunity to have access to 
productive credit and formal recognition of their productive condition. 
b. A second alternative to formalize productive groupings of greater complexity and organization 
would be to develop cooperatives, workers’ ventures and solidarity economy units that would 
allow not only the workers’ access to social safety net, but also the possibility of sharing 
equipment, to reduce acquisition costs of raw materials and thus augment value added. 
 
Although each of these actions would allow enterprises to be formalized, they are not enough by 
themselves to satisfactorily expand compensation levels or to promote a profound improvement of 
working conditions in the region.  Nonetheless, individually or especially in combination they would 
contribute at least temporarily to an improvement of the social context.  Should cluster workers work in 
formal enterprises—and thus have a labor card—they would have, on the one hand, access to social 
security benefits, and on the other, the formal right to a set of economic programs and services (access 
to subsidized credit, tax benefits, technical support, banking inclusion, etc.).  Such entitlements should 
allow the self-employed and small enterprises that make up the bulk of the Cluster to boost their 
garment production levels.  In the long run, however, there must be a substantive transformation of the 
socio-economic reality in the Caruaru Garment Cluster, as a fundamental condition for boosting new 
niche production of goods and services.  The goal must be to promote activities that are not premised 
on intensive use of low-skilled labor, and that can diversify productive chains to generate value added 
within the region.  
 
For reasons outlined above, public agencies or corporate buyers are unlikely to jump-start this process 
in Caruaru.  This leaves labor organizations as the most likely catalyst.  Given the weakness of local 
unions within the region, despite the presence of the Pernambuco Union of Seamstresses, successful 
labor intervention will depend on state-level organizations such as that union, national union 
federations (such as Força Sindical, the parent federation of the Pernambuco Union; the CUT, the 
nation’s largest federation; and Nova Central), and cross-union entities such as DIEESE.  However, there 
is likely to be employer and even worker resistance to such intervention by “outsiders” and to 
formalization along with resultant exposure to taxes and regulation.  To mitigate resistance, an 
important first step is dialogue and education about the benefits of formalization and associated 
upgrading.  Thus, the DIEESE-sponsored dialogue in Caruaru is a promising first step on this longer 
road—but only a first step. 
 
 
4. Final recommendations  
 
From our work several proposals to organize and protect home-based workers can be highlighted.  First, 
harking back to the CNTV President’s comments on São Paulo, national-level policies can help facilitate 
such organizing and job improvement.  Temporary trade protection against unfair competition can be 
important in heading off a “race to the bottom” and allowing space for upgrading—but does not by itself 
improve job quality.  Continued increases in the minimum wage and a stronger safety net that offers a 
viable economic alternative—other than highly precarious work at home or in small workshops—to the 
poorest, can help raise labor standards across the board. 
 
Beyond such national policies with important but limited impact, better monitoring and enforcement of 
labor standards in subcontracted and home-based work in the Brazilian clothing and textile sector 
depends on labor organization involvement.  The processes of monitoring and enforcement are 
hampered by a number of factors.  The sector is highly fragmented, with large numbers of small and 
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micro units that are difficult to find, let alone monitor in ongoing fashion.  Large numbers of smaller 
businesses are unregistered, and in most cases resistant to registration.  Workers in smaller enterprises 
or working in the home are typically unaware of their rights as workers (low education levels and the 
presence of Spanish-speaking migrants not fluent in Portuguese are contributing factors), and if aware 
may be reluctant to press for those rights because they may see enforcement as a threat to their current 
livelihood or to their own options for moving up to run small, informal businesses.  Many of the smaller 
enterprises are economically marginal, meaning that enforcing labor standards without accompanying 
changes in the businesses would likely lead to large-scale layoffs or business closures.  Nonetheless, the 
Brazilian cases highlight important things that labor organizations can do—especially in association with 
government agencies.   
 
The specifics of such strategies depend on whether home-based workers sell their products to 
middlemen who cater to mass markets or to high income markets, notably so in the case of São Paulo, 
where both demands exist.  For those selling to higher-end markets, proposals go in the direction of 
information campaigns, so as to let the home-based workers know their labor rights, and of the 
possibility of the CNTV or other unions protecting and representing them.  The CNTV and other unions 
acting in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area have been working together with some municipalities to carry 
on such information campaigns on workers´ rights.  Also, the need for a greater number of labor law 
inspectors must be stressed.  Again, union-government cooperation can greatly enhance the 
effectiveness of the inspectorate.   
 
In the case of areas where small and family firms dominate, for the short term we would point to the 
two options we outlined for Caruaru:  MEIs and cooperatives or other solidarity economy formations.  
Both approaches bring small and home-based units into a formal status susceptible to monitoring and 
enforcement, but in return give access to various kinds of assistance as an incentive for such 
formalization.  In the longer run, improving subcontracted and home-based jobs can only be achieved by 
broader processes of technological and product upgrading and associated formalization of employment 
on a larger scale.  In both the short and the long run, state and national-level labor organizations (unions, 
federations of unions, multi-federation projects) are the leading candidate for launching restructuring. 
 
Finally, the “social dialogue” process, which brings together firms, workshop owners, local and state 
institutions, seems of vital importance, not only in the case of low-wage Caruaru-type areas.  In the 
Caruaru cluster, this dialogue has questioned existing employment relations in the region and initiated a 
series of critical interventions featuring some national leaders who operate in the region through the 
classroom dissemination of their perspectives and through debates aired on local radio. Such dialogues 
in urbanized regions such as São Paulo State could also reach out to hard-to-reach groups of workers 
and smaller businesses.  The nationwide National Labor Forum, while not sectorally specific, set an 
important example of highlighting the presence, importance, and legitimacy of informal businesses and 
workers, including the self-employed and home-based workers—setting the stage for giving them voice 
in other regional and sectoral forums.  Raising awareness of the problems through worker education 
and social dialogue, although it is only a first step, is certainly the most important one. 
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III.     South Africa:  Clothing and textile industries in KwaZulu-Natal and 
the Western Cape 
 
1. Introduction 
 
South Africa’s clothing and textile industry has undergone a dramatic shift associated with policies 
promoting trade liberalization and more flexible labor market, beginning in the mid-1990s.  As a result of 
these policies and resulting changes in markets, work was significantly altered and the sector 
consciously shifted from predominately large factories, known as full-package manufacturers (FPMs, 
housing integrated apparel production) to Cut Make and Trims (CMTs, subcontractors specializing in 
particular parts of the production process), ranging from medium-sized CMTs to home-based survivalist 
and micro CMTs.  Thus, a process of informalization of labor and production in manufacturing started to 
emerge and intensify.  Today, the majority of factories are CMTs with varied degrees of employment and 
job security.  South Africa’s post-apartheid and progressive labor legislation aimed at protecting all 
workers.  However, as employers deliberately evaded the law and the state had limited capacity to 
implement and enforce collective bargaining agreements (working hours and minimum wage), 
vulnerable workers were left neglected.   
 
Various attempts by trade unions and new organizations to organize vulnerable workers have been 
made but the challenges are enormous.  South African union efforts regarding apparel and textile 
subcontractors have focused on getting them formally registered—a legal requirement, but one often 
honored in the breach.  Registration, in turn, subjects them to the scrutiny of regional labor-
management Bargaining Councils and the associated labor inspectorate, which enforce sector-specific 
labor standards as well as the basic laws.  The drive for registration has encountered resistance or 
avoidance by small shops, Bargaining Councils’ frequent failure to tailor policies to the needs of smaller 
producers, and many workers’ reluctance to push for registration for fear of enforcing themselves out of 
a job.  Strategies adopted by unions and other labor movements in the sector have included expanded 
enforcement, grassroots recruitment, work with small proprietors to promote business and job 
upgrading, and innovative attempts to organize the self-employed.  While there are no overwhelming 
examples of success in organizing vulnerable workers in South Africa, both traditional trade unions and 
new organizations recognize the importance of organizing informal and vulnerable workers.  
 
This report aims to present our research on the extent to which worker organizations improve 
monitoring and enforcement of labor standards in subcontracted and home-based workers (workers in 
all three types of CMTs) in the clothing and textile industry in South Africa.  We first look at the current 
structure of South Africa’s clothing and textile industry.  Then, we examine the industry’s labor process, 
followed by a discussion on the current labor standards and compliance with government regulation and 
collective bargaining agreements.  Next, we examine the various labor organizations, including trade 
unions and alternative organizations, their strategies, and the successes and challenges of organizing 
subcontracted and home-based workers.  The report concludes by exploring the possibilities for future 
strategies for organizing informal and vulnerable workers.  The report is based on research conducted in 
Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces.  The findings are drawn from secondary material 
(literature review) and primary data collected through formal interviews, as well as informal interviews 
and discussions with informants and relevant industry stakeholders.  Three FPM factory visits were also 
conducted in KwaZulu-Natal.  The research was conducted from February to June 2013 and a total of 16 
formal interviews were conducted including:   
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• Two provincial union organizers of the South African Clothing and Textile Union (SACTWU)  
• A provincial union official of SACTWU 
• A national union official of SACTWU  
• Two Department of Labor, provincial labor inspectors  
• A Local government official   
• Eight informal and vulnerable workers (CMT workers / home-based workers)  
• A representative of the South African Self Employed Women’s Union (SASEWA), an informal 
worker organization 
 
 
2. Historical context:  From import substitution industrialization to trade liberalization 
 
South Africa’s clothing and textile industry has had to adjust to local and international pressure, 
prompted by changes in the country’s macroeconomic policies that encouraged trade liberalization and 
labor market flexibility.  The outcomes of this process of industrial and workplace restructuring were 
devastating for the industry and workers.  Historically, the industry was highly labor intensive, absorbing 
mostly semi and unskilled workers.  From the 1970s to early 1990s, the industry enjoyed heavy state 
protection.  Government-sponsored import substitution industrialization was introduced, with subsidies 
to South African factories and restrictions on imports.  Production was mostly for the domestic market. 
Large factories predominated, with only a limited number of small and medium factories.  The industry 
was predominantly located in the Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces.   
 
Employment was relatively high in the sector's three key provinces, particularly in a number of small 
towns that almost exclusively relied on the industry as the main source of employment.  Yet South 
Africa’s labor legislation did not cover the majority of those who worked in this industry.  Apartheid 
spatial planning ensured that most clothing and textile factory towns (and factories) were not expected 
to comply with labor legislation.  As such, many “labor reserves” were created in the former homelands.  
Trade unions were also not allowed to organize in many of these factories.  However, toward the late 
1980s there was stagnation and the eventual decline of the industry.  The protectionism offered during 
apartheid allowed inefficiencies to go unchecked.  This resulted in a failure to become internationally 
competitive.  Export capacity was not developed and there was a concentration of production in low 
value-added products.  Overall, a number of factors stunted the industry:   
 
• A protectionist economy, offering a buffer to local producers from high input costs and 
international competitors; 
• No investment in new machinery and designs; 
• Adversarial labor relations (escalating labor disputes); 
• Limited demand (local consumption); 
• A crisis of over-production because of distorted consumer demand/mass of low-income 
workers; 
• As a result of all these factors, a primary goal of survival as opposed to growth and profit 
maximization. 
 
Then in the early 1990s South Africa undertook an expansive trade liberalization program that was 
overambitious and gave domestic industries a dangerously short time to adjust to international 
economic pressures.  Several international agreements were signed that encouraged South Africa to 
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adopt particular neoliberal policies.  These policies plunged South African industries, particularly the 
textile and clothing (and footwear) industry, into a crisis.  
 
The signing in 1994 of the Marrakech Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
coincided with the end of apartheid, and marked the official start of trade liberalization in South Africa 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The agreement set the reduction in the 
number of tariff lines, phasing out of export subsidies, and reduction in agricultural subsidies by an 
export-weighted amount of 36 per cent.  While trade liberalization was motivated by good policy 
intentions, the viability of the policy changes was not tested.  The Marrakech Agreement was hastily 
signed with the expectation that many industries would be given ample time to adjust and enjoy state 
protection.  But South Africa decided to lower tariffs much more quickly and did not put measures in 
place to protect “sensitive industries,” despite the fact that these moderating measures were permitted 
under the agreement.  Trade liberalization was accelerated by the launch of the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 1996.  The objective of this macroeconomic policy was to reduce 
inflation by constraining aggregate demand, reduce state intervention and increasing exports.  Different 
policy outcomes surfaced.  After 1996, production and employment in the clothing, textile and footwear 
industry fell sharply.  Exports declined significantly and the industry was flooded with legal and illegal 
imports from countries such as China.  A detailed account (including quantitative data) of how 
liberalization policies affected employment and wages in the clothing and textile sectors can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
 
3. Structure of clothing (apparel) and textile industry in South Africa 
 
Changes in industrial and economic policies resulted in the restructuring of the industry and 
recomposition of labor with a move towards subcontracting and informalization of production.  The 
consequence of trade liberalization was the growth of atypical forms of employment, involving high 
levels of informalization and labor flexibilization.  At the height of neoliberal restructuring, the South 
African clothing industry was facing massive global competition especially from Chinese imports.  In 
order to match the global competition and to reduce production costs, the South African clothing 
industry started laying off workers and flexed its industrial labor practices.  This resulted in labor 
outsourcing and subcontracting as well as home-based work.  Official statistics measure informality 
rather than subcontracting or home-based work, but at least in the textile and apparel sector, 
informality typically takes the form of subcontracting.  Heintz and Valodia (2008), examining 2004 data, 
estimated that informal employment made up 37% of those employed, with the majority of those 
working for an employer rather than being self-employed.  
 
At the level of firm organization, the relative weight of Full Package Manufacturers (FPMs) and 
subcontractor Cut, Make, and Trims (CMTs) in the sector shifted markedly. With intense local and 
international competition, some FPMs have opted to have shut down and relocate to areas where wage 
rates are cheaper (e.g. rural areas within South Africa or Swaziland and Botswana).  The remaining FPMs 
operate the entire manufacturing process of clothing, outsourcing parts of work to CMT enterprises.  
They are linked into the value chain for clothing, and are registered and regulated.  However, since the 
value chain is buyer-driven, these FPMs are still controlled by the buyers (the branding houses, retail 
chains etc.) and are subject to tight competition.  They supply large retail chain stores, corporate 
companies and a few independent boutiques through large-scale contracts, which they compete for 
based on quality, price, delivery time and design, often in collaboration with the branding company.   
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The result has been an overall decline in FPMs and a proliferation of medium, home-based, and 
survivalist enterprises (CMTs) (see Table III.3.1 below).  The rise of CMTs has been made possible by the 
externalization of production (subcontracting and outsourcing) by FPMs.  Today, there are more CMTs 
than there are FPMs.  FPMs and employers cite various reasons for the increase and necessity of CMTs.  
For example, an employer in a FPM factory stated:    
 
“The rise of CMTs is very important given that the clothing business is so seasonal. 
Businesses try to hang onto their core staff like sample machinists and patternmakers 
and let the others go because labor is a fixed cost.  The only way to survive is either by 
having a brilliant production manager, at exorbitant cost, or to retrench and CMT.  We 
took the latter option.  We now have the same amount of people employed as before 
but as owner managers.”  (Interview with FPM employer, Morris & Reed 2008) 
 
The Industrial Strategy Project of the early 1990s by the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) had proposed the flexibilization of production through reorganizing the production line to 
enable short-cycle manufacturing and “quick response relationships” to quickly adjust to shifts in 
customer needs and wants through a more trained and engaged workforce.  Employers rejected 
COSATU’s suggestion and instead opted for the externalization of labor functions to cheapen labor costs.  
The resultant effect on the value chain has been the insertion of casual and temporary workers, the 
subcontractors (CMTs) and their intermediaries.   
 
Trade unions and the Department of Labor are aware of the proliferation of production units and the 
challenges this poses for labor standards.  According to trade union officials,  
 
Yes, subcontracting and outsourcing of work and workers in the clothing and textile 
industries has actually grown.  Because people run away from paying higher wages then 
they start to contract work and to dark corners and to areas where there's none 
compliance… (Interview, Union Official #3) 
 
There is quite a lot of subcontracting and home-based work in the industry in South 
Africa, even though it is not visible.  We will not see it; it just flows in the dark.  
(Interview, Union Organizer#1)   
 
They do it by employing casual workers on a minimum contract then terminate the 
contract, and you re-employ them.  Alternatively, by downsizing the company into a 
number of small operations, supplying the same market.  (Interview, Union Organizer#2)   
 
The interdependent relationship between FPMs and CMTs has led to the growth of CMTs as well as 
continued poor working conditions.  This relationship has also challenged the bifurcation of the formal 
and informal economy.  The majority of CMTs are created by the formal sector (FPMs) to bypass labor 
legislation.  Retrenched workers also establish some CMTs as the only means of economic livelihood 
activity.  The economic power relations drive labor standards down at the lower levels of the supply 
chain.  According to a trade union organizer,  
 
Big employers in South Africa encourage the growth of CMTs but they dictate the price. 
And they would tell me [the owner] that I want this job done by next week Friday.  When 
he says, he wants this job by next week Friday the owner of the CMT would rush to finish 
this thing in time so that this big company will be able to come back again to give more 
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jobs so that the employees are able to carry on working.  You find that in CMTs workers 
work Saturdays and Sundays and others work at night which is actually not allowed 
because there is no shift pattern in the clothing industry unless in the textile industry 
where there are big machines and so workers have night shifts.  But because these small 
employers are rushing to finish the job they tell people that we will give you extra money, 
they will work on those arrangements.  (Interview, Union Organizer #1) 
 
Table III.3.1.  Types of enterprises in clothing and textile 
Types of enterprises in 
clothing 
Links to the value chain Workers 
 1. FPMs (Full Package 
Manufacturers) 
• Receive regular orders from 
large retail chains, branding 
houses, designers and 
corporate companies  
• Registered and regulated  
• Operating in larger and 
traditional factories  
 
• Bargaining Council wages  
• Regular working hours  
• Unionized  
• Mostly local workers  
• Standard employment 
relationships (SERs)  
2. Medium-size CMTs  (Cut, 
Make, and Trims, i.e. 
subcontractors) 
• Linked to a design house, 
designer or subcontracted by a 
larger FPM  
• Usually registered 
• Operating in smaller traditional 
factories (often renting space 
in/close to FPMs) 
  
• Bargaining Council wages  
• Regular working hours  
• Unionized  
• Local and foreign workers  
• Standard employment 
relationships (SERs)  
3. Home-based and 
piecework CMTs  
• Rely on contracts from bids  
• Registered/unregistered  
• Supply designers, small retail 
chains and corporate 
companies 
• Operating from private 
homes/smaller rented 
premises (far away from FPMs)   
 
• Paid per piece (piecework)  
• Irregular hours  
• Not unionized  
• Local and foreign workers  
• Atypical employment  
4. Survivalist CMTs and 
micro-enterprises  
• Supply small retail stores, 
street traders and individual 
customers  
• Unregistered and unregulated  
• Cannot access loans or bids 
• Operating from private 
premises/private garages  
• Poor, irregular wages  
• Irregular hours  
• Not unionized  
• Mostly foreign workers  
• Atypical employment, often 
with close-knit ties (family or 
friends)  
Source:  Adapted from Webster and Joynt (2011) 
 
In terms of employment contracts and general working conditions, despite some similarities, there are 
significant differences in employment conditions among FPMs and the three categories of CMTs.  The 
findings of this research indicate that most workers in FPMs are unionized, work regular hours and are 
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paid according to the Bargaining Council10 minimum wages.  Nonetheless, many such workers from 
these factories were disillusioned and frustrated with their wages, which did not stretch far enough.  
Concerns voiced by FPM workers bring to mind the employment conditions generally experienced by 
CMT workers, e.g., low wages and long hours of work, usually set at the discretion of the employer 
(based on the contract deadlines).  In some instances, FPM workers’ pay was said to be equally irregular.  
If work was not ready on time the employer would not be paid and the workers in turn would have to 
wait for their wages.  Apart from being given tea and lunch breaks, most other rights provided for in the 
Basic Condition of Employment Act (1996) and Bargaining Council agreements were not granted to some 
FPM workers. 
 
The larger, more established CMTs are registered with the Bargaining Council and often provide better 
wages and working conditions matching largely those of formal industry workers.  This is despite the fact 
that these CMTs sometimes cut corners, with policies such as "no work, no pay" rule, which means that 
if there was no work, or employees were away due to illness, they were not paid for those hours.  
Among home-based and survivalist CMTs, whether registered or not, many do not provide all the 
benefits to which workers are entitled as set out in Bargaining Council collective agreements.  This goes 
undetected by the Bargaining Council.  Home-based workers generally did not have very much job 
security and their jobs depended on them maintaining a good relationship with the owner of the 
operation.   
 
 
3.  Who performs this work?  
 
In FPMs, almost all the workers are South African men and women.  In CMTs, the profile of the 
workforce is different in each province and city comprising some South Africans as well as foreign 
nationals.  This is consistent with South Africa’s spatial and racial history and current reality.  For 
example: 
 
• In KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, almost all workers are South African Black and Indian women 
workers. Employers are mostly White and Indian men (owners of CMTs).  
• In Western Cape, Cape Town, almost all workers are South African Black and Coloured women 
workers. Once again, mostly White and Indian men are employers (owners of CMTs and design 
houses). 
• In Johannesburg, the majority of CMTs were owned by South Africans or foreigners and 
employed both South African women and Malawian, Zimbabwean and Mozambican men. 
 
 
 
                                                         
10 Bargaining Councils are employer and trade union organizations that negotiate and set industry/ sector wide 
conditions of service, solve labor disputes as well as make proposals on labor legislation and policy.  These councils 
recently amalgamated to form a national bargaining council.  A set of collective agreements now covers the entire 
country, setting minimum wage levels, maximum hours of work, annual leave, sick leave, as well as provision for a 
sick benefit fund and a provident fund.  Additionally, bargaining council inspectors visit registered firms to ensure 
that they are complying with the Agreements and to locate unregistered firms within the jurisdiction of the council 
so that they can be compelled to register and comply with the relevant standards.  Bargaining Councils are 
explained in detail in section 4.2.  
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4. Labor standards 
 
4.1. Government regulation and collective agreements 
 
All employers in South Africa are obliged to comply with seven key labor statutes, which include the 
following: 
 
• Labor Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) 
• Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA) 
• Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 
• Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 
• Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 
• Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
 
Prior to 2002, all South African workers were protected by the LRA and the BCEA if they had a written 
contract.  Informal workers were thus not protected by the various legislations because they are not 
registered employees and do not have written contracts of employment.  In 2002, South Africa’s 
legislature altered the LRA and BCEA in several ways designed to cover informal workers (Bennett 2003). 
The two laws now presume that a worker is an employee rather than an independent contractor unless 
the provider of work can prove otherwise.  The BCEA previously allowed the Labor Minister to designate 
a group of workers as employees for BCEA purposes, and that authority has now been extended to all 
labor laws.  Similarly, the sectoral Bargaining Council can now extend its terms (including collective 
bargaining agreements) to all in the sector, including informal workers. 
 
However, these laws continue to go largely unenforced.  Many employers, especially smaller ones, do 
not want to comply with labor and enterprise legislation.  Employees are not registered, less tax is paid 
and they deliberately avoid labor inspectors.  Often employers are aware when labor inspectors are 
coming to inspect their premises or are in the area.  Most workers are then told to either not to come to 
work, hide or not tell who the employer is.  Employers are aware that they are not in compliance.  A 
representative of small employers stated that:    
 
“I know that most of our members do not comply with BCEA or are not registering their 
members [workers].  The problem is the bargaining council. It is very rigid and never tries 
to understand our position.  These small guys are producing a few pairs of shoes but are 
expected to pay the same rate as big companies.  They cannot.”  (Interview in Mosoetsa 
2001)  
 
Skinner and Valodia (ND, 9) quote the director of the state-level Natal Clothing Manufacturers 
Association as stating that the large majority of the industry’s employers, likewise accounting for the 
large majority of the employees, fail to comply with industry-level accords on labor standards.  Workers 
are reluctant and or afraid to demand written contracts.  A typical worker comment:   
 
“We cannot complain because they can hire anyone they want.  There are many women 
who are looking for work and the boss knows that he dismisses you he will get another 
woman quickly.”  (Interview in Mosoetsa 2001) 
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Thus, the emergent structure of operations in the clothing and textile industries of South Africa clearly 
pose serious challenges with regard to compliance with labor standards as specified in the various 
government regulations.  
 
4.2. Bargaining councils and registration 
 
Luckily, now we have Bargaining Councils that govern the minimum standard.  So even if 
the union is not there but in terms of the Bargaining Council rules, once you have a 
factory with more than five workers, you are expected to register your business in the 
bargaining council.  If you do not, then that means that the business is operating illegally.  
The inspectors will be there to prosecute that company.  (Interview, Union Organizer #2) 
 
As government, our role is to make laws, monitor and ensure compliance.  We are doing 
the best we can.  We are aware that there are loopholes in the law. Some employers find 
these loopholes and get away with it.  For example, they do not register their businesses, 
employees and or do not want to comply with basic labor standards of this country. 
(Interview, Provincial Inspector #2) 
 
Clothing and textile wage levels and working conditions (See Table III.4.1) are regulated through 
collective bargaining.  Prior to 2002, there was a dual regulation of labor through regional collective 
bargaining on the one hand, and wage determinations for rural areas and the former homelands on the 
other.  As trade unions (particularly SACTWU, the majority union in the industry) gained momentum in 
the clothing and textile industry, it pushed for the establishment of the national Bargaining Council to 
deal with the regional wage differentials and the loopholes, which existed in the framework.  The 
national Bargaining Council was registered in 2002 against strong resistance from clothing 
manufacturers.  
 
A bit of background on Bargaining Councils is in order.  The Labor Relations Act of 1995 stipulates that 
each of the major sectors in South Africa should set up Bargaining Councils.  In these collective bodies, it 
is primarily the employer and trade union organizations that negotiate and set industry/sector wide 
conditions of service, solve labor disputes, as well as make proposals on labor legislation and policy.  
Historically, there were five such regional councils, which covered much of the clothing and textile 
industry.  These councils recently amalgamated to form three national Bargaining Councils for the 
clothing, textile and leather sectors.  The three national councils are:   
 
• National Bargaining Council for the Clothing manufacturing Industry (NBC) 
• National Bargaining Council of the Leather Industry of South Africa (NBCLI) 
• National Textile Bargaining Council (NTBC) 
 
A set of collective agreements now covers the entire country.  These agreements include a set minimum 
wage levels, maximum hours of work, annual leave, sick leave, as well as a provision for a sick benefit 
fund and a provident fund.  Additionally, council inspectors visit registered firms to ensure that they are 
complying with the agreements and to locate unregistered firms within the jurisdiction of the Bargaining 
Council so that they can be compelled to register and comply with the relevant standards.  The 
agreements generally run for a period of twelve months and are subject to amendment in accordance 
with the prevailing Labor Relations Act.  Another important function of the agreements is the provision 
for disputes, based on a mutually agreed-upon set of steps including: 
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a. The parties try to resolve the dispute through conciliation; 
b. If necessary, they refer the dispute to the Commissioner for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA) in writing. If conciliation fails, then; 
c. The parties refer the dispute for arbitration; 
d. It is further mandatory that all parties receive copies of any written referrals. 
 
Through Bargaining Councils, consensus must be reached and a collective bargaining agreement signed 
by employers (registered with the council) and workers must be registered through the majority union.  
The agreement extends to all employers (including those not registered with the council, the “non-
parties”) and all employees (including non-unionized workers and those unionized but whose unions are 
not represented in the bargaining council).    
 
National negotiations take place annually and most agreements are reached by the 1st July of every year.  
These agreements are then officially accepted and implemented nationally to party and non-party 
companies (employers and employees).  However, recently, non-party companies have objected to the 
extension of collective bargaining agreements.  Various legal challenges have been launched, petitioning 
provincial High Courts to set aside the extension of collective bargaining agreements.  The judgments of 
these court challenges have been in favor of employers, with SACTWU (the majority union), appealing 
court judgments.  A labor inspector observed,  
 
The biggest challenge is compliance. Non-party employers do not want to pay the 
agreed same wage rates. They either use the law to challenge national agreements and 
or relocate their business to Lesotho or Swaziland, where there are no labor laws and 
inspectors.  (Interview, Provincial Inspector #1) 
  
Some employers are playing hide and seek games with us. We try to find them and force 
them to comply. All they do is close shop and move elsewhere. (Interview, Provincial 
Inspector #2) 
 
In addition, one of the major problems with the collective bargaining process is the enforcement of 
labor legislation and Bargaining Council agreements.  In theory, the Bargaining Council sets up the 
minimum wages of all workers in the clothing industry.11  Table III.4.1 gives an overview of the labor 
regulatory framework in South Africa as applied to the apparel sector.  The level of compliance with 
collective agreements as set by the National Bargaining Council varies based on size of enterprise (as 
discussed above, see Table III.3.1).   
 
But in reality, actual wage rates do not reflect minimum wage rates set by the Bargaining Council’s 
agreements.  The past few years have seen clothing manufacturers splitting into three regulatory 
categories:  a shrinking number of complying firms; a large number of registered firms that are not 
compliant; and an unknown number of unregistered firms.  A study in Johannesburg cited employers 
who argued that “unregulated informal establishments present substantial competition to their own 
business,” while other employers reject the initiative to extend regulation, as they are happy to have 
low-cost producers to whom they can subcontract work (Joynt and Webster 2011, 15).  Our research has                                                         
11 Those that are not party to the agreement are bound by certain provisions of the collective agreements through 
the extension of collective agreements to non-parties by the Ministry of Labor.  It must be however, noted that the 
extension framework is under attack.  In a recent judgment, the KwaZulu-Natal High Court held in favor of non-
compliant firms implies that such firms are not currently bound by the collective agreement.  
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found that very few home-based operations were registered with the Bargaining Council, especially 
those falling under the survivalist type CMTs owing to their limited number of employees, as well as 
random availability of work, which entailed that workers were often working irregularly, and for 
relatively short periods of time, as required to complete a given contract. 
 
Table III.4.1.  Wages and minimum labor standards in South Africa in 2011 
Standard SA Metro SA Non-metro 
Minimum weekly wages R739.90 (USD 75.88) R489.00 (USD 50.15) 
Ordinary maximum weekly 
hours 
42.5 45 
Overtime rate x1.5 x1.5 
Overtime limit per week 10 hours 10 hours 
Annual leave 15 days 15 days 
Sick leave 40 days/year at 50% of wage 30 days paid in full 
Annual bonus 3.47% x actual annual wage 1% x standard annual wage 
Maternity leave Max 6 months/3.25 weeks paid Max 4 months/ Unemployment 
Insurance Fund benefits 
Paternity 3 days unpaid per year 3 days unpaid (via family responsibility 
pay) 
Notice period Weekly paid = 1 week 0-6 months service = 1 week, 7 -12 
months service = 2 weeks. More than 12 
months = 1 month 
Severance pay 1 week per year of service 2 weeks per year of service 
Sick benefits Yes - 
Provident fund Yes Yes 
Unemployment Insurance 
Fund 
Yes Yes 
Source:  National Bargaining Council 2011 
 
One reason cited for low registration rates was that operations were relatively “safe” in not registering 
because the Council’s inspectors struggled to locate them (as did the union).  The number of inspectors 
employed by the Bargaining Council and the Department of Labor are inadequate to cover the entire 
sector, especially if inspectors were to ensure that all home-working operations (from large registered 
CMTs to small survivalist operations) comply with legislation and agreements.  Even if located, most 
owners of home-based operations could argue that they cannot comply with the council agreement 
because compliance will raise their labor costs so much that they will go out of business.  At the one firm 
visited for this research, the owner of the operation was not registered with the Bargaining Council.  
However, the council had inspected his operation when he only had five workers, qualifying him for the 
blanket exemption for small firms (i.e., those with five or fewer employees).  But he sometimes 
increased his employees to above six workers, which meant that technically, he was obliged to register 
with the Bargaining Council.  
 
In the majority of CMT enterprises, especially in home-based CMTs and micro-survivalist operations, 
workers were not paid extra for working overtime, nor did they get sick or holiday pay.  In particular, 
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micro-survival CMTs12 were typically not registered with the Bargaining Council and in the absence of 
union organization, workers in such operations had little–if any–ability to negotiate better wages or 
working conditions.  Employers in these operations are mostly not registered and therefore not held to 
the terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act, so the workers are not covered by the Act’s benefits.   
 
In addition, home-based CMT operations often had an irregular supply of work, which means that 
workers had erratic work schedules, working for short periods of time during quiet months or 
occasionally not working at all for some weeks.  However, workers are always expected to be readily 
available for work if contracts come in, thereby making it difficult for workers to take on other work, let 
alone plan family activities far in advance.  Therefore working hours for the majority of home-workers 
were determined by the contracts with suppliers:  when there was work, they worked; when there was 
not enough work, they were told not to come in.  From three CMT enterprises visited for this study, only 
in one enterprise did workers report that they were paid for all the time they actually worked.  Many, 
however, reported working regular hours because there was an adequate flow of work. 
 
It is noted that workers in home-based CMTs often work overtime, mostly without receiving the 
required premium, in addition to weekends, to meet contract deadlines.  The pressure on the home-
workers is often intense and if the contract deadline is not met, payment from the retailer or design 
house is not made.  It follows that, without payment, workers’ wages are not paid.  Thus, in enterprises 
where there was a clearer distinction between the owner of the enterprise and home-workers, the 
pressure and risks of the business were effectively placed upon workers.  
 
Overall, this research and targeted campaigns by the SACTWU have revealed a blatant disregard of labor 
regulations by CMT firms.  Not only did CMTs prevent the union from organizing workers in the factories, 
but they also refused access to Department of Labor and Bargaining Council inspectors.  This is despite 
the fact that Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 compels them to adhere to these statutes.  In terms of 
the nature of labor conditions and law, the Bargaining Councils have jurisdiction, comprising a 
geographical area and an industrial scope under which respective home-based enterprises fall and thus, 
in theory are required to register with the relevant council, even if it is for the purpose of seeking 
exemption from the provisions of the council’s agreement.  However, most enterprises do not register 
with the council and consequently make it difficult for the inspectorate to monitor unless there is a 
formal complaint. 
 
The LRA in Section 32 provides that agreements concluded at Bargaining Councils may be extended to 
non-parties in certain circumstances.  Nevertheless, for the reasons noted above, the extension of 
Bargaining Council agreements to non-parties has not extended regulation to home-based work (and 
has possibly given impetus to its growth).  Although unions and others frequently call for stricter 
enforcement of collective agreements, it is no simple matter to achieve such enforcement.  The 
enforcement strategy (of taking employers to the Labor Court) that offers some prospect of success 
would target the contractors and intermediaries, who supply work to home-based enterprises.  
However, this could raise complex jurisdictional issues.  Many contractors or intermediaries would 
probably argue that they are not part of the clothing industry as such, but provide a service.  
Furthermore, the FPMs at the top of the supply chain are also not likely to be of assistance in this regard                                                         
12 As a reminder:  Survivalist operations are similar to home-based CMTs, except that they do not have the facilities 
and sometimes skills to do their own cutting.  Furthermore, survivalist operations, unlike many home-based CMTs, 
have a blurred line that divides owners and the workers who often work alongside each other as home-workers 
(Godfrey, Clarke and Greenberg 2005). 
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even though it is a contravention of the agreement for a registered employer to put out work without 
the authority of the council.  
 
Thus, labor conditions and laws are more readily adhered to in the formal sector as opposed to the 
informal sector on the primary basis that firstly, formal sector employers are more easily monitored for 
compliance and secondly the workers are legally able to and knowledgeable to form or join unions.  The 
situation is different for home workers.  There is the obvious challenge of identification of the real 
employer, someone who is liable for breach of legislation, on the basis that there may be more than one 
intermediary involved and the relationship between the workers.  Despite some laws that intend to 
protect both informal and formal workers, home-based workers, by nature of their work, are often 
excluded from legislative protection owing to their isolated nature and lack effective representation, 
unlike formal unionized workers whose trade unions can safeguard such rights on their behalf. 
 
 
5. Labor institutions 
 
South Africa’s labor legislation states that all workers have the right to join a trade union of their choice.  
The history and current reality of union organizing in South African workplaces is important.  South 
African’s apartheid regime produced a hostile political environment that restricted the establishment 
and growth of political movement.  Many political organizations, such as the African National Congress 
(ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Pan African Congress (PAC) were banned.  In 
response, the South African trade union movement seized this as an opportunity to engage with 
workers’ struggles and extend such struggles beyond the workplace to include community concerns.  
Many trade union officials played a dual role of shop floor and worker demands and political 
mobilization of communities.  This kind of “social movement unionism” became important in linking 
workplace struggles about higher wages and discrimination to broader community struggles for 
democracy.  Thus, in the absence of political organizations, such as the ANC, the South African trade 
union movement led these political, social and economic struggles.  However, with the advent of 
democracy and the unbanning of many political organizations, trade unions lost their impetus and 
slowly withdrew from community struggles.  The "social movement unions" of the 1980s disappeared 
and "business unionism" was born in the late 1990s (Buhlungu 2006).  Trade unions retreated to their 
traditional forms, and adopted new structures of consultation and social dialogues at workplace and 
state level.  The tripartite political alliance that governs South Africa is led by the ANC, which is the ruling 
party, and is comprised of SACP and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).  The alliance 
offered trade unions the hope of engaging differently with government, thus social movement unionism 
was perceived to be irrelevant.  The tripartite alliance offered COSATU the possibility to influence state 
policy and thus advance workers’ demands in government.  This is possible when trade union leaders 
are co-opted into senior government positions.  One recent example is the appointment of the South 
African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU)’s general secretary as Minister of Economic 
Development.  However, there is much debate about the actual extent of labor’s (COSATU's) influence in 
the alliance.  
 
One of COSATU’s affiliates is the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU), which is 
the majority union in the clothing and textile industry in South Africa.  SACTWU and the South African 
Self Employed Women’s Association (SASEWA) have attempted to organize informal or CMT workers but 
their campaigns have so far been erratic and patchy, with no large-scale successes.   
        
5.1. Standard trade unions:  South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union  
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5.1.1.  Background 
 
SACTWU is the dominant union in the fashion manufacturing industry with a reported membership of 
85,000 (constituting more than 85% of the workforce in the industry).  The union organizes workers in 
the clothing, textiles, leather, footwear and allied distribution industries.  It organizes workers from 
various operations in the industry including, spinning mills, CMT operations, footwear factories, cotton 
gins and even (reportedly) home-workers.  SACTWU, as a mainstream union, mainly focuses on 
providing support to workers in formal employment.  The key function of SACTWU is collective 
bargaining, in which it negotiates wages, terms, and conditions of employment for workers in the 
bargaining council.  SACTWU also provides numerous social benefits for its membership such as the 
awarding of higher education scholarships for members and their dependents. The union also initiated a 
Worker Health Program in 1998; an HIV and AIDS worker education program that offers various services 
related to prevention, treatment, and support.  This includes a HIV and AIDS counseling and testing for 
members, life skills training, home-based care, stipends for children with special needs, and a funeral 
and retirement fund.13  
 
One important piece of background in the garment industry is the Industrial Strategy Project proposed 
in the early 1990s by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), SACTWU’s parent 
federation.  As noted above, COSATU advocated with employers for a “quick response”-oriented 
flexibilization of production, but employers instead opted for labor externalization and casualization. 
However, COSATU and SACTWU have continued to be interested in ways to work with employers to add 
flexibility to production while preserving job quality. 
 
Registered (formal) enterprises are generally easier to organize as they are likely to comply with labor 
law, tax and occupational health and safety measures and are easier to identify.  As noted above, the 
union has persuaded the Bargaining Council to extend its agreements to cover wages and working 
conditions nationwide, including those of workers in informal enterprises.  In principle this means 
minimum protection and minimum conditions of work for all workers in the clothing sector, regardless 
of whether they belong to the union or not.  But the expansion of subcontracted and home-based work 
has resulted in a multitude of challenges that SACTWU faces in its ability to effectively organize home-
based workers and in general, informal workers.   
 
5.1.2. Challenges  
SACTWU identified several specific challenges that make organizing home-workers exceptionally 
difficult: 
1. High mobility and flexibility of small enterprises.  Small enterprises are able “to pack up and 
move the next day in order to evade union membership”.   
2. The employer-employee relationship is often blurred. “Many of the managers are also 
sitting at the machines working alongside the other workers”  
3. Loyalty to the manager.  “Often the designers are also the employers”  
4. Resistance to joining trade unions amongst home-workers because they do not pay taxes 
and do not have to pay travel costs.  
5. Workers disillusioned with trade unions because of their failure to defend their rights.  
                                                        
13 Source:  SACTWU 
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6. Irregular working hours and income. “They may have to work this week. Suddenly they 
might start working in the evenings to finish off orders but then next week there is no one 
there because there is no work.”  This also makes it difficult to locate and contact workers. 
7. Workplaces located in homes or garages and deliberately placed in backyard factories.  “This 
makes them difficult to locate and track down to organize.”14 
 
A major challenge in organizing workers is their invisibility to the outside world as well as to each other.  
From the interviews carried out, there is no evidence of any interaction between the home-based 
workers at the operation and others in the industry.  Thus, it is difficult to bring home-based workers 
together.  In addition, every organization is supposed to have common collective issues, but “developing 
a set of common or collective” demands is often very difficult.  In practice, it is crucial to have a clear 
understanding of the home-workers as an entity.   
 
SACTWU's organizing drive for workers in the informal economy started around 1999 but by mid-2001, 
the union had only recruited approximately 148 workers of which 72 were paid-up members.  According 
to a SACTWU official,    
 
SACTWU started a project to organize informal workers.  We took a resolution mid-2000 
to organize in the clothing informal sector.  But unfortunately, we have not really done a 
lot.  We did identify quite a number of areas in Cape Town to be unionized.  So we have 
not really done a lot. (Interview, Union official) 
 
Notwithstanding, whatever momentum SACTWU’s drive had gathered, it appears to have vanished. 
Most of the home-workers interviewed were doubtful of the prospects of SACTWU effectively 
organizing home-workers.  For instance, none of the interviewees had any knowledge of the project that 
SACTWU had launched to organize home-workers.  Furthermore, it was found that there was fear 
among those who were employees (those working for the subcontractors) that they would be dismissed 
if they joined the union or tried to organize themselves as home-workers.  Although the sample used in 
the research was small, it nonetheless provided a useful picture of home-workers’ attitude towards 
trade union/formal organizing.  
 
The following attitude towards formal organization emerged from the interviews carried out.  Almost all 
the workers interviewed were aware of the existence of the union, however, when asked if she would 
join a union, one female employee replied: 
 
I cannot join any organization and I would not want to be a member of any organization.  
I have two small kids I need to take care of.  I do not have time for any of that stuff. 
(Interview, CMT worker #1) 
 
Further, all the workers interviewed felt that the union was unable to meet their needs.  Another 
apparent theme in the interviews was that of the need to balance domestic and work responsibilities 
and the attractiveness of homework in providing such balance.  Thus, any form of organizing was not 
only seen as a waste of time but one that would upset the balance.  As noted by yet another female 
employee interviewed: 
                                                         
14 Interview, SACTWU’s Official:  Vlok, 2011 in Webster and Joynt (2011, 14) 
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No, I am not a member of any organization.  I would not want to be a member of any 
organization.  I have no time for such organizations; my husband is not feeling well so I 
do not have time to be going to other places. (Interview, CMT worker #2) 
 
Another reason for not joining unions was that most of the home-workers did not view themselves as 
employees but rather as self-employed.  As discussed above, home-workers can usually be sub-divided 
into two categories with differing needs:  owners of home-working operations and employees.  But for 
many employees, the line is blurred.  For instance, in one interview conducted, when asked what form 
of assistance one of the home-working operation owners needed, she replied as follows:   
 
I require support to become my own person, to work on my own, buy my own material.  
All I need is just a push.  The design house provides everything from the material to the 
designs; it is very hard to do your own things.  If there was business support, it would be 
better. (Interview, CMT worker #2) 
 
Evidently, her perceived needs were mainly business-related and linked to the prospects of growing her 
business further.  From the other interviews conducted, the needs of the home-workers were not as 
clear but appeared to be centered on a degree of flexibility along with the ability to earn an income.  
Thus, any efforts to organize the workers in the industry need to take into account these unique 
attributes of home-based work.  
 
In addition, some of the home-workers were not willing to join the union because they did not want to 
lose their money through contributions to the union while most of the workers felt they had nothing to 
gain in being members of unions or any other organization.  Only one home-worker was willing to 
entertain the prospect of other forms of organization, notably the possibility of community 
organizations such as women's support groups in the area.  
 
For trade unions, it was easy to organize visible workers as opposed to informal workers:      
 
People that are like sort of clearly visible are employees in bigger enterprises with 20 or 
more employees.  Those that cannot, perhaps operate...we call it cottage operations, 
that is where you work on your backyard.  They are also very scared to join the union. 
(Interview, Union Organizer #1) 
 
There are also family CMTs and businesses.  The husband, the wife, the daughter and 
three or four of them work on the machines.  They all work together.  You normally find 
this in the Indian community.  So it becomes difficult for the union to organize this family 
business because the moment you join the union it means that the family relationship 
might actually break.  (Interview, Union Organizer #2) 
 
CMT workers love the union, they love the union deep in their hearts.  But they have to 
choose between joining a union that will demand high wages, and unemployment.  They 
would rather be paid poor wages to pay for their bread and butter every day.  They will 
tell you, “even if I get two hundred rand as long as my daughter can go to primary school 
in the morning.  I like what the union is going to do for me because they have done a. b. 
c. d. for us.  But the moment you come here, once he [the owner] knows that there is a 
union here he will make sure that the business closes.”  (Interview, Union Official)  
 
47 
 
The above statements signal the challenges facing trade unions in their efforts to effectively organize 
the informal sector—including difficulty in getting businesses to register, and difficulty in recruiting 
workers in unregistered, but also registered, businesses at the informal end of the spectrum.  Regardless, 
there have been some efforts on the part of the union towards resolving this.  
 
5.1.3. New union strategy:  Needs of informal workers 
SACTWU in recognition of the differing needs of informal workers has introduced new organizational 
strategies and modes of representation in a bid to attract this sector.  Some of these include the 
introduction of easily accessible clinics, optometrists, and dentists as part of the healthcare fund.  
Others include medical aid, funeral benefits, HIV/AIDS testing, education and a pilot anti-retroviral (ARV) 
program.  Additionally, SACTWU has endeavored to offer education scholarship programs for workers 
children.  Contributions towards these benefits are made by the employer and sometimes by the 
workers as part of their union membership fees.  SACTWU also assists some owners and managers of 
CMTs by providing services such as managing books for finance in order to ensure that the CMTs are 
conforming to legislation.  
 
5.1.4. One strategy:  Faith-based networks and moral pressure 
The only type of association that has deep support amongst subcontracted and home-based workers is 
faith-based associations.  To harness this power the union would need to form coalitions of mutual 
interest with churches and mosques.  This would be similar to the prevailing situation in which faith-
based organizations are assisting individual members, mainly immigrants, with various services ranging 
from job referrals and legal advice.  The trade unions would similarly tap into these networks and foster 
strengthened coordination, which would in turn aid them to garner more power. 
 
The form of alliances between worker organizations and faith-based allies can be said to be mainly of a 
solidarity nature.  In the instance of SACTWU, it recognized the need to form strategic partnerships with 
the community, with the obvious point of entry and the potential source of power being faith-based 
organizations.  Such coalitions possess a number of attractive resources for the unions, such as 
possessing expertise upon which unions can draw on.  Religion is a potential complementary source of 
organization and power, not only for immigrants in times of economic and social exclusion, but also for 
local South Africans, many of whom are experiencing economic hardship.  There is a large following of 
Pentecostal churches, and other religious organizations that provide spiritual, social and financial 
support and networks.  These faith-based organizations often provide legal advice and job referrals—
functions one would expect unions, labor brokers, legal advisors and other organizations to provide.  
 
5.1.5. Another strategy:  Membership structure 
Another effort to spark organizing of home-based workers is that of the SACTWU Congress of 2010, 
which introduced a new membership category consisting of associate membership for six sets of 
workers, namely retired workers, retrenched workers, family members, students, designers, and home-
workers.  Of these, the most successful initiative has been with the students, who have formed the 
SACTWU Students Union.  In the case of such home-workers, the aim is to set up a special unit that 
would give these home-workers benefits, for example, not having to pay dues, which would usually be 
1% per week with a minimum and a maximum amount. 
 
5.2. Informal workers’ organizations:  South African Self-Employed Women’s Association   
 
The South African Self-Employed Women’s Association (SASEWA) is a revival of the Self Employed 
Workers Union (SEWU) that functioned from 1994-2004.  SEWU collapsed due to internal organizational 
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challenges.  SASEWA, based in Durban, the capital of KwaZulu Natal, organizes different women workers 
in the informal sector ranging from those working with traditional herbs, dressmakers working from 
home, home plowing, to those who are doing craft such as beadwork, baskets and grass mats.  The goal 
of SASEWA is to assist these women to collectively deal with the challenges they face in their various 
businesses. 
 
SASEWA is affiliated to Streetnet and has in the past had some contact with unions such 
as COSATU through its alliance with other similar interest groups referred to as the 
Ubumbhano, which was formed to offer representation at the municipality level.  
Notably, the work of SASEWA primarily focuses on those small time home-workers 
working for themselves or those employing less than three employees.  Thus their 
organizing strategy is more of a personalized nature relying on the referral system. 
(Interview, SASEWA representative) 
 
SASEWA is primarily a women’s organization that registers women from the age of eighteen upwards 
and includes children that are unable to complete their studies and opt to work as home-workers.  The 
members of SASEWA mostly work independently with occasional contracts.  The recruitment and 
organizing method involves door-to-door visitations and distribution of information pamphlets that 
explain the organization's work.  In the long term, the organization aims to assist workers in obtaining 
financing opportunities for their businesses, and set up funeral insurance for its members, who mainly 
work in the streets and lack adequate resources to pay for insurance policies, through pooling their 
contributions towards this policy.  SASEWA’s strategy is to provide these benefits through partnerships 
with other organizations. 
 
According to SASEWA, the organization has been able to encourage women to come together and 
collectively find solutions to their common problems that are specific to their type of work.  Additionally, 
SASEWA has been instrumental in helping its members acquire networking opportunities to further their 
businesses through meetings arranged, for instance, with municipalities.  SASEWA has assisted members 
to access higher education through sponsorships awarded based on their membership in the 
organization.  However, SASEWA faces some challenges in its operations, especially in terms of funding, 
human resources and adequate office space for its many members who have no proper trading places.  
 
As was illustrated in the case of the inner city Johannesburg Fashion District, workers in the informal 
sector tend to form alliances mainly with religious groupings (Webster and Joynt 2011).  Through such 
networks, they can access new business/clients, premises or sometimes links to financing for their 
businesses as well as employment in some instances.  In the case of the informal sector organizing group 
SASEWA, alliances have been formed with other like-minded organizations in order to have stronger 
recognition, as well as representation for instance with the municipality and with bigger established 
unions, such as the COSATU. 
 
Alliances have equally been sought with international solidarity organizations in terms of funding for 
capacity-building for worker organizations.  For example as noted by SASEWA representative, their 
organization has been a beneficiary of international solidarity organizations:   
 
Hivos is an organization from Netherlands with an office branch based in Johannesburg. 
They came to check what we have done in the past year with the funds they gave us.  We 
again filled in the forms that they required and so there is hope that our funding will be 
renewed. We have that hope even though we are not sure it will happen but they have 
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promised us.  (Interview, SASEWA representative) 
 
SASEWA notes that while it has in the past attempted to forge alliances with political organizations in 
order to enhance its operations, the results have been disappointing.  For example, the organizations 
representative recalls a particular incident,  
 
When the ANC came, we had many members from KwaZulu [where the ANC was 
historically weak].  Women from the ANC came to speak to our members.  That was the 
end.  The ANC wanted to get in to KwaZulu because it did not exist there at that time. So 
with the arrival of the ANC, some of our members from eShowe, eMpangeni [cities in 
KwaZulu] joined the ANC.  The ANC was only campaigning and never helped us in 
anyway.  Our organization fell apart after this ANC campaign.  They did it for themselves 
and did not help us in anyway.  (Interview, SASEWA representative) 
 
For SASEWA, the need to form strategic alliances is even more pertinent given the complexity of 
involving informal sector workers.  To this end, the Ubumbano alliance of SASEWA and ten other 
organizations, which include Achib, Asiye, The Eye, Simunye, and Sayiwa, gives the organization a much-
needed voice.  As noted by the SASEWA General Secretary;  
 
Forming Ubumbano was to prevent the municipality in Durban from dividing and ruling 
us.  For example if I as SASEWA go to the municipality and speak to them, the 
municipality have a tendency to divide street vendors.  There are those that they favor 
and those that they do not. So when we go to negotiate with the municipality we go 
together.  We do not want the municipality to separate us.  (Interview, SASEWA 
Representative) 
 
5.3. Worker cooperatives 
 
In addition to SASEWA, there has been a proliferation of worker-owned production cooperatives in 
recent years.  As compared to companies (factories), cooperatives are governed by a piece of legislation, 
separate from the Labour Relations Act. The Cooperatives Act of 2005 defines co-operative workers as 
"shareholders" and "members.”  On the face of it, worker-owned cooperatives are a step in the right 
direction in terms of workers organizing themselves, forging alliances and owning factories.  The 
problem though in South Africa, is that workers do not own the majority of these co-ops.  These sham 
cooperatives are in reality factories with standard employment relations (i.e., the employer-employee 
relationship), and the coops are simply created to by-pass legislation and collection agreements.  
Changing the legal status of a factory (CMTs or FPMs) from a private company to a cooperative means 
exemption from labour law and collective bargaining agreements (such as paying minimum wages).  
These pseudo-cooperatives are on the increase as factories are conveniently converted into 
cooperatives, and workers become “shareholders.”  This phenomenon is on the rise in many parts of 
KwaZulu-Natal.  SACTWU is aware of the rise and challenges of these types of cooperatives and it 
resolved to organize these workers, regardless of their factories’ legal status.  A SACTWU national 
official stated that 
 
We are aware that there are many bogus cooperatives in the industry and we agreed to 
stop them by going into these factories and organizing workers. These cooperatives are 
created to circumvent our labour laws and we are telling workers to be aware of this 
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latest trend in undermining worker rights. (Telephone Interview, SACTWU National 
official)  
 
SACTWU and other COSATU affiliates have successfully lobbied the government to amend the Act.  A 
government process has started to amend the Co-operatives Act by limiting co-operative exemptions to 
co-operatives with fewer than 50 members.  This amendment might not resolve the problem (especially 
for organizing), because many pseudo-cooperatives with more than 50 workers may opt to split and 
become even more hidden (because of their size) and further undermine the collective power of 
workers.  The amended Act will however specify that all cooperatives must comply with labour 
legislation and the Act will be aligned with the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Recommendation 
193 of 2002 for the promotion and strengthening of cooperatives.  The revised Co-operatives Act is 
expected later this year (2013).   
 
 
6. Implications for possible and future strategies  
 
The South African Clothing and Textile Union’s (SACTWU) campaigns to organize home-based/CMT 
workers have had some notable success in established and visible CMT operations.  The example of 
SACTWU vs. Feltex (below, Box 1), provides a useful example what is possible when organized labor 
(SACTWU) implements its resolution to organizing vulnerable workers and thus challenges employers to 
comply with collective agreements.  However, this case has not deterred other employers from 
deliberately evading the law and not wanting to comply with collective agreements.  SACTWU has 
continued with this strategy of taking employers to court, with varied results. It is not surprising 
therefore, that the number of such Labor Court cases has increased over the years.   
 
Box 1:  Campaign against labor brokers:  SACTWU vs. Feltex 
  
In 2000, SACTWU and Feltex concluded a collective agreement on wages and conditions of employment. 
The company then decided to outsource a large part of its labor to a labor broker.  These "outsourced" 
workers were paid less than the rates prescribed in the wage agreement.   The union took up the matter 
and argued that all employees (including the "outsourced" labor) must be paid the same rates as set out 
in the collective agreement.  The union won the matter at arbitration at the CCMA in 2001.  The 
company took the award on review to the Labor Court, but lost with costs.  They then took the matter 
further, to the Labor Appeal Court but lost again.  Not satisfied, the company took the matter to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled on the matter in late 2005. This Court 
also dismissed the matter with costs against the company.  The SACTWU vs. Feltex case provides 
important wage and other conditions of employment rights to workers employed under labor brokers. 
Source:  SACTWU 2006 
 
The success of SACTWU vs. Feltex and others (for additional examples, see Appendix B, Table B.5.) have 
meant that some of these CMT workers, mainly in medium enterprises, are now organized and/or 
exposed to trade unions.  A major concern is for  “invisible” workers, working in backyard garages and in 
survivalist operations.  Both trade union organizers and labor inspectors are unable to reach these 
operations.  Given the additional challenges of organizing CMT workers (discussed earlier) such as 
reluctance to join the union, mistrust of trade unions, job insecurity, limited resources, and many 
others; it seems that trade unions have to adopt two organizing strategies, one more traditional and one 
more innovative.  These two strategies should be employed concurrently, for maximum benefits.  
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Though we categorize these as a "traditional" and an "innovative" strategy, both strategies can be 
described as a combination of traditional and new trade union strategies.  
 
Before we describe these strategies, it is important to examine the basis for both strategies:  the fact 
that success in organizing informal workers is tied to employment security.  Even though some home-
workers may in theory be able to exercise their rights as employees against such a nominal employer, in 
practice it is difficult to do so.  This is because the person who ultimately determines their security of 
employment is the person giving out work, or from whom the intermediary receives work.  The term 
“triangular employment relationship” is used to describe this kind of relationship, although it is more 
appropriate in the case of labor brokering than home-working, where there may be several 
intermediaries between the worker and the “real” employer. 
 
Thus, greater employment security could be achieved by elaborating the rights of workers in a triangular 
employment relationship vis-à-vis the “real” employer.  Workers of a labor broker, for example, 
currently have no recourse against the client who, for whatever reason, may decide not to utilize their 
services.  The client is only jointly and severally liable for breaches of legislation by the broker as the 
workers are not part of the formal contract with the client.  Thus, home-worker is in an even more 
insecure position.  At any point the person giving out work can shift to another manufacturer, whether 
home-based or not, without even the inconvenience of giving the home-worker notice.  In this event, 
the work will simply cease.  In theory, the home-worker, if an employee, would have recourse against 
the owner of the home-working operation for severance pay as well as any other monies owing.  In 
practice, however, it is unlikely that the owner will be in a position to pay.  Keeping in mind these 
conditions, below we explore the traditional and new strategies that could increase the effectiveness of 
organizing subcontracted and home-based workers.  
 
6.1. Traditional union strategies – “business as usual”  
 
Traditional trade union strategies such as SACTWU may work best in established CMT operations.  These 
strategies use the existing resources and infrastructure (financial and organizing tactics).  What is 
needed are ongoing and not incidental or ad hoc organizing strategies for CMT workers.    
 
• Given the capacity (albeit dwindling) within the trade union and federation, unions could take 
on the role of monitoring outsourcing contracts by FPMs and ensuring that labor standards are 
enforced in contracts.  A database of such contracts and CMT recipients would be useful to track 
potential trade union members.   
 
• SACTWU could use the existing legislation and various collective bargaining forums.  The union 
could initiate a tripartite forum (labor, employers and government) to discuss and reach some 
consensus about common concerns. Indeed the employers and trade unions do not necessarily 
have common interests, but common ground could be sought for the “benefit of the industry.”  
This could encourage compliance with collective bargaining agreements, reduce “unfair 
competition” between employers, and union membership could increase.  
 
• Effective monitoring against non-compliance is essential in the industry.  At present, the 
Department of Labor’s inspectors rely mostly on SACTWU’s information in tracking non-
complying companies.  This close working relationship between labor inspectors and trade 
union official is important.  Based on the interviews conducted with labor inspectors, it was 
clear that often their responsibility to monitor was affected by lack of capacity, skills and 
52 
 
resources (human and financial).  FPMs also have vested interest in ensuring that there is 
universal compliance to eliminate unfair internal competition.  From the various successful labor 
court victories by SACTWU, labor institutions (particularly the Labor Courts and CCMA) also have 
a role to play in ensuring compliance and thus protecting worker rights.  A deliberate and formal 
alliance against non-compliance between labor (SACTWU), government (Department of Labor’s 
inspectors) and employers (registered FMPs and CMTs) can be established.  This has the 
potential to shift industrial relations in this industry from being adversarial to cooperation.  Such 
a forum would also propose measures to deal with employers who would want to retaliate. 
Compliance favors all stakeholders in the industry.  For employers, unfair competition will be 
eliminated if all employers comply.  For workers, better working condition, including the right to 
join a trade union, and standard wages can be achieved.  For government, improved industrial 
relations could mean economic growth.          
 
6.2. Non-traditional union strategies – “thinking outside the box”  
 
For workers in small-scale home-based and survivalist operations, non-traditional organizing strategies 
have to be sought.  For example, trade unions can recruit these members as “non-paying members.”  
This would cater for their casual employment status and low wages.  This strategy will increase the 
union’s visibility in the whole industry not just in FPMs.  For those who are retrenched, unemployed and 
former members of the union, a new category of membership could be established – “friends of 
SACTWU.”  This strategy would also cater to family businesses where the distinction between the 
employer and employee is blurred.  SACTWU and other new workers' organizations such as SASEWA 
could, as part of their strategy perform an oversight and monitoring functions of subcontracting and 
outsourcing done by FPMs.  Therefore, because employers will continue to outsource some of their 
activities, trade unions could use this space to encourage better wages and working conditions for all 
CMT workers.  Finally, as noted above, worker organizations could also fruitfully collaborate with 
religious organizations, which enjoy higher levels of trust and participation by informal workers. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the possibility of organizing informal and vulnerable workers is dependent on a number of 
factors.  Firstly, the size of the enterprise is the most important factor.  The larger the firm, the greater 
the chances that it is registered, easy to locate, in compliance, workers are registered, and easily 
organized.  This is challenge in South Africa, given that the majority of enterprises are small (with less 
than 50 employees).  As expected, large FPMs are more likely, as compared to Survivalist CMTs, to be 
registered and have a unionized workforce.  Secondly, the status of the enterprise is important.  If the 
enterprise is registered, there is a possibility to organize or at least to enforce collective bargaining 
agreements.  But, most of these enterprises bypass collective agreements by applying for exemptions 
based on their size.  Thirdly, some enterprises that are not unionized have standard employment 
relations, meaning workers have employment contracts.  Levels of insecurity for these workers are 
relatively low and they thus could be persuaded to join a union.  All of this depends on workers’ 
willingness to be organized and the trade unions’ capacity to recruit outside their traditional base, or of 
alternative organizations like SASEWA to achieve stable growth.  For traditional trade unions such as 
SACTWU, the recruitment of informal workers will require new and unfamiliar strategies and structures, 
which are likely to require extra resources.  Alternative organizations, while grounded in innovative 
strategies and structures, face a South African society in which labor institutions, allies, and 
consciousness are focused overwhelmingly on trade unions.  Notwithstanding the prevailing set of 
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difficult circumstances in organizing informal and vulnerable workers, the findings of this research 
indicate that there are possibilities for successful organizing strategies.  
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IV.      India:  From standard unions to SEWA 
 
1.    Introduction 
 
Of all the countries under study, India has the greatest preponderance of informal workers (operating as 
subcontractors and as home-based workers).  The textile and garment industry was important before 
and during the colonial era, and it remained an engine of industrialization in the country after 
independence.  Although the industry was often touted as a symbol of India’s participation in the 
modern global economy, its growth always relied on subcontracting and home-based work.  Under 
colonialism, the export-oriented, demand driven production structure demanded substandard labor 
conditions.  After independence, Indian capital undermined the growing labor organizations by turning 
to unregulated small-scale powerlooms for production.  In recent years, the garment industry’s reliance 
on informal work has been amplified by the country’s liberalization reforms and return to export-
oriented production.  Through these periods, a variety of workers’ organizations have emerged to 
protect the diverse group of Indian garment workers.  Toward the end of colonialism, formal mill 
workers organized into powerful unions that continue to exist today.  In the 1970s, new organizations 
emerged to focus specifically on the home-based workers that were left out of the formal mill workers’ 
unions.  Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, since India’s formal liberalization efforts, more 
organizations have emerged to protect subcontracted workers in the industry; during this period the 
older organizations (for formal workers and for home-based workers) have also continued to expand 
and innovate on strategies.   
 
The following report is based on a literature review conducted in the fall of 2012 and a field visit 
(conducted by Rina Agarwala in January 2013).  During this visit, Agarwala interviewed government 
officials in the Delhi Labor Ministry and the national-level offices of Employees’ State Insurance (ESI), as 
well as leaders and members of textile/garment unions.  Union interviews included:   
• Traditional politically-affiliated unions (AITUC and CITU—at local, district, and national levels)15 
• Independent unions (GAWU—at Head Office and local levels)16 
• Independent unions for informal workers (LERN/MKS and SEWA—at Head Office and local 
levels)17 
 
1.1.    Prevalence of subcontracted and home-based labor in India 
 
Various forms of informal labor are endemic in India, amounting to 93 percent of total workers and 82 
percent of nonagricultural workers (Agarwala 2013).  Within this, WIEGO (2012) estimates India’s home-
based workforce at 16 percent of the total workforce.  Moreover, between 2004 and 2010 the number 
of contract workers increased by 76% while the number of regular workers was nearly stagnant 
(Sethuraman 2011).  Subcontracting has been “officially endorsed in the recommendation of the Indian 
National Commission of Labour…which recommended the use of contract work in view of uncertain 
demand from global markets” (Sen and Dasgupta 2009, iv).  Textile and garment production conform to 
these national patterns, as we spell out below.   
                                                         
15 AITUC is All India Trade Union Congress and is affiliated to the Communist Party of India (CPI); CITU is Congress 
of Indian Trade Unions and is affiliated to the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM). 
16 GAWU is the Garment and Allied Workers’ Union. 
17 LERN is The Labor Education and Research Network; MKS is the Mahila Kamgar Sangatam (or Women Workers 
Union); and SEWA is the Self-Employed Women’s Association. 
55 
 
2.    Structure, labor standards, and labor organization 
 
2.1.    Textile production and labor in the colonial era (1800s-1947):  Handlooms and mills 
 
India’s textile production and labor organization began during the colonial era, and contemporary 
structures of production and organization still retain many marks of this history.  Unlike many colonies, 
India not only provided cheap raw materials to fuel England’s growing textile and apparel industries, it 
also engaged in its own textile manufacturing.  This took place through rural-based handlooms (which 
emerged before colonialism) and urban-based textile mills (which grew during the colonial era).  By 1900, 
there were 86 textile mills in India; by 1926, Mumbai alone had more than eighty textile mills, which 
employed 125,000 workers—or 25 percent of the city’s working population at the time.     
 
3.1.1. Foreign vs. domestic ownership structure 
Interestingly, although much of the investment for Indian textile mills came from British investors during 
colonialism, the owners were primarily part of a burgeoning class of Indian capitalists (such as C.N. 
Davar in Bombay).  Even after independence, Indian textile mills (and today’s garment factories) tend to 
be owned by Indian capitalists, not foreign capital.  This has important implications on labor 
organizations’ strategies today (see below).     
 
3.1.2. Foreign vs. domestic consumption market 
Not surprisingly, Indian textiles in the colonial era focused primarily on production for export—
beginning with yarn (for China) and moving toward finer products and increased technological 
sophistication during the early 1900s.  However, by the 1930s the global depression (which reduced 
foreign demand for Indian products) coupled with the Indian independence movement (which called on 
Indians to purchase Indian-made products) forced Indian textile mills to rely more on domestic demand.  
As part of the nationalist sentiment just after independence, Indian textiles continued to focus on the 
domestic market until the 1980s (see below).  It was this turn to the domestic market under colonialism 
that forced the Indian textile industry to expand outside the traditional centers (such as Bombay) to 
include the smaller centers (such as Ahmedabad and Chennai) that continue to form important hubs of 
textile production today.  As shown in the Appendix to this report, most textile employment today is 
concentrated in the states that house the three cities of Bombay, Ahmedabad, and Chennai 
(Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu respectively).     
 
3.1.3. Labor structure 
During the colonial era, Indian textile mills were labor intensive and notorious for little capital 
investment; machines were usually imported and used until they collapsed.  Production was intensely 
competitive and relied on short-term demands.  As a result of this structure, the industry relied on a 
largely informal workforce that enjoyed little projection and regulation.18  Informal workers were 
recruited and disciplined by “jobbers”; deputy managers, who tended to be skilled craftsmen, in each 
mill department oversaw jobbers and served as intermediate authorities; and mill managers remained 
largely removed from the labor force, analyzing market demand and coordinating department 
production.  This decentralized labor structure is not unlike the present day scenario.     
 
3.1.4. Labor organization                                                         
18 Wage differentials were determined less by skill and more by-product, so weaving fine fabric held greater 
prestige and thus higher wages than weaving regular fabric.   
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Labor unions formed during the colonial era and became increasingly militant alongside the growth of 
the independence movement.  Given the large percentage of informal workers in the industry, these 
unions followed a familiar Western model of collective bargaining and focused on attaining formal 
protections and regulations for all workers in textile mills.  At first, they served as “respectable” advisory 
bodies that could mediate specific issues between capital and labor (Chandavarkar 1994, 405).  In 1928, 
when the textile industry faced an economic crisis due to overproduction, Japanese competition, and 
limited investment from the colonial state, N. M. Joshi and R. K. Bakhle organized the communist party-
affiliated Girni Kamgar Union (Mumbai Textile Labor Union) to fight for increased wages and formal 
protections. Girni Kamgar dominated Mumbai’s labor movement and became one of India’s largest 
unions.  Between 1929 and 1940, the union led eight general strikes, and hundreds of smaller strikes.  As 
part of a larger Indian union movement, Girni Kamgar attained some substantial successes in that it 
attained formal regulations and protections for India’s industrial workers under law (see below on labor 
laws).  Although the union is smaller today, it forms the basis of the main politically-affiliated garment 
workers’ union in India today (under AITUC).  Although it retains its traditional focus on formal workers, 
it is also one of the few traditional, politically-affiliated workers’ unions in India that has begun to 
examine the industry’s informal workers as well (see below).  
 
2.2.    Textile production in independent India (1947-1991):  The rise of powerlooms 
 
The post-independence era led to a few important changes in India’s textile industry.  Until the 1980s, 
the Indian economy was guided by a policy of import-substituting-industrialization (ISI), a strong 
emphasis on self-sufficiency, and a state that owned essential industries and regulated all industries.  As 
a result, the largely rural handloom sector was not prioritized and declined substantially.   
 
Ironically, despite the heavy focus on urban industrialization, the Indian textile mills in urban centers 
also declined during this period.  On one hand the Indian state supported textile mills.  State entities, 
such as the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI), Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of 
India (ICICI), and the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI), gave 56% of their “soft loans” to the 
textile industry until 1982 (van Wersch 1992).   On the other hand, however, the state’s refusal to 
import capital from abroad hurt textile mill development.  As the Indian government noted, the intent of 
the textile industry was not to modernize and use the most efficient technology; such technology “…may 
not be appropriate for the country” (Jain, 1981, cited in (RoyChowdhury 1995).  As a result of this policy, 
most mills became what are popularly known in India today as “sick.” From 1951-1987 total cloth 
production from mills declined from 79% to 48% (RoyChowdhury 1995).   
 
In place of handlooms and mills, a powerloom sector began to grow.  Powerlooms operate in largely 
extra-legal, small-sector establishments that are loosely protected by the state (RoyChowdhury 1995).  
Powerlooms emerged to produce cloth on a subcontract basis for mills and help avert shortages in cloth 
production for the domestic market.  Today they provide cloth for the ready-made garment factories 
that we explain below.  Some are also involved in dyeing, finishing, or printing textiles.  Laborers in 
powerlooms are paid less than in mills (and handlooms) and are thus thought to undermine labor power 
in the textile industry.  As the powerloom sector grew, the government began to treat larger 
powerlooms like mills in terms of labor and tax regulation.  To by-pass the regulation, powerloom 
owners split their operations into smaller units.19  Between 1956 and 1974, the share of small-scale, 
unregulated powerlooms (as a percentage of productive units) in Bombay increased from 23% to 90%                                                         
19 Small, unregulated powerloom establishments are defined as those with less than 4 powerlooms, employing less 
than 20 workers.  
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(Chandrasekhar 1982, cited in Van Wersch 1992).  Labor in the powerloom sector was (and remains), 
therefore, largely informal.   
 
In the 1980s, India began its initial liberalization efforts—with some de-licensing and deregulation.  As 
part of this effort, the government implemented the 1985 National Policy on Textiles (Hirway 2010).  
This policy aimed to save the floundering mills by lessening state control, increasing credit assistance, 
ending state takeovers of bankrupt mills (which had been done for the sake of employment 
preservation) and opening the market to the import of technology and machinery (RoyChowdhury 1995).  
This was considered a major shift in the government’s involvement in textile mills.  During this period, 
the Indian government also followed World Bank recommendations to set up some textile mills that 
were entirely export-oriented (van Wersch 1992).  Although mill owners celebrated the relaxation of 
imports and some mills did expand due to increased exports, efforts were limited by the confines of the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement.  Therefore, the decline of mills continued while powerlooms continued to 
grow (RoyChowdhury 1995).20   
  
Although total employment in the textile sector expanded by 25% during the 1980s, some reports argue 
that most of this employment came from the unregistered powerloom sector, while regulated, formal 
employment declined during this period (Government of India, cited in RoyChowdhury 1995).  
 
The growth of the powerloom sector is often credited in India for undermining the historic 1982-83 
textile mill strike in Bombay.  This strike, which was led by the Girni Kamgar Union for formal mill 
workers, is said to have marked the end of Bombay’s textile industry and the end of the textile union.  
Although powerlooms continue to exist today, we have been unable to find any organization that has 
attempted to organize the informal workforce in powerlooms.  To the best of our knowledge, these 
workers remain unorganized.       
 
2.3.    Garment and textile production in neoliberal India (1991-present):  Export factories and 
homework 
 
In 1991, India officially institutionalized its version of neoliberal reforms—furthering state deregulation 
of industry, increasing privatization, and opening its borders to global markets.  By this time, textile mill 
production was relatively low, and the large urban mills were beginning to close down.  In their place, 
garment factories for ready-made clothes were emerging outside city centers.  By 2001, garments 
contributed to 4% of India’s GDP and 20% of its industrial output.  Although garments constituted a 
relatively small share of total exports (less than 10%), it should be noted that they constituted 30% of 
export earnings (Commission 2001).  This indicates the high value-added component of textiles. 
 
Despite the high value-added component of Indian garments, employment in the garments industry is 
largely informal.  According to our field interviews, the liberalization reforms further exacerbated the 
informal, unprotected nature of textile work in India by not only encouraging more subcontracted and                                                         
20 The 1974 Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was an international quota regime that restricted the ability of 
developing countries to export textiles, yarn, and apparel and was designed to protect the textile industries of 
developed countries. The MFA limited trade negotiations to the bi-lateral level. In 1995, the MFA began to be 
phased out through a ten-year plan (Chadha, Rajesh, Sanjib Pohit, Robert M. Stern, and Alan V. Deardorff. "Phasing 
out the Multi-Fibre Arrangement:  Implications for India." Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) at Purdue 
University https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/3505.pdf.)  
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homework, but also weakening enforcement of labor regulation among the so-called “formally” 
employed contract workers.  In 2001, garments employed 38 million people in India (Commission 2001).  
However, scholars argue this figure underestimates total employment (especially among women), since 
it omits most informal work conducted in sub-contractors’ workshops or at home.  Some argue that 89% 
of workers in garments and 93% of women workers in garments work informally in either sub-
contractors’ workshops or their own homes (Hirway 2010).  Since the textile/garments industry has 
turned increasingly to informal subcontracting work, many formal workers have been laid off and 
become unemployed and relied on a spouse’s income (for example in bidi), rehired in garments on an 
informal basis, or turned to other forms of informal employment (such as street vending).  A study in 
Mumbai found that out of 60 street vendors, 58 of them turned to street vending after either they or 
their spouses lost a job in the formal textile industry (Bhowmik 1999).  
 
Among the most significant liberalization policies to affect Indian textile/garments are the following:    
 
• In 1998, textiles were moved to the Open General License list, which meant that the import of 
textiles was liberalized (Sivadasan 2006).  Until then, textile imports had been heavily regulated 
and restricted by the state.   
• In 2000, the National Textile Policy was implemented to facilitate the growth of Indian textiles 
for export by increasing competitiveness, encouraging FDI and R&D to make necessary 
technological improvements, and sustaining traditional craftspeople in the industry.  The policy 
aimed to increase textile (and garment) exports to US$50 billion by 2010.  
• In 2005, the 1974 Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was fully phased-out. 
 
As a result of these policies, Indian textile labor now operates in two broad groups:  export-oriented 
producers, and home-based producers serving a domestic market.  We address each in turn. 
 
2.3.1. Factories that produce garments for export 
These factories operate in areas where the state government has embraced liberalization and 
globalization as twin economic strategies that promise to improve state productivity and employment.  
The factories operate in institutional settings specifically designed to attract investors by offering 
employers exemptions on taxes and duties, license requirements, import/export restrictions, and 
foreign direct investment rules.  These new settings are usually self-contained entities that boast 
advanced infrastructure.  They include:  industrial estates, new economic hubs, special economic zones 
(SEZs), industrial model townships and theme parks. Many of them began in the late 1980s, when India 
first began to liberalize its economy, and the government donated land for the operations.  They have 
grown in number since the 2000s.  As a result of these new settings, most textile and garment factories 
have exited from the traditional urban centers.   
 
According to a recent survey of ten export-oriented textile factories in the northern district of Gurgaon, 
conducted by an advocacy group (Mazdoor Ekta Manch or Workers’ Unity Platform) and a New Delhi-
Based think tank (Society for Labour and Development), each factory employs between 300-2500 
workers.  They produce ready-made clothes for major global brands including:  GAP, Tommy Hilfiger, 
Marks & Spencers, Miss Sixty, Monsoon, Next, Debenhams, Wal Mart, Calvin Klein, and Land’s End, 
Nordstrom, Banana Republic, Kim Rogers, Coldwater Creek, J.Crew, Lane Bryant, DKNY, Chico’s, Sean 
Jean, Alfani, Great Girl, Halomen, Sonoma, Soma, Avenue, Essentials, Garfield and Marks, New Looks, 
Empire Stores, 3 Suisses, Camif, Claire, Ellos, Kappahl, H&M, Levi’s, Adidas, Inditex, Ann Taylor, Charles 
Voegele, WE, Miss Etam and Debenhams (Bhattacharjee 2012).  In other words, while the factories are 
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Indian-owned, they operate at the low end of a buyer-driven commodity chain, where production 
quantity, form, and quality are determined by foreign buyers (i.e. retailers).     
 
Although all labor laws technically apply to these settings, enforcement is notoriously weak.  SEZs have 
been given “Public Utility Status”, which means workers’ ability to use strikes are limited and litigation is 
discouraged.  In some SEZs, the Labor Minster does not have jurisdiction and all labor laws are enforced 
by the Customs Officer or the SEZ Development Commissioner.  As the Deputy Development 
Commissioner of NOIDA’s SEZ (NSEZ), openly stated to Agarwala:   
 
We act as the Labor Commissioner for NSEZ, so all labor disputes come to us, and we 
serve as the mediator.  It’s a single window method of dealing with everything at once.  
That is what makes the SEZ attractive.  Wednesday is my labor day, where I listen to all 
labor problems.  They don’t get payment on time or they are fired without notice.  I talk 
to management, and then they fix the problem.  But sometimes leaders of small unions 
form, and they are immediately taken out of work.  
 
Although all workers in SEZs are legally entitled to their right to organize, the Commissioner was candid 
about workers’ inability to organize in practice in SEZs.21   
 
The Commissioner also acknowledged that SEZs do subcontract work outside the factory premises, but 
only factory workers approach him with complaints—thereby, further reconfirming subcontracted 
workers’ invisibility and vulnerability.  Although export factories operate in the high-value added sector, 
they rely on cheap labor and low-end technology.  As shown in the Appendix to this report, this strategy 
has resulted in negative productivity growth in many states.  In recent years, global retailers have 
increasingly demanded that they deal with smaller numbers of large producers.  In response, many 
producers in India have formed umbrella organizations to meet the massive demands of major retailers; 
but the umbrella organizations do not preclude the smaller members from retaining an informal 
workforce.  High value producers have increased their size through vertical integration.  In addition, 
because garment production for exports relies on buyer’s orders, it is highly seasonal, increasing during 
festivals and holidays and declining at other times.  This leads to increased reliance on a flexible 
workforce.   
 
Based on our initial fieldwork, we found that export-oriented textile factories have three groups of 
workers:  permanent, contract, and piece-rate workers.     
 
Permanent workers are considered formal workers.  They comprise a small percentage of workers who 
deal with advanced tasks.  Unions reported that many permanent workers in export factories have been 
routinely denied their basic rights to organizing into unions, overtime pay, leave, appointment letters, 
minimum wage, timely payment of wages, illegal deductions from wages, and failure to contribute to 
workers’ pensions and insurance.  Perhaps the most common complaint among permanent workers is 
that employers terminate their employment without warning or cause.  Most of the remaining work is 
outsourced to contract workers and piece workers.   
 
Contract workers are those working for subcontractors.  Contract workers are considered informal 
workers, because nearly all contract workers are hired through chains of sub-contractors, thereby 
absolving the employer of any legal evidence of an employee relationship and any responsibility of labor                                                         
21 Interview, January 14, 2013. 
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regulation.  Contract workers hired through sub-contractors are not protected even under the Contract 
Labour Law.  Although they are informal and thus unregulated, they operate on the factory premises or 
in sub-contractors’ workshops.  According to our interviews with the AITUC-affiliated Garment Workers’ 
Union in the NOIDA Special Economic Zone in Northern India and with SEWA in Gujarat, export factories 
do not provide work to home-based workers.              
 
Of all the workers in export factories, contract workers are the most common and the most exploited.  
According to recent reports, they tend to be women (Hirway 2010); they tend to be first- and second-
generation rural-to-urban migrants (Jenkins forthcoming); and the number of dalits (members of the 
lowest caste in India) and minorities (such as Muslims or tribal members) among them are 
disproportionately higher than the national level and most of them are semi-literate or illiterate 
(Bhattacharjee 2012).  In our interviews, some unions mentioned that workers’ illiteracy prevented 
them from identifying the brands that they worked for, which made it difficult for unions to identify the 
commodity chain.     
 
Piece-rate workers are viewed as self-employed (and are thus informal and unregulated).  According to 
our interviews, they tend to be skilled, better compensated and consist mostly of men.  They often work 
seasonally, relying on agricultural income during parts of the year.  Initial reports indicate that they work 
at home.  We were not able to get much information about these workers during our first field visit, 
because they do not appear to be organized in the unions we interviewed.  In addition, the government 
offices for labor do not interact with them much.  As the Additional Labour Commissioner of Delhi 
explained: 
 
95% of our complaints come from unskilled contract workers.  The temporary nature of the 
export business means employers have to outsource work to contractors, and they lack 
supervision.  Without prosecutions, employers will violate laws.  This is the nasty side of humans.  
Enforcement is the mother of social entitlements.  But piece-rate workers rarely complain.  They 
are more skilled, and they can work for multiple factories at once, and they earn twice as much 
as permanent workers!22         
During our field visit, we found that a few unions have emerged to organize the permanent, contract, 
and piece-rate workers who work in the export factory premises.  Again, these workers include formal 
and informal workers.  These organizations do not yet organize contract and piece-rate workers 
operating in contractors’ workshops or at home.   
 
3.1.1. Home-based work that produces garments for domestic markets 
This is the second category of workers in the contemporary textiles/garments industry.  These workers 
are all informal.  These workers are largely women, although several interviewees mentioned that men 
are increasingly entering this sector.  Men are usually employed to conduct more skilled work, such as 
embroidery.  Women do the lower skilled work such as cutting cloth, dying cloth, the needling sequence, 
the washing sequence, and threading.  Although they are labeled as “unskilled” and paid as “unskilled”, 
women also sew full garments (from models provided by the contractor).  Some are recent migrants 
from rural areas; recent migrants tend to be young and live together in a rented shack.  Others are 
second or third generation migrants who own or rent homes in a slum; this group comprises of multiple 
generations within a family.  Some home-based workers operate thought sub-contractors, who are 
often members of their local slum or kinship networks.                                                               
22 Interview, January 14, 2013 
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Home-based workers include two types of workers:   
 
• Contract workers who work for “micro-factories.”  These workers operate in their homes or in 
sub-contractors’ workshops.  The micro-factories are small and often unregistered and 
unregulated.   
 
• Piece-rate workers who work for wholesale and retail shops.  These workers sometimes work 
through sub-contractors and sometimes work directly with shop owners.  This is the group of 
workers that SEWA organizes (see below).    
 
Several organizations, such as SEWA and LERN/MKS, have emerged to organize these workers in 
innovative ways (see below).   
 
2.4.    A note on the carpet industry 
 
The carpet industry in India is classified within textiles (see industrial classification in the Appendix).  The 
carpet industry has traditionally been done based on sub-contracting/putting out from home-based 
work (Seidman 2007).  In the 1980s, the carpet industry became more export oriented and began to 
grow.  To facilitate this growth, the government of India created training centers.   
 
Although the centers were limited to workers over age 12, many younger children were trained.  In 1981, 
the government had 600 centers producing 30,000 weavers under age 15 per year.  At the time, the 
Indian government actively encouraged child labor to meet the growing export demands.  International 
NGOs, particularly in the US, responded with a pressure campaign to eliminate child labor that resulted 
in the Rugmark certification, which we will discuss below. 
 
 
3.    Labor laws 
 
There are no labor laws specific to garment or textile workers in India.  Rather, garment and textile 
workers in India are protected under the nation’s general laws for all industrial labor.  On paper, these 
laws are relatively expansive.  In reality, however, they cover only 7% of the nation’s workforce.  Below 
is a review of these labor laws.   
 
Perhaps the most famous of Indian labor law is the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act, which requires large, 
formal, industrial establishments to obtain government permission for layoffs and closures.  This Act 
(along with the Indian Constitution) also protects workers’ right to form associations and unions.  For 
garments and textiles, this law only applies to large mills, not powerlooms.  The law does not apply to 
casual/contract/or informal labor.  Although this law only protects a minority of India’s workers (i.e. 
those who are formally employed), this law has been one of the main targets of criticism from advocates 
of neoliberalism and labor reform.     
 
To regulate working conditions in factories regarding sanitation, safety, and other health-impacting 
issues, the Indian government passed the 1948 Factories Act.  The 1948 Minimum Wages Act protects 
workers’ wages, according to skill level, and the 1965 Bonus Act guarantees a bonus to those working 
for more than 30 days.  Finally, the 1948 Employees’ State Insurance Act and the 1056 Employees 
Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act provided workers with old-age pension and insurance 
62 
 
in the case of sickness, injury, maternity leave, and death.  In some states, additional local laws 
supplement these national-level labor laws.      
 
To avoid all of these laws, as noted above, many mill employers splintered their operations into smaller 
units or powerlooms that were not covered by these regulations. 
 
The 1970 Contract Labor Act aims to extend basic health, safety, sanitation standards (restrooms, first-
aid facilities, etc.), and some wage regulations to contract workers.  This law is notorious for being weak 
and overtly ignored by the state and employers.  Moreover, this Act applies only to principal employers.  
Therefore, if principal employers use sub-contractors to hire contract workers, the sub-contract is held 
responsible.  As a result, almost no employer hires contract workers directly; rather they rely on long 
chains of sub-contractors to easily avoid this law.  As V.S. Arya, Joint Labor Commissioner for South 
District, Delhi and the License Officer for the Contract Labor Act, explained, “Outsourcing is not in the 
favor of workers.  Nowhere.  Section 10 of the Contract Labor Act says the government can abolish 
outsourcing.  But it has become a necessity with the recession.”23  In other words, even the primary 
enforcement official of the Act openly admitted that enforcement was thin.    
    
Lastly, the 1986 Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, forbid the employment of children below 
14 years of age in factories. 
 
Industry-specific legislation in textiles in India is limited to regulating the process of nationalizing “sick 
mills.”24  For example, the 1972 Sick Textile Undertakings Act stipulates that employees in the 
nationalized sick mills become employees of the National Textile Corporation.  This guarantee from the 
state meant that workers would be entitled to steady wages, pensions, and other benefits.  There were 
minor amendments made to this policy in the years that followed, with the final amendment coming in 
1995.  Interestingly, this coincides directly with the time that the 10-year period to phase out the MFA 
began, furthering the liberalization of the textile industry both internationally and domestically. 
 
Perhaps the most innovative institution that has emerged in India for garment workers in some states is 
the Welfare Board.  Welfare Boards are tripartite institutions, where state governments, employers, and 
workers have representation and contribute funds.  Employers’ contributions come from a tax on 
production, while workers’ contributions come from their membership dues.  To become a member of a 
Welfare Board, workers must prove their informal work status; unions normally educate workers about 
welfare boards and provide confirmation for workers’ informal status.  Welfare Boards are currently 
trade-based.  Perhaps the most famous are those for bidi (hand-rolled cigarette) manufacture and 
construction—both of which I have extensively analyzed elsewhere (Agarwala 2013).  Garment workers 
also have welfare boards; they appear to be relatively active in Gujarat, inactive in Maharashtra, and 
non-existent in Delhi.  In return for workers’ membership dues, Welfare Boards provide trade-specific 
benefits to informal workers.  In addition to offering material benefits, Welfare Boards help consolidate 
the identity of informal workers and provide a forum for their concerns.  In the section on SEWA, I 
describe the benefits allotted to informal workers in the garment industries.  Further analysis on the 
extent and effectiveness of these boards on garment and textile workers has yet to be conducted.                                                            
23 Interview, January 16, 2013 
24 Sick mill is a term used in India to describe mills that are not growing or attaining any profit, where the 
machinery has not been updated, and where few investments have been made. Before liberalization 
these mills were able to survive due to government support. 
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4.    The role of trade unions in textile and apparel in India 
 
Based on our initial fieldwork, we find that there are three distinct forms of unions organizing textile 
workers’ in India.  As detailed below, these organizations differ in terms of their target membership and 
their primary organizing strategy.  Significantly, despite their diverse membership and organizing 
strategies, all three union types are legally registered under Indian law.  The relationship between these 
three types of unions is often tense (especially between type #1 vs. types #2 and #3).  This section ends 
with a short note on NGOs, whose approach is very different from that of the unions.     
 
The three forms are:   
 
• Traditional unions that are affiliated to political parties.  These unions primarily organize 
formal workers, although some have recently begun to organize informal workers.  Membership 
is limited to workers operating in factory premises (particularly in export-oriented factories),  
 
• Independent unions.  These unions more explicitly organize formal and informal workers. Like 
traditional unions, their membership is limited to workers operating in factory premises (again, 
with a particular focus on export-oriented factories).  Because they are not affiliated to any 
political party, their strategies differ from traditional unions, and they tend to exercise 
something closer to "social movement unionism.”  
 
• Independent unions for informal workers.  Like type #2, these unions are not affiliated to any 
political party.  Unlike type #1 and #2, however, their membership is limited to informal workers 
only.  Their members operate outside factory premises (in sub-contractors’ workshops or 
homes). These workers tend to produce textiles for the domestic market.   
 
4.1.    Type 1:  Traditional, politically-affiliated unions 
 
The oldest and perhaps most typical textile unions in India are those affiliated to union federations, 
which in turn are affiliated to major political parties in India.  This has been a typical union organization 
strategy for formal workers in India since the independence movement formed under colonialism.  
Because the textile industry was so crucial to colonial rule in India, textile workers were instrumental in 
the independence movement.  The first “traditional” union of textile workers to form in India was that 
affiliated to AITUC.  As the list below indicates, since independence, several additional affiliated unions 
have arisen alongside the rise of new political parties.  Today these unions include:     
  
Federation All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), affiliated to the Communist Party of India (CPI) 
• Unspecified textile unions/federations 
• Unspecified jute unions/federations 
 
Federation Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), affiliated to the Indian National Congress 
Party (INC) 
• Indian National Textile Workers Federation 
• Indian National Jute Workers Federation 
 
Federation Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), affiliated to the Communist Party of India-Marxist 
(CPM) 
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• All India Jute Workers Federation 
• Unspecified textile federation/s 
 
Federation Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS) 
• Unspecified textile unions, totaling 61 
 
Federation Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), affiliated to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
• Unspecified textile unions, totaling 236 
• Unspecified clothing unions, totaling 36 
• Unspecified jute unions, totaling 54 
 
These unions greatly benefit from their historical experience, their institutional recognition, their 
political-party affiliations (and the resources that come with such affiliation), and their massive, 
national-level scale.  They also tend to be the most recognized institutional form by the Indian 
government.  Although government officials must mediate between unions and employers, they usually 
spoke of unions as their partners.  In Agarwala’s interview with the Additional Labour Commissioner of 
Delhi, for example, he exhibited a high respect/fear of traditional, politically-affiliated unions, and spoke 
at length about their “joint” action against employers.  In contrast, he belittled unions that are 
unaffiliated to parties:   
 
Non-affiliated trade unions are too small, they don’t have bargaining power.  They have 
no membership.  They can try to pressure consumers, but that is small.  We use the law 
and the courts.  We mainly pressure the employers.25  
 
Similarly, the Joint Director of the Employee’s State Insurance Corporation, explained, “Trade unions are 
my friends, because they help me carry out my duty.  We don’t have enough social security officers to 
inspect all factories, so we need to rely on other sources.”26  Because the ESI Act only applies to formal 
workers, Tripathi only partners with traditional, politically-affiliated unions.  Only the district level Labor 
Commissioner for South Delhi, was more candid, “Trade unions are a pain.”27  
 
Although traditional, politically-affiliated unions were extremely active in organizing textile workers 
after independence, many of them became inactive after the failure of the 1982 Mumbai textile strike, 
which involved 240,000 workers, lasted eighteen months, became renowned for being one of the largest 
and longest strikes in Indian history, and ultimately ended with the closing of India’s largest textile mills.  
With the exception of AITUC (see below for more detail), we found these unions to be relatively inactive 
in the textile and garments industries of Delhi, Gujarat, and Mumbai (i.e. the traditional textile centers).  
In many ways, the challenges facing the larger labor movement in India (and elsewhere) are 
undermining these unions’ impact on textile and garment workers.   
 
Perhaps most importantly, these unions have in the past focused on organizing formally employed (and 
thus legally protected) workers in registered enterprises.  These workers were highly concentrated on 
the shop floor, and they lived in nearby tenements, which facilitated organization.  As we have shown, 
subcontracting has increasingly shifted textile and garment production to informally employed (and thus 
unprotected) contract workers (who may operate in the factory or in a smaller, unregistered unit) and                                                         
25 Interview, January 14, 2013 
26 Interview, January 15, 2013 
27 Interview, January 16, 2013. 
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home-based workers.  These workers are not only scattered by work environment, they are also 
scattered by residence.  Despite these changes, however, most traditional, politically-affiliated unions 
have been unable and/or unwilling to alter their organizing strategy to accommodate the swelling, 
decentralized, and scattered informal workforce.  None of the traditional politically-affiliated unions 
spoke of finding creative ways to organize informal workers or organizing informal workers in their place 
of residence (which is sometimes also their place of work).  Rather, they bemoaned the changes to 
informal work as a fatal attack on union organizing.  As Mohammed Isha, President of the CITU-affiliated 
Readymade Garments Union in Delhi explained,  
 
We used to have 2000 workers across 7 factories in our local union.  In 2009, one of the 
largest companies gave us everything we demanded (a phase-wise minimum wage and 
a 20% bonus), because the company was doing well.  But in 2011, the garments 
industry faced a major crisis, and the Delhi-companies closed.  The companies split into 
smaller units and employed home-based workers and moved out of Delhi.  Some went 
to Bangalore and Haryana, others to Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh.  All these places 
have much lower minimum wages than us. To be honest, we are having trouble forming 
unions anymore.”28  
As the Additional Labor Commissioner of Delhi reiterated, “Employers are now leaving Delhi for 
neighboring states, like UP and Rajasthan, where salaries are lower and land is subsidized.  Employment 
is down in Delhi, so strikes are also down.”  In other words, workers’ bargaining power is viewed as 
arising from their legal right to strike (a right reserved only for formal workers), and capital flight is seen 
as neutering workers’ power.  
As researcher Agarwala has argued elsewhere, this trend is not unique to textile and garment unions 
(Agarwala 2013).  Traditional, politically-affiliated unions across industries in India routinely argue that 
the Indian state’s overt sanctioning of informal labor and capital mobility, coupled with the world’s 
changing structures of production, have undermined unions’ collective bargaining power (which relied 
entirely on a formally protected labor force).  Although these unions do not resist the turn toward 
export-orientation, they continue to make traditional demands to the employer for workplace benefits 
that employers can provide.  For example, the main demands of the AITUC and CITU-affiliated unions 
that Agarwala interviewed in Delhi in January 2013 are:  
 
• Minimum wages 
• Provision of insurance and pensions (under the ESI and Provident Fund schemes),  
• Permanent contracts for all workers 
• The eradication of sub-contractors and employers’ direct employment of contract workers (in 
the minority of cases where contract work is justified).   
 
In other words, these unions are demanding a formal workforce, because they believe that informal 
workers’ only hope for protection involves an alteration to their employment status.    
 
It is important to note that although at the local level, AITUC’s textile union strategies are limited to 
demanding formal protections for all workers by using existing conciliation strategies, at the national 
level, AITUC leaders offer more creative insights on informal workers’ organization.     
                                                         
28 Interview, January 2, 2013 
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4.1.1. Bargaining Strategy 
Traditional unions initially made their demands by employing strikes against an employer on the shop 
floor.  Strikes spiked just before independence, and then trended up from the 1950s until the early 
1970s.  However, beginning in 1974, the Indian government stopped reporting the figure, instead 
reporting industrial disputes in the manufacturing sector as a whole.  Not surprisingly, disputes in 
manufacturing as a whole dropped drastically after the Indian government initiated liberalization efforts 
in the 1980s; they dropped further when liberalization was officially implemented in 1991.  
 
According to our interviews with AITUC and CITU unions in January 2013, strikes are rarely used today, 
because workers are afraid that factories will shift location; India’s federal structure, where wages are 
determined at the state level, empowers capital over labor with the threat of capital flight.  In such cases, 
CITU unions have become relatively inactive.  AITUC unions, on the other hand, have remained more 
active, and they are unique in their efforts to organize the formal and informal contract workers 
operating in the factory premises of SEZs.  Instead of using strikes, AITUC uses existing conciliation 
channels.  They repeatedly emphasized to Agarwala that their actions are not antagonistic and they 
operate within the law.      
 
To recruit members and discuss grievances, they meet workers at the factory gates during tea and lunch 
breaks.  They never hold meetings during the workday inside the factory premises, and they never meet 
or recruit workers in their neighborhoods (this is very different from the other two forms of unions; see 
below).  Then they write a letter of demand to the employer.  If the employer does not agree to 
negotiate, they may hold a demonstration at the gate.  They then turn to the state and write a 
complaint to the relevant government office (such as the Labor Commissioner, Labor Inspector etc.), 
who in turn will begin the dispute resolution process, which may eventually end up in the labor court or 
even the high court.  This process takes years.  AITUC (and CITU) shared records and files that were still 
in process after 15 years.  Because most factories have moved to states with lax labor law enforcement, 
unions tend to take labor matters up with the national government offices.   
 
Despite the delays, these unions defended this strategy as their only option and a fairly effective one.  
As Pramod Rajput, Deputy General Secretary of AITUC-Delhi and President of All India General Mazdoor 
Trade Union, explained: 
 
Since 2008, jobs have declined by 60%. Now workers just want jobs.  They don’t want to 
do demonstrations.  We don’t have factory-level strikes.  We have a system.  We file a 
complaint with the proper office.  For minimum wages, we go to the Labor Department, 
for ESI or PF, we go to the national government ESI or PF offices, for overtime, we go to 
the Factory Inspector.  Then they come to inspect the company.  The government listens 
depending on the strength of the union leader and whether the complaint is filed legally. 
We are a strong union with strong leaders and we always follow the law.  The 
government helps us, because they know that.29   
 
Indeed, Agarwala met several government officials (including the Delhi Labor Commissioner and the ESI 
Officer) who were all respectful, even fearful, of AITUC.  Nevertheless, the claims of effectiveness were 
likely exaggerated, and AITUC’s commitment to acting within the law did not offer any solutions to 
workers within their informal status.  To the extent that AITUC is addressing unregulated, informal 
contract workers, they are demanding that they be formalized.                                                             
29 Interview, January 11, 2013 
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In addition to mobilizing workers to fight for legal labor protections, traditional, politically-affiliated 
textile unions have also engaged in political mobilizations designed to alter public policy.  In particular, 
they have been fighting for a common minimum wage for workers across Indian states and industries.  
In this endeavor, they work with each other, but also the independent unions described below.   
 
4.1.2. A note on other critiques:  Gender and party affiliation 
In addition to critiquing traditional, politically-affiliated unions in India for failing to accommodate the 
needs of informal workers, some scholars critique them for their male dominance and relatively small 
female membership.  Scholars and feminist groups argue that as the workforce becomes increasingly 
informal and feminized, this lack of attention to women workers is precluding traditional unions from 
organizing the new, more vulnerable labor force.  Sankaran and Madhav (2011) and Venkata Ratnam 
and Jain (2002) argue that traditional unions are male-dominated because they have overlooked 
women’s issues.  To be sure, my January interviews with CITU’s Garment Union reiterated union leaders’ 
gendered stance toward organizing.  Ninety-five percent of CITU’s Garment Union members were male.  
“Women don’t want to organize.  They are too scared to fight,” declared Mohamed Isha, President of 
the Union.30   
 
While concerns about male-dominated unions’ ability to represent a largely female workforce are valid, 
they do not lend much insight into why women workers have failed to push women’s labor concerns 
onto traditional unions’ agendas.  Moreover, they overlook the efforts that many women are indeed 
making to incorporate women’s labor concerns into mainstream labor agendas.  Thirty to forty percent 
of AITUC’s textile union in the NSEZ, for example, is female (which sits in stark contrast to the CITU Delhi 
Textile Union’s five percent female figure).  Naem Ahmed, General Secretary of AITUC’s Textile Union in 
NSEZ, was matter-of-fact about their female membership, “We have female members, because females 
are working in these factories.”31  AITUC leaders view these critiques of sexism as wrongful attacks 
stemming from their opponents.  For example, Amarjeet Kaur, (a female) Secretary of AITUC, noted,  
 
In the 1960s we fought to prevent women from being employed during nightshifts in 
factories, because the shifts were not safe for women.  Globalization, however, pushed 
the government to liberalize this law in the export sector, and we found that in fisheries 
and garment factories, women’s night shifts have increased.  But employers have not 
made any provisions to ensure women’s safety, like transport or guards.  So women are 
facing a lot of violence.  We argue that women’s night work should be their choice, but it 
must be safe.  And our critics are turning our argument against us, accusing us of being 
paternalistic and denying women the right to work!32  
 
Scholars have also critiqued these unions’ historical affiliation to political parties for fragmenting the 
labor movement and impeding unified mobilization (this is characteristic of all major sectors in India, not 
just garment and textile).  In the face of such a severe onslaught on labor’s basic rights in the                                                         
30 Interview, January 2, 2013 
31 Interview, January 2, 2013 
32 Interview, January 16, 2013.  We should note that researcher Agarwala had a lengthy interview with Kaur, where 
she identified AITUC’s involvement in drafting the Home-based Workers’ Convention that ILO eventually accepted, 
lobbying the Indian government to sign it, organizing women through their women’s organizations (National 
Federation of Indian Women and Working Women Forum of AITUC), and organizing informal workers including 
10,000 domestic workers in Mumbai.    
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contemporary era, however, we found significant evidence for unified mobilization among traditional, 
politically-affiliated unions in India.  These unions consistently engage in joint action to protest against 
economic liberalization or agitate for a higher minimum wage at the national level.  On February 2, 2013, 
all traditional, politically-affiliated unions joined independent unions to have a first-ever nation-wide 
general strike for 2 days to demand an all-India minimum wage of Rs. 10,000/month to unite workers 
across states and industries; currently employers in India can move to states with lower minimum wages.  
“We don’t engage in factory-level strikes, but we always engage in joint action with other unions for 
general strikes,” explained Rajput of AITUC.33      
 
Despite the debates surrounding the strengths and weaknesses of traditional, politically-affiliated unions 
in India, it is clear that their demands for a formally regulated and protected workforce, while laudable, 
have long failed in India.  It is for this reason that alternative unions have emerged in India to fill the 
growing needs of the entrenched and expanding informal workforce.       
 
4.2. Type 2:  Independent unions for formal and informal workers 
 
The second form of organization that is emerging among textile/garment workers in India is the 
“independent union for formal and informal workers.”  Examples of such unions are:   
 
• Garment and Allied Workers’ Union (GAWU) in the Delhi region and 
• Garment and Textile Workers’ Union (GATU) in Banglaore 
• Munnade in Bangalore 
 
GAWU and GATU emerged in 2007 to fill the void left by politically-affiliated unions in the garments 
industry.  GAWU’s membership today is 4,176.  These unions are independent, and are thus not 
affiliated to any political party.  GAWU and GATU are, however, affiliated to the National Trade Union 
Initiative (NTUI), the only federation in India of independent unions.  Like traditional unions, they tend 
to organize formal and informal contract workers operating in the factories; they do not organize 
workers operating in powerlooms, subcontractor’s workshops, or at home.  Sixty percent of GAWU 
members are permanent and 40% are informal contract workers.  These unions also target the more 
marginal population of workers that many critics argue are often left out of traditional, politically-
affiliated unions (i.e. women, tribals, Dalits, migrants, etc.).  Given their membership and their 
organizational ‘youth’ (which means they are not yet well-known), we argue that they employ more 
innovative bargaining strategies than traditional, politically-affiliated unions.     
 
It should also be noted that because these unions are new and small (relative to traditional unions), they 
lack the resources and scale, and thus the political heft, of traditional, politically affiliated unions.   
 
4.2.1. Bargaining strategy 
Perhaps most significant to us was that we found these unions rely on a broader bargaining strategy, 
akin to "social movement unionism."  This strategy better accommodates the vulnerable status of 
unprotected contract workers who occupy the most marginal social positions in India.    
 
As Anannya Bhattacharjee, President and Founder of GAWU and GATU, noted, “We do a lot of civil 
rights work, work on civic amenities, and cultural work.  We are not just engaged in labor.  We’re not                                                         
33 Interview, January 11, 2013 
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here to throw workers out of work.  And we see unions [as] one aspect of organizing.”34  In other words, 
these unions recognize that contract workers (and even many permanent workers today) are afraid of 
demonstrating, because they are afraid of losing their jobs.  Therefore, these unions attempt to assist 
workers in improving their livelihoods not just at the workplace, but also in their civic and home lives.  
To do so, they often organize at workers’ homes.    
 
At the same time, these unions engage activities similar to the traditional, politically-affiliated unions.  
Said Bhattacharjee, “Unions have a legal entity, which is important.  And through them we fight for 
wages, freedom of association, sexual harassment, crèches, [elimination of] 'wage theft', nonpayment of 
wages, and forced overtime.  There is no doubt a tendency toward bondedness in the garment 
sector.”35  Like the traditional unions, they go to factory gates during tea breaks to organize workers.  
They also follow a similar bargaining strategy to traditional unions in that they first contact management 
with grievances, then the labor department, and then the labor court.  Unlike the traditional unions, 
however, they also recruit workers at their place of residence.  In fact, before approaching management, 
union organizers spend considerable time establishing personal relations with workers, training them, 
and visiting their homes.  Because managers often threaten workers who visit GAWU with employment 
termination, GAWU often holds meetings in workers’ residential colonies.36  This strategy is very 
significant, and different from that of traditional, politically-affiliated unions, because it enables 
independent unions to complement their civic and civil work with their labor organizing efforts.  Finally, 
to collect information on the problems being faced, GAWU and the think-tank Society for Labor and 
Development gather data using the government program, Right to Information (RTI).     
 
To distinguish their activities from traditional, politically-affiliated unions, Bhattacharjee explained, “The 
politically-affiliated unions mainly just provide legal services.  For example, they help with the wrongful 
termination and reinstating contracts.  But we try to get more to a state of power.”37  To distinguish 
their activities from social service NGOs, Retu Singh, Treasurer of GAWU explained, “We are not an NGO.  
We don’t provide services.  We fight.  We need a union status.”38 
  
In addition to their civic and factory-level efforts, these unions engage in political mobilizations designed 
to alter public policy.  One important current campaign is the Asia Floor Wage campaign (led by 
Bhattacharjee), which seeks to win a continent-wide minimum wage of US$475/month (in Purchasing 
Power Parity terms) for garment workers.  Bhattacharjee (2009, 14) stated that as of 2009, the Asia 
Floor Wage Alliance included over 70  organizations in 17 countries in Asia, Europe, and North 
America—including trade unions and “labor and human rights organizations, development NGOs, 
women’s rights organizations, and academics.”39  According to Bhattacharjee, the Asia Floor Wage is 
“aspirational.”  She also supports other minimum wage campaigns, including the All-India General Strike 
for a common minimum wage in India, alongside traditional unions.  Finally, unlike traditional unions, 
these unions also use brand pressure to campaign for buyers to bear some responsibility for the 
payment of minimum wages.   
 
3.1.1. A note on Munnade                                                         
34 Interview, January 3, 2013 
35 Interview, January 3, 2013. 
36 Interview with GAWU organizers January 11, 2013.  
37 Interview, January 3, 2013.  
38 Interview, January 11, 2013 
39 Interview, January 3, 2013. 
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Another union that appears to fit this category is Munnade (short for Garment Women Workers’ Front).  
According to Jenkins (Forthcoming) Munnade is an organization of rural-to-urban migrant women 
garment workers in Bangalore, in the south Indian state of Karnataka.  The women work in factories.  
The minimum wages offered to them formed a ceiling for their rates rather than a floor, and they faced 
other serious labor standards problems, as well as dealing with the combination of paid work and care-
work duties.  The organizers behind Munnade, who came from Cividep-India, a small labor rights NGO, 
first set up a self-help micro-savings organization for these women in order to keep a low profile.  
Having built the self-help organization, they used it to launch the independent, majority-women 
Garment and Textile Workers Union, which grew to over 2,000 members in 2009.  Like GAWU and GATU, 
Munnade has won complaints for non-payment and demands for improved health and safety conditions.  
This example suggests that, as in Brazil, there are most likely a large number of similar localized cases 
across India. 
 
4.3. Type 3:  Independent unions for informal workers 
 
India is perhaps most unique for its third category of unions—independent unions that specifically 
target informal workers only.  The first is the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA).  The second 
such union that we discuss below is LERN/MKS (which is affiliated to the SEWA federation).  We also 
briefly discuss the HomeNet alliance.  
 
4.3.1.    SEWA 
The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), India’s leading organization of informal workers, has 
been registered as a trade union since 1972.  In 2011, SEWA attained the status of a legally registered 
union federation (similar to AITUC and CITU).40  Because its membership is comprised entirely of 
informal workers, its bargaining strategies are unique and differ from the vast majority of Indian unions, 
who primarily target formal workers and employ what I call “traditional models of collective bargaining.”   
 
SEWA counts over one million members in over 100 trades (Chen and Doane 2008).  Chen and Doane 
(2008) profile home-based apparel workers in Ahmedabad, in Gujarat state.  Home-based garment 
workers now make up 4% of SEWA members, 13% of urban members, and 23% of home-based workers 
within SEWA; their numbers have grown to the point where they now outnumber bidi workers in the 
membership.  According to Agarwala’s interviews in January 2013, men are also beginning to enter the 
home-based garments industry, because there is no other employment alternative.41  
 
It is important to note that SEWA’s home-based garment workers are piece-rate workers who produce 
garments for the domestic market.  Unlike union types #1 and #2, SEWA does not organize workers 
(even informal contract and piece-rate workers) connected to export factories.  “SEWA is never going to 
organize contract workers [for export factories].  This is beyond our focus.  We organize the self-                                                        
40 A union federation is a central organization that has unions as members.  In SEWA’s case, its largest union 
member is the original union in Gujarat.  In addition to SEWA-Gujarat, there are 6 other (smaller) SEWA unions in 
India.  LERN/MKS is also a union member of the SEWA federation.  SEWA attained federation status to increase its 
presence and power in international and national level policy decisions. SEWA was the first (and to date, the only) 
non-traditional union federation to attain this status.  To attain union federation status, SEWA faced much 
resistance from traditional union federations and ultimately had to engage in a major legal battle.  As a result of 
SEWA’s efforts, the majority of existing union federations altered the rules to qualify for federation status to be 
more stringent.  Now, to qualify for legal registration in India, a union federation must have legally registered 
union affiliates across 8 states in India.   
41 Interview with Zetunben, Home-based Workers’ Field Coordinator, January 19, 2013. 
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employed [who produce for the domestic market].” declared Ela Bhatt, Founder and Chairperson of 
SEWA.42  As Manali Shah, Head of the SEWA Union, further explained, “We thought about going to the 
worksheds for export factories, and we tried it a bit.  But it didn’t work.”43  This focus has important 
implications for SEWA’s organizing strategy, which we detail below.     
 
When SEWA first began organizing garment workers in the mid-1970s, women were picking up textile 
scraps from the mills and making cheap dresses or quilts that they would sell in local markets.  When the 
mills began to close, however, the mill managers turned to the ready-made garments sector and 
became the owners of local wholesale and retail shops.  These shops hired women to produce the 
ready-made garments in their homes.  Because all the shops are small, they are not regulated under 
existing labor laws.  In some slums, shop owners rely on sub-contractors to communicate with the 
home-based woman workers; in other slums, shop owners interact directly with the home-based 
women workers.  In both cases, workers are given the cut cloth, and they must buy/rent their own 
sewing machine and tools (including scissors and thread).  Each neighborhood specializes in a different 
set of clothing.  
 
SEWA’s garment workers are primarily Muslim women.  Within one family, several women across 
generations are engaged in garment production and are members of SEWA.  Garment workers reside in 
slums in Ahmedabad.  Most are first or second generation migrants who have settled in the slums of 
Ahmedabad.  They own or rent a home in the slum.  The relationship between workers, sub-contractors, 
and shop owners is complicated by the fact that they all reside in the same neighborhood, are often 
related, and are always part of the same community and kinship network.    
 
SEWA’s bargaining strategy 
SEWA has launched several extremely innovative strategies to meet the diverse and complicated needs 
of home-based garment workers.  Underlying all their efforts is recognition of informal workers’ status 
as a permanent status.  Like all unions, SEWA’s main contribution is empowering and educating workers 
to fight for their rights to dignified work.  Unlike other unions, SEWA does not fight to formalize informal 
workers.  Rather, SEWA fights to improve work and livelihood conditions for workers within their 
informal labor status.    
 
Wages 
Unlike union types #1 and #2, SEWA does not fight for traditional minimum wages based on time of 
work (i.e. rupees/month).  Rather, they fight for minimum wages on a piece-rate basis (i.e. rupees/shirt 
made).  As Manali Shah explained, “This is how women are paid on the home basis, so this is how we 
should determine the minimum wage.”44  At present, SEWA works with employers to negotiate a 
minimum wage on piece-rate basis.  Once an agreement is reached, they report it to the State Labor 
Commissioner.  It is revised every 2 years.  While this is indeed a major improvement, SEWA is 
simultaneously fighting for a policy-level minimum wage that can be more universal (across more 
employers and covering more products).  SEWA is not yet part of the state-level minimum wage advisory 
committee, but they are part of the national-level minimum wage advisory committee.   
 
In addition to organizing home-based women workers who sew garments, SEWA organizes women who 
transport garments from shop to shop and onto vehicles to transport outside of Gujarat.  This work is                                                         
42 Interview, January 19, 2013 
43 Interview, January 20, 2013.  
44 Interview, January 20, 2013 
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done by carrying parcels on their heads or pulling handcarts.  These women used to transport cloth, but 
now they transport only ready-made garments.  In 2010-2011, SEWA’s headloaders had a major strike in 
one of the largest cloth markets in Ahmedabad to demand a revised wage since products had changed 
from loose cloth to packed garments (which are heavier).  Shop owners called SEWA to stop the strike, 
and they agreed to negotiate a new wage rate.  In response, SEWA held a meeting in the courtyard of 
the market to publically recognize the employers’ association and give each shopkeeper a shawl as a 
sign of their respect and their intention to establish constructive relations.  Shah explained, “Industry 
workers need to work together.  Currently, different areas have different wages, depending on the 
relationship we create with the employers.”45  SEWA is currently mapping all the cloth shops in 
Ahmedabad, so they can extend the wage to other areas.   
 
In addition to fighting for piece-rate wages, SEWA ensures that all workers in an area are receiving the 
same wages.  For headloaders, SEWA also fought to ensure that women and men headloaders received 
the same pay.   
 
In general, the members Agarwala interviewed during the field visit reported that employers were 
indeed giving them their agreed upon wages.  “The shop owners give us our money, and we can 
increase our wages more by coming together to increase our work.  But we need pensions, health 
insurance, education scholarship, government identity cards,” said Karunisa, a home-based garment 
worker and long-time SEWA member.46  The headloaders Agarwala interviewed said their main 
complaint is that they don’t have access to private space (because they work in the public space of the 
street).  Their demands included a place to eat during the day and a place to go the bathroom.  Their 
demands also include a home for the workers and their families to live in, because many members do 
not own a home.47  SEWA leaders reiterated this point.  Ela Bhatt, Founder of SEWA, said, “Minimum 
wages and these things are out.  We need pensions and social security.”48  “Our members are receiving 
their wages due to our efforts.  Wages are not our main problems.  Our problems are different.  Our 
members don’t have full year employment and we need to improve their skills,” explained Shah.49  This 
trend is very similar to what researcher Agarwala has found and analyzed among informal workers in 
other industries (such as bidi and construction).     
 
Cooperatives 
Perhaps SEWA’s most interesting approach is its use of cooperatives.  Cooperatives complement SEWA’s 
union efforts against employers by giving informal workers an alternative source of income that draws 
from group-based support.  Shah provided an illustration for garment workers:   
 
For the last three years, we were not able to increase our wages.  Employers couldn’t, or 
wouldn’t do it.  So we did it in another way.  During the festival season, there is more 
work and more designs and they get more wages.  But they have to buy their own raw 
materials.  Therefore we said they should buy the raw materials in bulk.  So we 
registered a cooperative, a Thread Facilitation Center, where SEWA buys raw materials 
in bulk and sell them back to our members.  We used to have two shops, but now we 
only have one, because our shops put pressure on the other shops to decrease their                                                         
45 Interview, January 20, 2013 
46 Interview, January 19, 2013 
47 Interview with headloader members, January 19, 2013 
48 Interview, January 19, 2013 
49 Interview, January 20, 2013 
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prices!  So eventually we just closed ours down.  Therefore, wages couldn’t increase but 
we did this to help our members increase their real incomes.  
 
SEWA has made similar such coops in various trades (including nurseries, wastepickers etc.).  “When 
women used to collect textile scraps from the mills and sell them to shop-keepers [who would hire 
women to turn the scraps into cheap quilts and dresses]), we created a chindi (or scraps) cooperative 
that gave women higher rates for their scraps, explained Shah, “Other shop keepers were furious, and 
this made some women nervous.  But one of our scrap-pickers, Karimaben, started the cooperative, and 
her brother was a shop owner.  This gave others confidence to fight.  Organizing is hard, but people get 
confidence by seeing each other.”50   
 
Welfare boards 
As detailed in Section 3 above, Welfare Boards are tripartite institutions that are implemented by the 
state or central government and are funded by governments, taxes on employers, and membership fees 
from workers.  In return for being a member of a Board, workers are entitled to a variety of welfare 
benefits.  Currently, Welfare Boards in India are occupationally based and benefits differ according to 
trade.  Welfare Boards have become an increasingly popular protection mechanism among informal 
workers’ organizations in India.   
 
SEWA has fought for Welfare Boards for home-based garment sewers and self-employed headloaders.  
Because work environments differ between these trades, so too do the Welfare Board benefits.  The 
headloaders welfare board provides medical and education materials.  The garment sewers welfare 
board offers a sewing box with scissors, a table, and other tools; Rs. 1200 for medical needs; and skills 
training.  In 2009, all self-employed workers were given identity cards from the Welfare Boards.  Women 
members appeared most excited about this card.  “The government now knows we are workers!  This 
was a great learning for the Labor Department,” said member Zetunben.51     
  
Said Shah, “Our approach is a campaign approach.  Every three years we decide the most important 
issue.  We decide on a long-term campaign and a short-term one.  The Welfare Board was part of our 
short-term campaign.  Welfare Boards give members something, and that gives them strength to fight 
for more.  Our motto is:  Take something and fight!  Take something and fight!  Take something and 
fight!” 
 
Private company 
In 2003, SEWA launched the Trade Facilitation Center (TFC), which is registered as a non-profit company 
where workers are shareholders.  The TFC serves as a mediator between garment workers and buyers.  
Buyers place orders through TFC.  TFC then provides workers with training on designs and sewing; they 
currently employ 40 stitchers and 100 paid staff.  Many of the sewers are daughters of SEWA garment 
worker members.  TFC has 56 machines. These women assemble the cloth in the TFC.  Additionally, the 
TFC sends the cloth and a toolbox to their rural members to complete the embroidery (a local skill-based 
craft).  “I was working with rural women members in agriculture and animal husbandry, and their main 
complaint was the lack of water.  This was a problem for drinking, but also for income generation.  So 
we tried to generate income from their embroidery,” explained Savita Patel, CEO of TFC.52  The rural 
embroiderers are organized into 225 groups, totally 15,000 embroiders (7,000 are considered A-grade).                                                          
50 January 20, 2013 
51 Interview, January 19, 2013 
52 Interview, January 18, 2013 
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Today, TFC owns two retail shops in India.  The majority of their products are sold through the retail 
shops and during exhibitions.  They also complete some orders for domestic and foreign retail brands.  
TFC also conducts trainings for foreign garment workers.           
 
4.3.2. HomeNet 
 
SEWA was the chief initiator of HomeNet, “the network of home-based workers of South Asia,” who are 
estimated at 50 million, 80% of them women (HomeNet 2012).  HomeNet, officially launched in 2002 
with the Kathmandu Declaration, groups 290 organizations across Bangladesh, Indian, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and South Asia.  HomeNet India in particular includes 29 organizations in 13 states, with over 85 
thousand members.  HomeNet seeks to increase the visibility of home-based workers, advocate for 
national policies, strengthen grassroots organization of home-based workers, and develop networking 
across these organizations.  HomeNet collaborates with other regional entities, such as the South Asian 
Association of Regional Cooperatives (SAARC), a business association of home-based workers.  
HomeNet’s website emphasizes efforts to bring organizing in other countries in the region up to the 
level of SEWA.  
 
4.3.3. LERN/MKS 
 
The Labor Education and Research Network (LERN), based in Mumbai, was registered in 1998 as an NGO 
under the Indian Societies Act, to examine the concerns of informal workers.  “At that time, we were 
trying to get NGOs to work together to understand the problems,” explained Sharit Bhowmik, founder 
and President of LERN.53  Unlike unions, NGOs in India have the added advantage of being able to 
receive foreign funds.  In 2009, LERN registered a sister trade union, called Mahila Kamgar Sangatam 
(MKS) or Women Workers Organization, under the Indian Trade Union Act.  Today, MKS is a member of 
the SEWA Federation.  LERN/MKS has also been active with HomeNet.   
 
MKS is registered as a state-level union in Maharashtra.  Currently, it has 6000 members in 5 regions of 
Maharashtra (including Nasik, Sholapur, Mumbai, and New Mumbai) and a few paid staff.  Its members 
are restricted to women informal workers only.  Sixty percent of the members are Muslim and “Other 
Backward Castes”—thereby indicating their very marginal status in the Indian social hierarchy.  Many 
are migrants from the South Indian city of Chennai.  All members live and work in the slums; half own 
their own homes, and the other half rent homes.  In addition to organizing street vendors, domestic 
workers, service workers, microfactory workers, and rag pickers, MKS organizes home-based workers.  
Garment workers comprise a significant portion of the home-based workers; some male garment 
workers also work in microfactories.  
 
MKS emerged to fill a deep void in organizing this invisible and highly marginalized population.  “Before 
we came, they had religious and caste organizations.  But no one organized as a worker,” said 
Bhowmik.54  
 
LERN/MKS’s bargaining strategy 
As Indira, a senior analyst at LERN, explained, “First we have to convince women that they are 
workers.”55  Once they are convinced, they can then begin making demands as workers.  One of the                                                         
53 Interview, January 17, 2013 
54 Interview, January 17, 2013 
55 Interview, January 17, 2013 
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most important manifestations of this is the identity card.  This card certifies their status as an informal 
worker and is distinct from members’ other identity cards, such as their voter identification card or their 
ration card for the public food distribution system. MKS helps them fill the paperwork to create a trade 
union identity and a ration card for the public food distribution system.  Many members are denied the 
ration card, because they don’t own their homes, or their slum shack is an unregistered address.  MKS, 
however, as a registered union, can verify their members’ addresses and help them attain the card.  As 
researcher Agarwala has detailed elsewhere, getting an identity card is one of the most important 
benefits informal workers receive from organizing (Agarwala 2013).  It not only gives them a state-
sanctioned certification that they are indeed workers,56 it helps them “enter the system,” so they can 
then make further demands on the state.  Women members that Agarwala spoke to in MKS reiterated 
that the identity card and the health camps were huge benefits for them.  Some organizers said they 
want to create a specific garment union identity card, but this has not yet happened.  Laxmi, an 
organizer at MKS, explained to Agarwala:   
 
Getting women to simply join the union was our first problem.  We are workers!  But we 
had to have multiple meetings to convince them that we deserve something.  And we had 
to make our own organization, because unions would just remove us from their unions.  
Even after the work we did we were told we are just servants and women.  But we should 
get as much respect as them.  Our women didn’t know anything, not even the alphabet.  
Now they can read and can grab their respect.57    
 
After getting an identity card, workers then mobilize to demand higher wages.  In addition, if they learn 
that women are receiving different wages for different labels, they stop work until the wages are 
equalized.  In terms of piece-rate work, MKS has convinced contractors to give workers half-pay for 
rejected pieces.  Like the other types of unions, they agitate to cut the contractors and allow workers to 
interact directly with the principal employer.  Interestingly, unlike the other 2 forms of unions, MKS 
never targets the Labor Commissioner for these demands.  “There is no point going to the Commissioner, 
because the law does not apply to these workers,” explained Bhowmik.58  Instead, MKS targets the 
contractor for these demands.  Contractors allow workers to interact with MKS, but they do not allow 
them to speak during the work hours.  Therefore union meetings are held at night or on Sundays.  
However, making demands to the contractors has been difficult, since they are often connected to the 
workers through kinship networks.     
 
Significantly, MKS also demands things for workers’ communities (since the workplace is also their 
home).  These demands include sanitation, healthcare, improved grain quality in the public distribution 
system.  To make these demands, they have to interact with the state.  But before going to the state, 
they hold several area-wide meetings in the slums where workers live to gather information on the 
problems.  Like GAWU, they also collect information using the government’s Right to Information 
Initiative (RTI).   
 
Finally, MKS provides training for various trades.  For example, for garments, MKS is training some 
members to improve their designing skills; for domestic workers, they are training them to make food 
for diabetics.  Recently, some members did a financial training class at a local college (called Safai                                                         
56 The card does not qualify such workers for protection under the labor laws described above or entitles them to 
formal recognition from the employer.  But it does give them recognition as workers from the state.  
57 Interview in MKS offices, January 17, 2013 
58 Interview, January 17, 2013 
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College); in return a group of college students came and did a study at MKS.  MKS recently established a 
training center with 13 laptops on the second floor of their one room office (located in Dharavi, the 
largest slum in the world).  They teach the women how to use computers, and they also provide training 
to members’ children.  Recently, they conducted a childcare training with the hope that those trainees 
can soon form a childcare center.   
Bhowmik spoke of these services with mixed feelings:   
 
We are trying to convince the HomeNet folks that we need a trade union, not an NGO 
that just does service delivery.  Service delivery can be a recruitment tool…sewing, 
training, healthcare—all this helps convince people to join when their husband says ‘no’.  
But service delivery also makes members just expect goods and services, and if they 
don’t get it, they complain that they haven’t received anything from the union.  Women 
stay with the union and continue to pay dues not because they receive something, but 
because of the group.  The group makes them stronger.59  
 
4.4.    A note on type 4:  NGOs 
 
Child labor in Indian rug-making came under scrutiny when the working conditions of children became 
an acute issue in the 1990s with the growth of human rights discourses. There were many government 
initiatives in the US and elsewhere to prohibit the import of goods produced by children; these came as 
a result of consumer outcry.  As part of this trend, Rugmark emerged as the first organization started in 
India by Indians to introduce socially labeled goods.  These movements targeted consumers to improve 
working conditions.  The state was rarely involved.  According to Seidman (2007), however, Rugmark’s 
impact on child labor is debatable.   
 
 
5.    Conclusions 
 
The growth of India’s textile and garment industry has always relied on subcontracting and home-based 
work.  The presence of informal workers, therefore, is not a new aspect of this industry.  Rather, what 
has changed since the birth of India’s textile and garment industry during the 1800s to the present day is 
the form and mission of textile and garment workers’ unions.  Textile and garment workers’ unions 
today are more aware than ever before of the entrenched nature of informal work and the need to 
launch innovative ways to organize informal workers.  
 
Under colonialism and during the first decades after independence (until the 1980s), several, powerful, 
unions emerged to provide formal protections to textile mill workers.  These unions were large and 
greatly benefitted from their affiliation to major political parties.  These unions succeeded in attaining 
protections for a minority of workers that the employer formally and legally recognized; but employers 
continued to employ the vast majority of workers in the unregulated sector through unregistered 
powerlooms, contractor’s workshops or at home.  To save their declining membership, some of these 
very same unions are launching new efforts to organize formal and informal workers in the budding 
factories producing garments for export (detailed above as ‘Type 1’).  In the 1970s, new, independent 
organizations emerged to focus specifically on the home-based workers that were left out of the formal 
mill workers’ unions (detailed above as "Type 3").  These associations (some of which became                                                         
59 Interview, January 17, 2013 
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recognized as unions) launched innovative strategies that organize home-based workers within their 
informal work status, rather than trying to formalize them.  Since the 1990s, these organizations have 
not only proliferated, they have attained increased recognition and status by the Government of India 
and the international labor community.  Finally, since the 2000s, a new set of independent unions has 
emerged to protect sub-contracted workers in export-oriented, garment factories.  Unlike traditional 
unions, these unions are independent of political parties, and they offer innovative strategies that 
address informal workers’ civil and labor rights (detailed above as "Type 2").  
 
In sum, Indian unions and other worker organizations offer a diverse range of strategies to extend 
protections to informal workers, even in the current era of liberalization and globalization.  Their efforts, 
however, have not yet reached scale, and they do not yet cover all informal workers (especially in the 
export sector).  If the different forms of organizations for informal workers work together, we may 
witness a change in the future of labor movements in India. 
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III.  Chinese labor NGOs:  A grassroots approach to the challenges of 
informality 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
Thirty years of economic reform have not only turned Mainland China into “the world’s factory,” but 
also have led to a tremendous shift in the employment structure.  More and more Chinese workers, 
including apparel workers, are now being pushed into and kept in the informal labor market (Park & Cai 
2011; Cooke 2008).  The growing informal sector has negatively affected employment security in several 
ways.  First, informalization has made it difficult for the government to enforce protective regulations 
for workers to ensure safe working environments.  Second, an informal economy does not provide social 
insurance or benefits.  In particular, rural migrant workers, one of the major populations that make up 
the informal economy’s worker population, have suffered from exploitative conditions of informal 
employment:  low and unpaid wages, excessive overtime, no contracts, poor working conditions, 
exclusion from official trade union structures and lack of labor rights and social security protection.  For 
instance, according to a ILO report drafted by Li Shi (2008), 79% of migrant workers had no signed 
contracts with their employers in 2004; over 80% of workers worked seven days per weeks; over 70% 
worked nine hours or more a day; and only 5% were covered by unemployment insurance.   In response 
to a lack of support from the state or trade unions at various levels, alternative forms of labor organizing, 
namely labor-related nongovernmental organizations (labor NGOs), have emerged in China regardless of 
formidable challenges to their existence.  With a particular focus on the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) 
Region, this report attempts to examine the role played by China’s labor NGOs in combating the 
negative impacts of increasing informalization.  More specifically, we will examine whether or not 
grassroots labor NGOs can contribute to monitoring working conditions and defending workers' rights 
and labor standards in the YRD.  If so, then how?   
 
Before we begin examining the role of labor NGOs in monitoring and enforcing labor standards in the 
garment sector, we will get a glimpse of the extent of informalization among textile and garment 
workers so as to better understand the background of labor NGO development in the region.  
By informal, we apply a version of the definition proposed by Gallagher, Lee and Kuruvilla (2011):   
“employment that is not stable or secure, that lacks a written agreement or contract, and that does not 
provide social insurance or benefits.”  In other words, the term “informal labor” refers to those workers 
who:  (1) lack a labor contract; (2) lack a labor contract and social insurance; (3) have labor contracts but 
on a short-term basis or without social insurance; or (4) are employed via employment agencies.60  Thus, 
we argue that informal workers in China’s textile and apparel sectors usually refer to factory workers 
who are subcontracted and employed on a fixed short-term basis and those who toil in small workshops, 
family workshops or unregistered workshops. 
 
This introduction continues with more detailed information on the context in which unions and labor 
NGOs operate; growth of subcontracted and home-based work; and the character of the textile and                                                         
60 These workers are commonly known as “paiqiangong,” or dispatch workers.  As required by the Labor Contract 
Law of 2008, a labor dispatching company must comply with the Company Law and the registered capital must not 
be less than RMB two million.  Labor dispatching is a common employment practice where workers enter into 
employment contracts with labor dispatching agencies (equivalent to temporary agencies in the US), and are then 
sent to another company.  Dispatch workers are highly vulnerable to exploitation and infringement of labor rights 
due to unclear and under-specified legal obligations.  They are usually not paid wages commensurate with their 
counterparts who are directly hired by host companies and their safety and health are not well protected.  
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garment industry.  The remainder of this chapter is then divided into four sections.  The first part will 
briefly describe our data collection procedures and highlight the significance of the study area.  The 
second section will describe the spatial and social organization of production as well as the extent and 
nature of informalization in the garment and textile industries in the YRD.  The third part will critically 
evaluate the effectiveness of government inspectors, trade unions and corporate codes of conducts in 
checking misbehavior of garment enterprises and protesting interests of garment workers.  Lastly, we 
will provide a summary of the existing labor NGOs in the YRD and then take a more critical look at the 
work of the organization ABC (name withheld), the first and only NGO experiment initiated by garment 
workers in the region, and their impact on the regulatory regime.  While ABC supports not just garment 
workers but more broadly migrant workers, we believe that it is an important institution to examine as 
it demonstrates the limitations labor NGOs face in labor law enforcement and monitoring.  
 
1.1.    Labor organizing in China 
 
To help gain a more clear perspective of our field work and survey results, it is important to set the 
overall context of worker organizing and unions in China.  The conditions in which Chinese workers’ 
organizations operate are much different than in Brazil, South Africa and India.  The All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the one and only trade union federation in the country (Domoney 2007), is 
closely linked to the Communist Party of China and the state.  Indeed, unions in China, rather than being 
independent, function as an appendage of government or of private employers (Yang 2006).  In almost 
every case, enterprise management controls both the appointment of union committee members and 
the financial capacity of the union (Chan 2012).  Some local governments have adopted policies to the 
contrary.  According to the Guangzhou municipal government’s “Methods for Enforcing the Trade Union 
Law” approved in 2007, the chairperson of a company trade union cannot be a manager, and similarly, 
in Shenzhen city, the “Implementing Regulations” specify that top management should not hold union 
committee positions.  In many state and non-state firms, however, union leaders are concurrently board 
directors, personnel department heads or senior managers who normally stand with management 
rather than with workers (Tong 2012).  Within this subservient structure, the workplace union branches 
are worse than weak.  They almost invariably take a pro-management stance in mediation and pre-empt 
workers’ organizing efforts.  Thus, they cannot represent the interest of the workers and no collective 
bargaining can take place (Yang 2006, 28).  Strikes, although neither formally forbidden nor allowed by 
law, in practice are frequently repressed (Cornell University 2000 and Chen 2004 via Domoney 2007, 4). 
 
Labor NGOs attempt to address worker concerns, but NGOs are difficult to establish with government 
recognition.  The most significant challenge is the registration system.  This system is known as the “dual 
management.”  Under this system, organizations are required to obtain the sponsorship of a 
“professional leading agency” such as a government ministry or provincial government agency first, and 
then seek registration and approval from the Ministry of Civil Affairs or a local civil affairs bureau.  This is 
very difficult for a NGO to do, thus leading many to register as business or commercial entities.  As 
commercial entities, NGOs do not have the official endorsement of the government as they would if 
they were registered as social organizations, thus are more susceptible to government scrutiny and can 
be easily shut down.  
 
Furthermore, labor NGOs largely focus on a broader group of workers (often migrant workers as a 
whole), rather than on workers within a specific sector.  They aim to improve the overall conditions for 
workers through services and advocacy and help them build a community, as opposed to strictly 
addressing labor rights issues and actively organizing workers.  This strategy is less antagonistic to the 
government’s stance on worker organizing and helps labor NGOs keep their doors open.   
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Generally, the development of labor NGOS can be divided roughly into three phases (Xin 2012):   
 
1. 1996-2003:  Labor NGOs first emerged as an alternative form of labor organizing in the Pearl 
River Delta (PRD) in China’s southeast region, with some external help especially from Hong 
Kong;  
2. 2004-2007:  Labor NGOs mushroomed in the PRD and gradually developed in the Greater 
Shanghai area and Beijing when deeper capital-labor conflicts observed.  Migrant workers 
themselves began to fight for their own rights and interests;   
3. 2008-2012:  The state has imposed stricter control or co-optation of labor NGOs, favoring 
those organizations that provide social services rather than direct advocacy or organizing.  
About ten pro-labor rights NGOs in Shenzhen were suppressed and forced to close their 
workers’ centers in the first half of 2012.  Labor NGOS have been strictly monitored and 
subject to differential treatment, resulting in each NGO focusing on distinct campaigns and 
reducing cooperation.  
 
Thus, labor NGOs originated in the PRD and only recently spread to the north.  PRD-based NGOs 
typically provide a mix of social services, worker education, and outright advocacy for workers’ rights 
(including campaigns to receive unpaid wages, ensure that minimum wage and overtime are paid, and 
rectify workplace safety problems, sometimes bringing Hong Kong-based and even global advocacy to 
bear).  The degree to which labor NGOs actually organize workers is variable but on the whole limited, 
since the Chinese authorities tend to be suspicious of independent worker organizations outside the 
official union structure (Xin 2012; Zhao 2012).  Labor NGOs in the PRD have at times been involved in 
worker protests and even strikes, but this kind of activism is exceptional, not ongoing.   
 
Some researchers hold pessimistic views of the role of China’s labor NGOs in facilitating independent 
labor movement.  For instance, Lee and Shen (2011) criticized some labor NGOs in PRD and Beijing for 
being co-opted and trapped by state patronage.  Despite their potential for the nurturing of workers’ 
self-organizing capacity or democratic citizenship, many labor NGOs confirmed their roles as 
government liaisons and undermined worker solidarity through their activities, Lee and Shen argued.  
Some labor NGOs “endorse only a strictly legalistic means of rights protection,” which protects the rights 
that are only mentioned in the labor law and condemn collective action as illegal behavior (Lee and Shen 
2011).   On the other hand, there are NGOs that aim to serve the needs of migrant workers through 
cultural and entertainment activities that facilitate their integration into the host community instead of 
advocating for their rights (ibid).  In addition, Froissart (2011) argued that while migrant workers were 
more aware of their rights and were granted greater negotiation and bargaining abilities through legal 
workshops offered by such NGOs, negotiation and mediation rather than confrontation were preferred 
by the pragmatic labor NGOs.  These institutions serve as channels for addressing social tensions and 
public discontent through indirect means and limited mobilization of workers.  Froissart identifies this as 
a “slight correction of inequality and peripheral systemic changes,” (2011, 25) which helps promote 
stability and durability of the regime.  In terms of the advocacy by labor NGOs, a typical example is the 
ongoing campaign by Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM), a Hong Kong 
based labor NGO.  SACOM has pressured Apple supplier Foxconn to improve safety conditions and 
adopt more humane work schedules (SACOM 2013a).   
 
Even within the PRD, where authorities tend to be more tolerant, the victories of labor NGOs are 
typically limited—e.g. gaining unpaid back wages or overtime pay.  However, their presence as 
observers and critical voices alongside more independent-minded unions and some regional officials 
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who lean in favor of workers’ rights, have created a general environment in the PRD in which terms and 
conditions of employment have somewhat improved.  Labor NGOs outside the PRD are in general less 
outspoken and have an even more limited record of accomplishment. 
 
Little is known about labor NGOs that serve garment workers in particular (though certainly some NGOs 
do address their issues; a current campaign by SACOM and others targets hazardous sandblasting of 
denim in jean production [SACOM 2013b]).  To our knowledge, findings from our fieldwork in the YRD 
represent the first such examination.61 
 
1.2.    The rise of informal and subcontracted work 
 
The structural reforms that began in the 1970s have transformed the Chinese economy and have had an 
impact on the working conditions and labor rights of the new working class.  The Chinese working class 
has been remade through decollectivization, industrial privatization and export-oriented 
industrialization (Andreas 2012).  This new working class is composed of the urban poor, who have 
suffered from the breakdown of the “iron rice bowl” system (the earlier socialist set of guarantees of 
income, services, and social security), and the rural migrant workers who have become the second 
generation of dagongzai/mei, internal migrant workers.  Industries such as construction, garment and 
textiles rely heavily on rural migrants, who are often exploited due to Chinese migration and labor laws.  
Under China’s hukou (local registration) laws, migrants officially remain residents of their rural regions 
of origin, entitled to social benefits only in those regions and not in the cities where they currently 
reside.  This restrictive “rural citizenship” is passed down from parent to child, so even the second 
generation (and potentially later generations as well) born in the cities of rural parents lacks—even in 
adulthood—the right to schooling, health care, and other basic services.62  
 
In China’s new capital-labor relations, informalization and casualization are two major processes that 
occur throughout the labor market, regardless of the nature of the companies (foreign-invested 
companies, joint ventures, private companies or state-owned enterprises) and irrespective of industry 
or sector.  This means that manufacturing, service and construction sectors are all using informal 
laborers as well as formal ones.  Flexible employment, lack of written employment contracts, and 
absence of social insurance were often the norm in the 1980s and 1990s.  China’s initial Labor Law, 
implemented in 1995 (Ministry of Commerce 2007), laid out basic rights for all employees including the 
right to a written contract and other basic provisions regarding compensation, benefits, collective 
bargaining, and access to social insurance.  It included provisions for regional minimum wages and a                                                         
61 Indeed existing literature mainly investigates the state-society relations and examine whether the development 
of labor NGOs indicates the growth of civil society in a libertarian sense. Thus, most of them only regard grassroots 
labor NGOs as entities serving migrant workers as a whole, but not conducting a thorough analysis of their 
constituents and impacts on labor standards.    
62 The hukou system was first introduced in 1955 to cope with demographic pressures in the course of rapid 
industrialization.  Under the hukou system, the majority of rural population was confined to the countryside and 
entitled to few rights and benefits that the state conferred on urban residents, such as housing and educational 
opportunities for children.  The hukou system served as an important mechanism in distributing resources and 
determining life chances in China.  As suggested by Wu and Treiman (2007), hukou status can be viewed primarily 
as an ascriptive attribute, since it is assigned at birth on the basis of the mother’s registration status.  Those whose 
mothers have urban status automatically acquire the same status themselves.  Mothers who have rural status 
must compete for urban status through very limited channels.  In other words, the child with non-local hukou 
could not enjoy services delivered by the local government even though they might be born in the city.  
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labor inspection system.63  But the Labor Law had little effect on actual employment practices.  However, 
with the introduction of the Labor Contract Law (reinforcing the requirement of written contracts with 
all employees, mandating key benefits, and establishing a path to permanent employment64) in 2008, 
there has been substantial progress in providing written contracts, social insurance, and in general 
regularizing employment in the manufacturing sector, including the garment sector—though to a lesser 
extent.  Manufacturing has experienced progress largely because so much of the sector is comprised of 
formal factories, in which workers have some coverage under labor laws.  We emphasize that both the 
Labor Law and the Labor Contract Law apply to all employees, regardless of the size of the enterprises or 
the site of work (subcontracted and home-based employees are included). 
 
The recent literature on work informalization in China sheds added light on the changing institutional 
and economic environment shaping subcontracted work in the textile and clothing sector.  From Iron 
Rice Bowl to Informalization:  Markets, Workers, and the State in a Changing China (2011) raises an 
intriguing issue observed in China’s official statistics.  There is a substantial group of “missing workers” 
who are actually rural migrants working in various informal sectors—surely including garment 
manufacturing, though perforce the lack of statistics makes it difficult to estimate the size of this or any 
other group.  With regard to the effect of legislation, Gallagher and Dong (2011) suggest that despite the 
significant increase in workers’ protections offered by the law, the manner of implementation and 
enforcement are weakening the overall impact of the new Labor Contract Law and other labor 
protection laws.  This reflects internal disagreements between the central and local governments.  The 
adoption of the new Labor Contract Law coincided, unfortunately, with the onset of the global financial 
crisis.  Hence, there has been less central government support for legislation that can increase 
employers’ operating costs.  Local governments in coastal manufacturing centers have already taken 
their own regulatory measures that aim to dilute the impact of the law on local economies.  These 
observations enable us to understand the changes in the nature of the market and the state at a time 
when the Chinese economy is highly governed by the global capitalist logic. 
 
Cooke (2008) identifies how Chinese workers engage in informal employment.  She claims that informal 
workers can be found in three types of organizations:  (1) organizations operating in the formal sector; 
(2) organizations operating in the informal sector; and (3) loosely formed informal employment 
organizations.  In other words, informal employment in China incorporates non full-time, temporary, 
seasonal and casual work in the informal sector; full-time temporary work in formal organization; self-
employment; and those employed by the self-employed.  Our field research shows that subcontracted 
clothing and textile workers occupy all three of these spaces.  Cooke (2008) suggests that the proportion 
of workers in informal employment is relatively low in the state-monopolized industries and monopoly 
service industries such as telecommunication and finance, but is much higher in competitive industries 
that are labor intensive such as retail, catering and community services.  With the expansion of                                                         
63 Article 3 gives a sense of the scope and generality of the law:  “Laborers have the right to be employed on an 
equal basis, choose occupations, obtain remunerations for labor, take rests, have holidays and leaves, receive 
labor safety and sanitation protection, get training in professional skills, enjoy social insurance and welfare 
treatment, and submit applications for settlement of labor disputes, and other labor rights stipulated by law.” 
64 The Labor Contract Law, which applies to all employees, among other provisions:  imposes significant penalties 
for failure to provide a written contract; mandates automatic transition to open-ended employment for those who 
have completed two fixed-term contracts or ten years of work with an employer; requires minimum standards 
such as minimum wage and overtime; and places restrictions on termination and adds severance pay requirements 
(Troutman and Sanders LLP, n.d.).  Though compliance is uneven, the Law appears to have led to an increase in 
written contracts as well as an increase in formal complaints by employees to arbitration panels and courts (Becker 
and Elfstrom 2010). 
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subcontracting in apparel, this sector has gravitated toward the latter profile.  Again, our field research 
confirms (for one region) that following the expansion of the private sector in smaller cities and towns in 
inland China, informal employment has become a major mode of employment.  Cooke then argues that 
the majority of informal workers will continue to be disadvantaged owing to:  (1) the fact that private 
employment agencies function as labor subcontractors facilitating the avoidance of labor regulations; (2) 
the absence of a social security system for workers in informal employment; and (3) the lack of effective 
enforcement of employment related regulations.  
 
Generally speaking, informal laborers in China, though in many cases nominally covered by labor laws, 
are largely unprotected by the state and seriously lacking in organization.  With the uneven 
implementation of the Labor Contract Law, the emergence of a two-tier labor market across sectors is 
witnessed, evidenced by the growing percentage of dispatch workers (workers hired through an 
employment agency) used in firms and the rising incidence of capital-labor conflicts that accompany the 
informalization process.  
 
 
2. Data collection  
 
2.1.  Choice of study area   
Our fieldwork was conducted in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) Region of Eastern China.  The YRD is 
China’s industrial heartland that encompasses Shanghai municipality, southern Jiangsu and northern 
Zhejiang Province (Figure V.2.1).  There are many reasons for choosing this region as the field study site. 
 
First, the YRD is one of the major textile and apparel manufacturers and exporters in Mainland China.  In 
2012, garment manufacturers in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai produced yearly 3949.81, 3654.74 and 
504.41 million pieces of clothing, ranking second, third and fourteenth, respectively (Table V.2.1).  
Overall, garment enterprises and workshops in the YRD contributed about one-third of China’s annual 
volume of garment production.   
 
Secondly, the apparel industry in the region has been well developed, exhibiting a high degree of 
specialization and division of labor among enterprises.  As shown in Figure V.2.1, the industrial cities and 
towns in the YRD specialize in manufacturing different types of apparel.  For instance, Pinghu mainly 
produces clothing for export, Huzhou specializes in making children’s clothing and Hangzhou focuses on 
producing women’s clothing.  In addition, the region has experienced heightened efficiency brought 
about by a complex division of labor among enterprises.  For example, there are more than 3,000 
enterprises in the industrial cluster of Zhuji that solely produces socks.  Most of them are small- and 
medium-sized factories specializing in different segments of sock production (Li & Fung Research Centre 
2010).  In short, the region is populated by diverse garment production units, which vary in size and 
output type.  A more comprehensive picture of the process of informalization can be depicted, as the 
survey samples are not limited to a specific type of manufacturer.  
 
Last but not least, studying informal worker organizing in the YRD will fill a major vacuum in existing 
literature.  Being one of the major economic hubs and new export-oriented industrial zones in China, 
the YRD has become a major host region for Chinese migrant workers.  However, labor NGOs are not 
given their due weight in research.  Most research focuses on labor organizing in the Pearl River Delta 
Region (PRD), located in Guangdong province, not the YRD.  For example, the research carried out by 
Deng and Wang (2004) and Yue and Qu (2007) respectively on Panyu Dagongzu Wenshuchulibu (Panyu 
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Workers’ Service Centre), a migrant workers’ NGO in Panyu, Guangdong China, summarized the 
activities and services provided by the center.  These activities and services include the provision of legal 
aid, cultural and entertainment services, offering occupational safety and health education, and the 
promotion of corporate social responsibility.  Similarly, Huang (2006, 2012) discusses in his research 
legal consultancies, advocacy, training courses on various issues, cultural activities and occupational 
safety and health education as major functions of labor NGOs in the PRD.   Our research attempts to 
supplement the inadequacy of past research and aims to provide a preliminary analysis of the role 
played by the YRD’s labor NGOs in monitoring and enforcing labor standards, supported by fieldwork on 
one particular labor NGO. 
 
Figure V.2.1.   Spatial specializations of textile and apparel industry in the Yangtze River Delta Region 
Source:  China Industrial Map Editorial Committee (2006, 26) 
 
The trend in garment manufacturing is to build factories in smaller cities, towns or even villages, in order 
to lower the cost of labor and fixed assets.  As a result, only a few sizeable garment factories still exist in 
Shanghai City, except trading companies and retailers’ sourcing offices.65  We selected several towns                                                         
65 Trading companies, which are usually based in Shanghai, have played a significant role in the flow of 
manufacturing orders.  Indeed, the YRD’s garment enterprises rarely have direct contact with their foreign 
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and cities in the YRD for our research including the Shanghai City Proper, Changzhou, Hangzhou, Pinghu, 
Huzhou and Ningbo.   
 
Table V.2.1.  Total number of garment pieces produced in China in 2012 (By Province/ Municipality) 
Province/ 
Municipality 
Pieces of Clothing (Million) 
Dec 2012 Jan - Dec 2012 Jan - Dec 2012 
(Percentage) 
Guangdong 518.77 5371.84 20.10% 
Jiangsu 365.02 3949.81 14.78% 
Zhejiang 361.82 3654.74 13.67% 
Shandong 356.62 3604.65 13.49% 
Fujian 312.71 3293.91 12.32% 
Jiangxi 129.63 1193.31 4.46% 
Hubei 105.96 987.59 3.69% 
Anhui 78.24 806.95 3.02% 
Henan 76.84 758.17 2.84% 
Hebei 63.59 697.30 2.61% 
Liaoning 40.28 621.84 2.33% 
Shanghai 44.43 504.41 1.89% 
Hunan 29.38 264.97 0.99% 
Total 2570 26728 100% 
Source:  Zhongguo Chanye Xunxiwang (2013) 
  
2.2.    Methodology 
In this research, the main data collection methods applied include questionnaire surveys, in-depth 
interviews and secondary data analysis.  Between March and August 2012 and in January 2013 we 
conducted a survey of garment workers.  The purpose of the survey was to analyze garment workers’ 
living and working conditions and the extent of informalization in the region.  We collected information 
from a total of 357 workers with the assistance of several graduate students of Peking University and 
local scholars.  Among the respondents are 223 workshop workers and 134 are factory workers.66  We 
applied a convenience sampling method because no sampling frame was available.  
 
There are two major ways to approach factory worker samples:  waiting at entrances of factories and 
asking workers to fill in the questionnaires; and seeking factory managers’ assistance.  We chose to seek 
factory managers’ assistance to provide access to workers on factory grounds.  Most of them allowed us 
to enter into worksites and pick respondents ourselves while only a few selected the pool of potential 
interviewees for us.  Although the management helped arrange access to interviewees, our respondents                                                                                                                                                                                   
customers.  They usually obtain manufacturing orders for international apparel brands from Shanghai’s trading 
companies.  Acting as independent domestic middlemen, the trading companies usually assume the responsibility 
for moving clothing overseas.  Thus, strictly speaking, YRD manufacturers principally use domestic channels to 
obtain production orders and distribute garments abroad because there are no dealings abroad with a foreign 
customer. 
66 Factory workers are directly employed by bigger (more than 50 employees) and registered garment production 
units.  Workshop workers are those who work in family workshops or unregistered workshops. Each workshop 
usually comprises fewer than ten workers. 
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felt free to fill out the questionnaires outside the presence of the managers.  They were provided a 
questionnaire that contained 124 questions and were asked to fill out the questionnaire on their own 
immediately with the assistance of the researchers.  The topics covered by the survey included, but 
were not limited to, family background and migration status; conditions of work and employment; living 
conditions and entitlements; and labor organization and collective action.  Workshop worker samples 
were collected during our visits to urban villages in the YRD wherein family workshops and unregistered 
workshops cluster together.  Due to the limitations of convenience sampling, we could not make any 
generalizations about the total population from our samples.  
 
The research team also conducted in-depth interviews with frontline workers, factory owners and 
managers in July 2012 and January 2013 to obtain a deeper understanding of the labor process, 
employment practices, and spatial and social organization of production in the region.  In total, we 
studied 34 textile and apparel enterprises in the region, approaching them through our personal 
networks and assistance of local scholars in Shanghai.  
 
In order to explore informal worker organizing and its impacts on labor standards in the region, the 
research team conducted a thorough case study in January 2013 of ABC (name withheld), a labor NGO.  
ABC is the first and only labor NGO founded by garment workers in the region that is committed to 
defending labor rights.  In the field study, we interviewed the founder, three full-time staff members 
and eight core members to gain a comprehensive picture of daily operations, the decision-making 
process and mobilization strategies of the organization.  With the help of ABC’s staff, the local trade 
union cadre and official labor inspector were also interviewed, so as to examine the partnership 
between the organization and external parties.  We also briefly examine other labor NGOs in the YRD 
and their impact on improving labor conditions and monitoring.  
 
 
3. Labor protections for garment workers under Chinese labor laws 
3.1.    Protection offered by Chinese labor laws  
The Labor Law of 1994 and the Labor Contract Law of 2008 are two major laws regarding labor 
standards.  The Labor Law of 1994 is the first comprehensive labor standards law in Mainland China.  It 
covers minimum wage, child labor, working hours, protection of women, collective contracts, rest and 
vacation, the settlement of labor disputes, the role of trade unions, labor protection, labor inspection 
system and many other areas.  The major aspects of the Labor Law of 1994 are summarized in Table 
V.3.1, below.  
 
The Labor Contract Law defines requirements of employment contracts and informs both employers and 
workers of their rights and obligations.  It is the first national law governing employment contracts 
(Wang 2009).  The Labor Contract Law aimed to increase worker protection in response to China’s 
capitalist-style economic growth.  For instance, Article 14 of the Labor Contract Law mandates open-
ended contracts after two fixed-term contracts, which makes the termination of workers much more 
difficult.67  In addition, layoffs have become more difficult in terms of new procedural requirements 
involving the trade union and local authorities.  The amendment of the Labor Contract Law, which went 
into effect on 1st July 2013, further improves protection of dispatch workers.  The amendment requires 
employers to hire the majority of their workers directly and strictly controls the number of dispatch                                                         
67 Open-term employment contract is a contract for which the employer and the employee have agreed not to 
stipulate a definite ending date.  
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workers.  Moreover, the law clearly states that “equal pay for equal work” requires employers to 
compensate dispatch employees in the same manner as direct-hire employees who hold similar 
positions.  
 
Table V.3.1.    Key areas of labor protections offered by the Labor Law of 1994 
Overtime Pay • 1.5x for over 44 hours per week  
• 2x for weekends 
• 3x for national holidays 
Maternity Leave • Paid leave for at least 3 months 
• A half hour breast feeding time, up to twice during working hours  
Holidays  • Shall arrange rests for workers during 11 days of official national holidays 
including the New Year Day, the Spring Festival, the International Labor Day 
and the National Day, etc.   
Employment 
Involvement 
• Worker’s Congress for state-owned enterprises, but not required for private 
enterprises 
Labor Disputes  • No right to strike  
• Mandatory arbitration before taking legal actions  
Wages  • System of guaranteed minimum wages 
• Specific standards on minimum wages shall be stipulated by provincial 
people’s governments 
Social Insurance • All employees shall be covered by social insurance schemes 
Supervision and 
Inspection 
• The labor administrative departments at or above the county level shall 
supervise and inspect efforts by the employer to abide by laws and 
regulations, and have the power to stop any behavior that runs counter to 
labor laws and regulations and order correction. 
• The supervisors of the labor administrative departments shall have the 
right to go to the employer to make investigations about the employers’ 
implementation of labor laws and regulations, consult data they deem 
necessary, and inspect labor sites. 
Child Labor • Legal working age is 16 
 
3.2. Coverage of labor laws  
  
According to Article 2 of the Labor Law of 1994, the law “applies to enterprises, individually-owned 
economic organizations (hereinafter referred to as the employer) and laborers who form a labor 
relationship with them within the boundary of the People’s Republic of China.”  The labor laws cover 
those entities, which (i) comply with the legal definitions of “laborer” and “employer”; and (ii) get 
involved in provable employer-employee relations.  In other words, labor standards set by this law do 
not apply to workers who are employed illegally.  Illegal workers are among the groups excluded from 
both labor law and labor statistics, along with juveniles under the age of 16, family labor in home-based 
units and undocumented foreign workers.  Significantly, the category of “illegal workers” also includes 
workers who are employed by unregistered economic organizations.  Thus, the availability of evidence(s) 
for a valid employer-employee relation (e.g. having a copy of written employment contract) is important 
to determine whether or not workers are protected by Chinese labor laws.  
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Although China’s labor laws do not cover garment workers who work for unregistered manufacturing 
units, this does not mean that state labor inspectors do not have jurisdiction in the unregistered sector.  
Some of the articles of the Labor Law of 1994 give the state inspectors powers to investigate issues in 
workshops.  For instance, Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Labor Law of 1994 enable state inspectors to monitor 
labor safety and sanitation, check against the use of child labor and wage arrears in all workplaces, 
regardless of the non-existence of evidence proving an employer-employee relationship.      
 
 
4. Spatial and social organization of production  
In this section, we will briefly describe how work is structured in the textile and apparel industries and 
workers’ living and working conditions in the YRD.  According to the surveys we conducted in July 2012 
and January 2013, there are several crucial differences in labor standards between garment workers in 
the region.  This depends on whether they are hired by large factories as core or contract workers, or 
hired by small garment workshops.  Thus, our analysis will consider the labor process and standards in 
the industry separately for the two groups (factory workers and workshop workers).  Their living and 
working conditions will be briefly described and compared thereinafter.  
 
4.1.     Work structure  
 
4.1.1. Technologies  
Facing fierce competition from other less developed countries in low-end product markets, the garment 
enterprises in the region have been forced to innovate and adopt new technologies in order to raise 
productivity (China National Garment Association 2012).  For instance, computer-aid design (CAD) 
system has been widely used in the YRD’s garment sector.  Its usage has reached 100% among 
“enterprises above designated size.”68  Computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), for example taking the 
form of auto-cutting machines, is also increasingly used due to the problems of labor shortage and 
soaring labor costs.69  It is estimated that the use of CAM will increase to 15% in 2015.  In addition, 
advanced sewing technologies have been introduced into established enterprises in the region.  The 
production by sewing machines with electronically controlled functions has rocketed by over 40% and 
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) were also used in about 2,000 production lines in the year 2011.  
In contrast to enterprises above designated size, small factories and home-based workshops lack capital 
to invest in new machinery or technological innovations from abroad.  They have no choice but to use 
simple domestic machines doing low value-added manufacturing tasks.  
 
4.1.2. Firm Sizes  
There are no official statistics on average firm size in the region.  The National Bureau of Statistics of 
China only reports on “enterprises above designated size.”  Hence, the official statistics exclude data on 
small and medium-sized garment enterprises (SMEs), as well as home-based workshops.  As shown in 
Table V.4.1, there are 4,162 enterprises counted in the Yangtze River Delta, larger numbers in outlying                                                         
68 “Enterprises above designated” size is a statistical term used by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  The 
term refers to industrial enterprises with annual sales revenues of RMB 20 million (about $3.2 million) or above.  
69 In recent years, the development of the textile and garment industry has encountered a bottleneck brought 
about by the soaring labor costs, which could be attributed to the population structure of China.  Although the 
number of people in the labor force is increasing, there has been a decrease in the ratio of young people.  As 
export-oriented factories in China’s Sunbelt tend to hire young migrant workers from rural areas, the salary levels 
of frontline workers have increased sharply with the worsening shortage of young workers. 
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Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces and the smallest number in Shanghai proper.  They have assets totalling 
RMB 350 billion (1 RMB is currently equivalent to 0.16 USD) and employ 136 thousand people (out of 
China's total apparel employment of 334 thousand, in larger enterprises).  On average, an enterprise 
above designated size in the region has about 310 employees and assets of RMB 86 million.  The figures 
show that the YRD’s apparel enterprises have a scale larger than an average Chinese firm.  
 
Table V.4.1.  Economic indicators of apparel enterprises above designated size in Shanghai, Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu Provinces and the Yangtze River Delta as a while 
 Number of 
Enterprises 
Employees 
(10000 
persons) 
Gross Output 
Value of Industry 
(RMB 100 million) 
Total Assets 
(RMB 1000 
million) 
Average 
Number of 
Employees 
Average 
Assets (RMB 
1 million) 
Shanghai 430 11.50 440.35 395.67 267.44 920.16 
Zhejiang 1499 47.25 1468.37 1417.87 315.21 945.88 
Jiangsu 2233 77.44 3033.92 1763.00 346.79 789.52 
YRD 4162  136.19 4942.64 3576.54 309.81 859.332 
China 11168  334 13823.77 7369.71 299.07 659.90 
Source:  National Bureau of Statistics of China (2012), China National Garment Association (2012) 
 
Figure V.4.1.  Distribution of workers interviewed by size of enterprise 
 
With regards to SMEs and home-based workshops, we can only get a preliminary and non-conclusive 
estimate of their scale.  This is due to a lack of large-scale surveys of manufacturing units with annual 
sales revenues below RMB 20 million.  In the survey we conducted in 2012 and 2013, most workers 
came from SMEs and home-based workshops.  Figure V.4.1 shows the distribution of workers by size of 
their garment-manufacturing units from our survey.  More than 65% of respondents work at small-scale 
workshops, which employ less than 50 workers, and about one-fifth of workers are at firms with an 
employment size of 50-99.  In contrast, large-sized enterprises are relatively rare in our sample.  Only 2 
of the 195 respondents who gave a valid response to the firm size question work at large garment 
enterprises that have more than 500 workers. 
 
4.1.3.  Contracting relationship  
Manufacturing orders received by garment production units in the region have to pass through several 
steps, including but not limited to trading companies, first and second tier factories, small home-based 
units and home workers.  Figure V.4.2 is a simple visualization of the apparel supply chain we found in 
YRD.  It depicts the contracting relationship between the four tiers of garment manufacturing units, 
retailers and middlemen.  It is noted that a model with four tiers of manufacturers shown in the figure 
66.15% 
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13.85% 
1.03% 
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50 - 99
100 - 499
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does not simply imply that every order has to pass through the same chain.  Indeed, the length of the 
supply chain varies according to different sizes and types of orders.  Longer chains are generally found in 
large export orders, which usually come from global brands, while smaller export orders and domestic 
production have smaller chains.  The latter type may begin in tier 2, 3 or 4 depending on the size of 
orders.  
 
The first tier is the manufacturer contracted to make the garments.  They are large-scale manufacturers, 
also known as enterprises above designated size, which obtain manufacturing orders indirectly from 
trading companies or directly from sourcing offices of larger brands.  Some tier one factories are wholly 
controlled subsidiaries of larger brands or partially owned joint ventures, and thus they do not need to 
compete for orders.  The large manufacturers (contractors) at tier one usually have up to three vertical 
tiers below them and many manufacturing units form horizontal chains at each tier.  In other words, the 
structure of the supply chain is rather similar to a pyramid:  the higher the level of tier, the fewer 
manufacturing units there are.  
 
First tier manufacturers may further subcontract to a number of smaller locally owned garment factories 
and subsidiary plants in neighboring industrial towns in the region thus, forming the second tier supply 
chain.  Most of the second tier manufacturers are middle-sized factories that employ more than 50 
workers.  They are usually long term sub-contractors of tier one manufacturers.  
 
Tracing down the chain to the third tier production units, we find that they are small garment 
workshops that the second tier manufacturers subcontract to when the orders cannot be finished on 
time.  They are small-scale factories or workshops that are found in the same neighborhoods as the 
second tier factories, but with less infrastructure, and sometimes based in homes.  Due to relatively 
outdated machinery used in tier three workshops, they usually take up simple production processes for 
domestic orders and seldom manufacture garments for larger brands.70 
 
The third tier workshops further subcontract to even smaller home-based workshops that employ ten 
workers or fewer workers.  These fourth tier subcontractors are unregistered business entities that do 
not pay taxes and use electricity at the lower price for household consumers.  These workers often times 
work from home but can choose to work from other precarious locations.71 
 
Third tier production costs are generally lower than registered factories nearby.  The manager of the 
firm NY (firm names have been replaced by codes) said,  
 
Clothes can be produced at much lower costs in home-based workshops.  Let’s take 
electricity as an example.  The home-based workshops and standard factories are 
charged at different rates for electricity consumption.  As the skilled workshop workers 
produce garments in home settings, they only have to pay electricity bills at prices for 
domestic consumers, which are far less than industrial electricity prices.  Also, the self-
employed status of workshop workers greatly reduces their public pension expenditures.                                                         
70 The second tier producers seldom subcontract production orders for global brands to tier three workshops.  If 
they cannot finish orders on time, they will subcontract to other second tier manufacturers instead of lower-level 
workshops.  
71 The home workers at fourth tier are subcontracted working for an employer, intermediary or subcontractor for a 
piece rate in their homes or in other premises of their own choice.  In contrast, employees of the third tier home-
based workshops do not carry out production in their homes but in employers’ workplaces in home-based settings. 
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Figure V.4.2.   Simplified supply chain showing manufacturing subcontracting relationships in the Yangtze 
River Delta Region for overseas and local markets 
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These third tier small workshops usually produce low-end garments for the domestic market, in 
particular, clothing sold at Taobao Marketplace (a Chinese language website facilitating consumer-to-
consumer retail, much like eBay in the US).  They also do the labor-intensive processes that cannot be 
mechanized such as trimming or making knots.  
 
Different from early years of reform, entities along the garment supply chain are no longer concentrated 
in the city proper of Shanghai.  Most manufacturing units, particularly tiers 2, 3 and 4, are now located 
in neighboring industrial towns in the YRD like Pinghu and Huzhou or even in newly-developed industrial 
zones in inland provinces.  Trading companies that contract directly with foreign buyers and sourcing 
offices of larger brands usually stay in metropolitan areas like Shanghai and Hangzhou.  To account for 
the decentralization of apparel industries in the region, soaring production costs and policies of local 
governments should be taken into account.  It is found that many Shanghai garment enterprises are 
negatively affected by the soaring land rents in major cities.  For instance, rising land prices in Shanghai 
have forced the firm HR (firm names have been replaced by codes) to move its production lines to 
Yangzhou, Jiangsu.  The company has rented out its old factory building in Shanghai at 1.7 million RMB 
to Home Inns Co. as a budget hotel.  Apart from high land prices, the production line reallocation is also 
caused by high labor-related costs in metropolitan areas.  Ten enterprises that we visited have set up 15 
factories (most of them are tier two manufacturers) in small industrial towns in the region and inland 
provinces.  For example, the firm DHT has opened a new factory in Hubei to cope with the rapid increase 
in production volume: 
 
If this trend (moving production inland) continues, the proportion of the migrant 
workers in our plants will continue to drop.  Hubei migrant workers who originally 
worked in coastal provinces like Guangdong could choose to work in their hometown.  
The reallocation of factories to Hubei has greatly reduced our labor costs from 100 
RMB to 50 or 60 RMB per worker per day. 
 
4.1.4. Prevalence of employment contracts in our sample 
In the survey we conducted in 2012 and 2013, there is a great difference in employment contract signing 
rates between factory employees and workshop workers.  As shown in Figure V.4.3, 81% of factory 
workers interviewed through this study have signed written employment contracts with their employers, 
while 11% out of 223 respondents from garment workshops said that they have signed written 
agreements.  The low signing rate of employment contracts among workshop workers (who are in 
theory covered by the Labor Contract Law like all employees) indicates that a vast majority of them are 
informally employed in the strictest sense, even when the term “informal labor” is limited to those who 
lack labor contracts.  
 
The prevalence of employment contracts among factory workers (about 81%) in our sample does not 
necessarily mean a relatively high degree of employment security in China’s apparel factories overall.  
Indeed, as suggested by Liu (2011), most factory workers with labor contracts are contingent workers, 
who work under contracts for fixed periods of 1 to 2 years.  In addition, the mere existence of written 
employment contracts is not sufficient to ensure proper protection of workers’ rights and interests 
because some workers are not allowed to keep copies of their contracts.  In our sample, only 56% of 
factory respondents who have contracts said that their employers provide copies of employment 
contracts (Figure V.4.3).  In short, the results of our survey suggest that garment workers in the region 
lack employment security even though the contract-signing rate is high in formal factories.  
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Figure V.4.3.  Percentage of garment workers in the study sample with employment contracts 
   
 
To those respondents who said they did not sign employment contracts, we asked why (see Figure 
V.4.4).  Respondents were provided five options.72  The majority of those who had not signed contracts, 
about 64%, indicated, “I never requested an employment contract and my employer never asked me to 
sign an employment contract.”  This may indicate that workshop workers are generally unaware of how 
to protect their rights and interests.  Proving the existence of an employer-employee relationship is 
always the first step for a worker in order to legally challenge his/her boss for labor law infringement.  
Thus, garment workers who do not sign an employment contract or do not have a copy of the contract 
are very likely to be “excluded” from the rights entrenched by labor laws, particularly when the firms 
deny that a worker is an employee.  
 
4.1.5. Factory work without a contract:  Baogongtou and Baogondui subcontract labor 
As found in our survey, a small proportion of factory workers have not signed employment contracts 
with the factory owners.  In some cases this may be because the workers – especially factory workers – 
are subcontracted labor working for Baogongtou, labor contractors, or Baogongdui, a workshop 
contracting team that performs the work of the factory workers.  It is noted that the subcontracted 
laborers do not have employment contracts with the Baogongtou.  This is because labor contractors are 
not the workers’ bosses in a legal sense.73  
 
                                                         
72 The five options provided were:   
• “I think that the labor contract is useful. Yet, my employer declines to sign it”  
• “I don't want to sign an employment contract”  
• “I never request employment contract and my employer never asks me to sign it”, 
• “I never think of the labor contract” and “others” 
73 According to the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, labor supply subcontractors do not have 
corporate status and hence do not have a legal status to employ workers.  
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Figure V.4.4.  Reasons for lacking employment contracts among workshop workers 
 
 
Baogongtou:  The contractor management system  
Workers under the contractor management system are frontline workers who are controlled by labor 
contractors (Baogongtou), instead of factory managers.  One interviewee from the firm AT mentioned 
that some of the company’s employees are directly managed and supervised by labor contractors.74  It is 
believed that the emergence of the Baogongtou management system is related to the recent 
recruitment difficulties of migrant workers in the Greater Shanghai Region.  Baogongtou recruit workers 
from rural families in the countryside and supervise the fulfillment of production tasks.  They may also 
serve as workers’ representatives in negotiations with management.  In return, the garment enterprises 
pay labor contractors management fees that are calculated at a rate of 100 RMB per person, per month.  
From the factory manager’s perspective, the Baogongtou system is associated with many benefits, in 
particular, reducing the direct confrontation between the management and the employees and lowering 
the possibility of labor strikes. 
                                                         
74 The Baogongtou system is similar to the “Number Ones” system depicted by Elizabeth Perry.  In the book titled 
Shanghai on Strike:  The Politics of Chinese Labour, Perry suggests that in the early twentieth century, unskilled 
factory workers labored under the stern control of the “Number Ones” (Naomowen).  They were women workers 
who had won promotion by force of personality.  A Number One, who supervised the labor process and had the 
power to fine or punish those who violate the rules, managed each workshop or work group.  
 
0.00% 
0 0 0 0 0
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Baogondui:  Contracting team  
A contracting team (Baogongdui in Chinese) is comprised of workshop workers who go to factories 
together as a team for temporary production tasks.  We found that some skilled garment workers in the 
YRD region have joined hands to establish their own neighborhood workshops.  They usually get 
subcontracted orders and produce clothing for the nearby garment factories.  If these workshops lack 
sufficient subcontracting production orders, the workers organize themselves into free contracting 
teams, entering factories or larger workshops to undertake production tasks.  The manager of the 
factory NY said,  
 
When the workshops suffer from lack of orders, the workers would form contracting 
teams to engage in production at garment plants.  On average, the factories would pay 
the contracting team members 170 RMB a day.  During the peak season, we certainly 
need to hire these skilled workers and their salaries could rise to 200 or even 250 RMB 
per day. 
 
Once a work order is complete, the charges received for subcontracting would be shared equally among 
its members.  As these contracting teams are autonomous associations of garment workers who 
voluntarily cooperate for mutual economic benefits and there is no hierarchy, one could thereby regard 
them as rural-cooperatives.  
 
Factory managers in our sample expressed a generally negative attitude towards these contracting 
teams because workers’ associational power is greatly strengthened.  It certainly improves the workers’ 
bargaining position in salary negotiations.  However, managers usually have no choice but to outsource 
parts of the manufacturing process to contracting teams, particularly during the peak season.  The 
manager of JF said,   
 
In recent years, many workers hired in local garment factories belong to contracting 
teams.  The representatives of these baogongdui approach the management every day 
to negotiate their salaries.  If they cannot come to a consensus, the contracting team 
members would slow down the pace of production or even leave the factories. 
 
4.2.      Labor processes and standards 
 
4.2.1. Wages and working hours  
 
Wage level, salary payment and overtime pay 
An average garment worker in our sample earns RMB 2900.10 a month (about USD 470).  Workshop 
workers on average earn more than their factory counterparts.  Workshop workers, who responded to 
our questionnaire, earn an average monthly income of RMB 3045.11, whereas, factory workers in our 
sample earn RMB 2719.69.   
 
We also asked factory and workshop workers whether they are paid on time and whether they are paid 
in full.  About 62% of our factory respondents indicated that their salaries are always paid on time, while 
29% stated that they sometimes or always receive late payments.  The remaining 9% did not answer the 
question.  Regarding whether factory workers receive full payment, 68% of the respondents said that 
they are always paid in full while about 18% sometimes receive partial payment.  The remaining 14% did 
not answer the question.  The situation of our workshop respondents is even worse. It is found that 
nearly 35% of workshop workers surveyed have been paid late and about a quarter of them receive 
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partial payment.  These figures show that late and partial payments are not rare, threatening the 
income security of garment workers in the region.  
 
With regard to overtime pay, majority of our respondents (about 51.5%) claimed that their overtime pay 
is at a normal weekday rate, while only about 16% stated that they are paid at a higher rate.75  In other 
words, most garment workshops have violated the labor laws as their employees work overtime without 
extra pay.76  As stipulated under the Labor Law of China, employees shall be compensated at a higher 
rate for overtime work.  The overtime compensation rate depends on the day when the overtime work 
is rendered:  150% for overtime work during workdays, 200% for overtime work during weekends and 
300% for overtime work during public holidays, for example Spring Festival.  
 
Working hours and number of holidays  
On average, garment workers in our sample have to work 9.8 hours per working day and they have 2.53 
days off per month.  When asked whether they get days off on public holidays, more than 95% of our 
respondents said they do not work on Labor Day and National Day and 85% have days off on New Year’s 
Day and Tomb-sweeping Day (a traditional Chinese festival).  A majority of workers said that they could 
have public holidays off.  But none of them receives holiday pay and all workers reported that holidays 
are sometimes counted as part of their leave benefits.  While most workers may not be required to work 
on public holidays, they are not given the day off as a paid holiday. 
 
Labor segmentation  
Labor segmentation has prevailed in the YRD’s garment industry.  The garment industry workforce can 
be divided into broad low-skilled and high-skilled groups.  High-skilled workers are equipped with all-
around skills or perform the same production tasks with practiced skills, while low-skilled workers 
perform simple tasks repeatedly.  Generally speaking, high-skilled workers face relatively better working 
conditions overall.  They seldom work overtime and have higher hourly rates.  In addition to the value 
brought by their skills and experience, this may also be attributed to strong associational power of 
skilled workers.  As an example, the differences in salaries and working conditions between prototype 
makers (known as Yangyigong, and are skilled workers) and unskilled front-line workers are summarized 
in Table V.4.1, below. 
 
4.2.2. Access to social insurance 
As stipulated under the Labor and Labor Contract Laws, enterprises have the obligation to contribute 
(along with workers) to old-age insurance, medical insurance and unemployment insurance premiums.  
They are also encouraged to buy industry injury and childbirth insurance for their employees.  
Enterprises that do not purchase this insurance are responsible for covering industrial injury and 
childbirth expenses for their employees.  Despite their compulsory nature, the numbers and 
participation rates in social insurance schemes are far from satisfactory in the YRD’s garment sector, 
particularly among workshop workers.  In general, the employers of registered factories are more likely 
to pay social insurance premiums compared with their workshop counterparts.  The survey responses 
concerning social insurance coverage are summarized in Figure V.4.6.  It is noted that the relatively high 
rate of access to medical insurance among workshop workers may not refer exclusively – or at all – to                                                         
75 The remaining 84% either did not receive it or do not know if they receive it.  So the workers who do not know 
how they are compensated are already included in the 84%.  It is however possible – though unlikely – that some 
of those workers who do not know how their wages are calculated actually do receive overtime pay (again, this is 
unlikely).  This in turn would increase compliance in the sample to greater than 16%. 
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employer-provided medical insurance.  Indeed, the introduction of rural cooperative health care 
insurance in some rural villages may increase medical insurance coverage among garment workers.  
Rural governments mainly pay the contributions of this scheme, rather than the enterprises the workers 
have been employed by.   
 
Table V.4.1.   Comparison of working conditions between skilled prototype makers and unskilled front-
line workers interviewed in our field research 
 Skilled Prototype Makers Unskilled Front-line 
Workers 
Working Hours 8:30 – 17:00 8:00 – 22:00 
Daily Working hours 7.5 13 
Number of Working Days 
per Month 
24 28 
Length of the Break One-hour lunch breaks One hour of rest in total, 
including lunch and dinner 
breaks 
Monthly Salaries 2700 RMB 3000 RMB 
Average Hourly Earnings 15 RMB 8.24 RMB 
 
Figure V.4.6.  Percent of interviewed workers reporting access to social insurance schemes 
 
 
Low access to social insurance schemes might be due in part to workers’ unwillingness to make social 
insurance contributions.  For example, migrant workers who may go back to their villages and thus 
forfeit contributions have lowered their incentives to participate in insurance schemes.  This argument 
may apply to some factory workers in our sample.  As shown in Figure V.4.7, 26% of factory workers (35 
out of 134 respondents) interviewed claimed that they are not covered by social insurance because they 
are not willing to pay insurance contributions.  In contrast, in garment workshops, workers gave the 
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employers’ “non-provision of the schemes” as their primary reason for limited insurance coverage 
(Figure V.4.7). 
 
Figure V.4.7.   Reasons for no access to social insurance schemes  
 
 
Table V.4.3.   A comparison of safety conditions between small workshops and registered factories 
 Small Workshops Registered Factories 
Yes No Don’t 
Know 
Yes No Don’t 
Know 
Workplace Safety 
Training 
17.7% 75.0% 7.3% 43.1% 54.6% 2.3% 
Fresh air Ventilation 
at Workplace 
73.2% 21.1% 5.7% 85.9% 10.2% 3.9% 
Sufficient Lighting at 
Workplace 
88.1% 8.8% 3.1% 94.5% 5.5% 0% 
Emergency Exit(s) 71.2% 16.8% 12.0% 85.0% 12.6% 2.4% 
 
4.2.3. Health and safety 
Four indicators were used to examine workplace safety conditions in this survey.  They are provisions of 
(i) workplace safety training by employers (ii) fresh air ventilation (iii) sufficient lighting and (iv) 
emergency exit availability.  As shown in Table V.4.3, more than 70% of workshop respondents and 80% 
of factory respondents agreed that their workplaces have fresh air ventilation, sufficient lighting and 
emergency exits.  The figures imply that workshop workers perceive greater hazards in the workplace 
than their factory counterparts.  This is not unexpected given that government inspectors only monitor 
working conditions of registered factories.  Without government intervention, workshop owners – who 
frequently use residential housing or temporary buildings as workshops – will have less incentive to 
adopt costly workplace safety measures. 
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High percentages of workers reporting good ventilation, sufficient lighting and emergency exits in our 
sample do not imply a healthy or safe work environment.  Indeed many factory and workshop workers 
suffer from various types of occupational illnesses.  Among those who work in registered factories, 
muscular pain (61%), visual disturbances (38%), headaches (22%) and anxiety (21%) are the most 
common occupation related health issues.  Common illnesses in garment workshops are fatigue (19%), 
muscular pain (14%), visual impairment (12%), and sleep disorders (12%).  The strenuous nature of work 
on production lines should be addressed to account for high risk of occupational illness in garment 
factories.  The high incidence of occupational illnesses greatly threatens the interests of garment 
workers in the region as most of them do not sign any employment contracts and are not covered by 
medical insurance.  They cannot sue their employers for compensation and have to pay medical 
expenses themselves.  
 
Figure V.4.8.   Incidences of occupational illnesses 
 
 
4.2.4. Infringement of rights and worker control  
Workshop workers reported greater incidences of personal rights infringement, relative to their 
counterparts in registered factories.  As shown in Figure V.4.9, fines and verbal insults are the most 
common means of worker control in both factories and workshops.  The workshop respondents also 
reported physical abuse, including battery, forced labor (an alarmingly high 1 workshop worker in 12), 
and frisking.   
4.3. Socioeconomic background of garment workers  
 
A majority of our respondents were migrant workers who were born in poor villages in inland provinces 
of Mainland China, like Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei and Henan.  Many of them were born in or after the 1980s 
and have completed at least junior secondary school.  The gender difference could be observed 
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between workshop and factory samples – the former employ more males while the latter are employ 
more females (details about the socioeconomic background of survey respondents can be found in 
Appendix D).  
 
Figure V.4.9.   Incidences of personal rights infringement cases 
 
 
4.4. Conclusion  
In short, the supply chain of the YRD’s garment sector has several layers, including but not limited to 
trading companies, first and second tier factories, small home-based units and home workers.  The first 
tier manufacturers are large enterprises that are the primary recipients of production orders for foreign 
markets.  They subcontract some orders to second or third tier manufacturing units.  In contrast, small 
garment workshops generally produce garments for low-end markets because their machineries are 
usually simple and outdated.  
 
Most textile and garment workers in the YRD are migrant workers who were born in poor villages in 
inland provinces of Mainland China.  A majority of them do not have labor contracts with any entity.  
Even those with labor contracts still do not meet the criteria for “formal labor,” as their contracts are 
always short-term (1 to 2 years) and they are not fully covered by social insurance schemes.  In some 
cases, groups of informal workers organize themselves into free contracting teams (Baogongdui) to 
undertake production tasks of factories. 
 
The YRD’s garment workers in our sample earn an average of RMB 2900 (USD 470) per month and have 
2.53 days off per month.  Though there was perceived compliance with the occupational safety and 
health measures (ventilation, lighting and emergency exits), many garment workers in our sample 
reported occupational-related illnesses, as well as verbal and to some extent physical abuse.  
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5. Effectiveness of government inspectors and corporate code of conduct in defending labor rights  
In the YRD, the major institutions of monitoring and enforcement are trade unions and the Labor 
Security Supervision Team under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.  Apart from domestic agents, 
an international social movement against corporate misbehaviors has continuously exerted pressure on 
garment manufacturers in the region to obey labor laws and improve workers’ living and working 
conditions.  In the following paragraphs, the effectiveness of trade unions, the Labor Supervision Team 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) campaigns will be critically evaluated.  The existing regulators 
of labor standards are effective to only a very small extent.  They seldom succeed in protecting the 
interests of informal workers in the garment sector because (i) they never monitor working conditions of 
small workshops, which employ large numbers of informal labor; and (ii) they usually lack resources, and 
rarely take initiative to promote workers’ interests.  
 
5.1. Trade unions 
In the existing literature on Chinese civil society, the consensus is that the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU), the one legally sanctioned federation, is tightly tied to the state, ruling party, and in 
most cases to enterprise management.  Some scholars have suggested that the labor unions are no 
longer serving the interest of only the state, and have started to find themselves responsible for serving 
the welfare of workers (Unger and Chan 1995).  This trend can be shown clearly in a tripartite workshop 
on collective bargaining during the drafting of the Labor Law in 1994.  Unger and Chan (1995) find that 
the Union Federation, which was organized by the Party State, spoke in defense of workers’ interests.  
 
Figure V.5.1.   Trade union membership 
 
 
However, our fieldwork shows quite a different story on trade unions.  It is argued that trade unions in 
the region are not monolithic.  In other words, the union officials’ attitudes towards migrant workers 
vary greatly from level to level and even from people to people.  Generally speaking, we agree with the 
proposition suggested by Chen (2010), that workplace unions and those above the workplace level, play 
different roles in defending labor rights – the prior are puppets of the management while the latter 
seem to lean towards the workers. 
 
No 
62% 
Yes 
36% 
Don't Know 
2% 
No Yes Don't Know
102 
 
Most garment enterprise unions we visited fail to defend labor rights because the union leaders are 
managers or are selected by the management and the trade union membership rates among migrant 
workers are too low.  As shown in Figure V.5.1, a majority of our respondents (about 62%) indicated that 
they are not members of a trade union.  Concerning the role played by trade unions, only 14% of 
workers surveyed stated that their workplace trade unions have monitored and defended labor rights.  
In contrast, about 27% and 23% of the interviewees define the role of trade unions as “none” and 
“holiday celebration” respectively (Figure V.5.2).  In short, most garment workers lack union 
representation, and few have observed active monitoring of labor rights. 
 
Figure V.5.2.   Perceived primary role of the trade union 
 
 
In contrast, it is found that some open-minded trade union cadres are sympathetic towards garment 
workers.  For instance, one of the leaders of Zhejiang Provincial General Trade Union has initiated a 
project called “Labor One” (Laibowan in Chinese), which is a microblog hosted by Tencent Weibo.  There 
are four sections in this Internet platform, namely “praises to labor,” “grassroots dream,” “good 
employers” and “labor law lecture.”  Through “Labor One”, the founder wanted to promote labor 
standards and dignity for migrant workers, including those in the garment sector.  Despite good 
intentions and efforts of senior union cadres, their impact on labor law enforcement seems insignificant.  
This is because trade unions above the workplace level are seldom involved in workplace disputes, 
unless workers organize a dramatic strike or demonstration.  
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5.1.1. Labor security supervision system  
In order to study the dynamic between government inspectors, workers and enterprises, we visited the 
street-level supervisor of labor conditions in an urban village in the city XH in January 2013.  The 
supervisor heads the JB Labor Supervision Team (JLSS) or in Chinese, JB laodong jiancha dadui).77  It is 
found that the government inspector in the region seems ineffective in monitoring work conditions and 
defending worker rights and labor standards in the YRD’s garment sector.  There are several reasons for 
this failure.  
 
Photo V.5.1.    A screenshot of “Labor One” 
 
Source:  http://e.t.qq.com/labor2012 
 
First, JLSS is overwhelmed and shorthanded.  With just six full-time officers, the team has to monitor 
labor conditions of the district that is populated by more than 100 thousand workers.  It categorizes 
factories into 3 groups according to their contract signing rates, social insurance participation rates and 
workplace conditions (e.g. provision of housing and food subsidies): 
 
We visit group A factories once per year, group B factories three times a year and group 
C factories four or five times a year.  We seldom monitor working conditions of large 
garment enterprises that have more than 400 employees as they are usually properly 
managed.  Another type of manufacturing units we seldom visited is small garment 
workshop, particularly home-based one.  The team ignores home-based workshops 
                                                        
77 According to the Regulation on Labor Security Supervision (Laodong Baozhang Jiancha Tiaoli) promulgated in 
2004, the Labor Security Administration of the State Council (Guowuyuan Laodong Baozhang Xingzhengbumen) 
shall be in charge of the labor security supervision work of the whole country.  The labor security administration of 
a local government at the county level shall be in charge of the labor security supervision work within its own 
administrative area.  These labor administrations, operating both under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
and under their respective local government, may entrust an organization meeting the law enforcement conditions 
for supervision (i.e. labor supervision team) to conduct the labor security supervision.  For violation of labor laws, 
labor administrations may give warnings, order corrections and impose a fine of no less than RMB 100 and no 
more than RMB 500 for each affected employees.  For refusal to pay wages, overtime pay, minimum pay, or 
economic compensation after cancellation of an employment contract, labor administrations may order payment 
and impose punitive damages of 50% to 100% of the total owed amount. 
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because they are not registered and thus it is difficult to prove the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship.  (Interview with a team member)  
 
Without adequate resources to frequently monitor all manufacturers including established enterprises 
and small home-based workshops, it is doubtful whether the state inspector could enforce the labor 
standards in the region in any meaningful sense.  
 
In addition, the team does not really stand on the same footing as workers when it deals with workplace 
conflicts.  It is a complaint-based inspection system, so they only initiate an investigation once they have 
received a complaint.  And while workers may be best placed to observe workplace problems, they are 
not educated by labor administrators on exactly what kinds of rights they have and which institutional 
channels they can use to protect their labor rights:   
 
When workers consult us on labor disputes, we have been placed in a very difficult and 
embarrassing position indeed.  As a law enforcement agency, we should maintain our 
neutrality and not be biased towards any parties.  We would not teach workers how they 
can defend their rights, for instance, telling them which provisions of labor laws are 
applicable to their cases.  (Interview with a team member)  
 
Thus, the passive nature of the labor security supervision system in Mainland China has greatly 
hampered its effectiveness in defending labor rights.  The system is designed for educated workers who 
are knowledgeable of labor laws and how they are applied.  This is not the case of the YRD’s garment 
workers as most have only completed junior-secondary schools, lacking basic knowledge of labor laws.  
 
5.2. CSR campaigns 
 
By the end of March 2011, among the 25,000 enterprises in the world that meet the minimum 
certification requirements of SA8000 and have received the accreditation, 25 of them are in China.78  
Chinese textile and garment enterprises that received this accreditation are mainly located in the PRD 
and YRD regions.  A Chinese textile industry CSR code, named CSC9000T was introduced in 2005 by the 
Chinese government.79  In 2010, the Fair Labor Association also conducted a living wage survey in 
China’s garment sector. 
 
However, studies show that the impact of international labor standards on China’s textile and garment 
industry has been minimal.  For instance, Chan and Siu (2009) argue that many workers are not aware of 
the corporate code of conduct, and for those who have some idea of it, the code and the monitoring is 
barely relevant to their lives.  Except for the child labor criterion, China fails to meet the International 
Labor Organization’s core labor conventions.  In particular, the right to organize and collectively bargain, 
though affirmed by the Labor Law and Labor Contract Law, does not yet exist in practice for many 
                                                        
78 SA8000 is an international social accountability standard that encourages enterprises to develop, maintain and 
apply socially acceptable practices in the workplace.  The areas that SA8000 addresses include forced and child 
labor, health and safety, freedom of association and collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, 
working hours, compensation and management systems. 
79 CSC9000T (China Social Compliance 9000 for Textile & Apparel Industry) is a Social Responsibility Management 
System based on China’s laws and regulations, international conventions and standards, and China’s particular 
situations. 
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workers.  There is a huge wage gap between China and developed countries in terms of hourly pay and 
weekly wage. 
 
6. Labor NGOs in the Yangtze River Delta Region 
Generally speaking, the development of labor NGOs in the YRD is much less robust than in the Pearl 
River Delta (PRD) in the south of China (Wu 2012).  He, Huang and Huang (2009), estimated the number 
of labor NGOs operating in the PRD at 30-35 as of August 2008.  In contrast, to the best of our 
knowledge, there were only six civic organizations with the aim to defend workers’ rights in the YRD as of 
August 2012.  In particular, Shanghai does not have any NGO engaged mainly in defending workers’ 
rights.  
 
Table V.6.1 provides a summary of various labor NGOs operating in the YRD.  In terms of the occupations 
of founders, labor NGOs in the YRD can be categorized roughly into three groups:  
(1) Grassroots NGOs formed by former workers who are victims of industrial accidents or have been 
involved in labor disputes; 
(2) Subsidiaries of established labor NGOs that are based outside the region; 
(3) Offshoots of academic departments.  
 
Despite the difference in vibrancy of the labor NGOs between the YRD and PRD, organizations in these 
two regions have many common characteristics as they have faced similar institutional and financial 
impediments.  For instance, regarding the legal status of the organizations, most labor NGOs in the YRD 
fail to fulfill the stringent regulations for registration, and thereby are forced to register as commercial 
entities to acquire a quasi-legal status.  Furthermore, on the organizational level, NGOs in the YRD are 
financially strapped and rely heavily on donations and project-based funding from the international 
community.  
 
For the purpose of this report, we focus strictly on ABC (name withheld), as it is the first and only NGO 
experiment initiated by garment workers in the region.  Despite its limited scope for action, ABC provides 
critical holistic support to migrant workers, including subcontracted and home-based workers, and helps 
them build a strong community.    
7. ABC:  A grassroots attempt to overcome the challenges of informalization 
Given the limited effectiveness of trade unions in defending the interests of workers overall, we 
examine other forms of organizations that attempting to represent informal workers, including contract 
and sub-contracted workers.  The main actors are an eclectic group of labor NGOs, which have been 
most extensively developed in the PRD.  This section examines the activities, constraints and impact of 
ABC operating in the YRD Region.  
 
While there is a handful of labor NGOs in the YRD, ABC is the first and only attempt by garment workers 
to improve living and working conditions for all migrant workers in the region.  In this section, we will 
introduce ABC, which specifically targets the migrant worker community, including garment workers.  
First, a brief history of the organization will be provided.  Secondly, the organization’s mission and its 
guiding philosophy will be examined.  Thirdly, we will examine ABC’s organizational structure, focusing 
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on how workers are incorporated into the organization.  Then, ABC’s strategies and tactics for 
organizational survival and promoting labor standards will be examined.  We will analyze how this 
organization collaborates with the state and other external actors.  Last but not least, the benefits of 
ABC to garment workers in the local community, specifically its effectiveness in monitoring and 
enforcing labor standards in textile industry, will be preliminarily assessed. 
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Table V.6.1.   Summary of labor NGOs operating in the Yangtze River Delta Region 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Name withheld. 
Source:  Wu 2012, 3-4. 
Name of the 
Organization 
Suzhou Migrant 
Workers Home 
 
ABC* Xiaoxiaoyu 
Labor 
Services 
On Action 
Public Interest 
Hotline (Suzhou 
Branch) 
The Little 
Bird Hotline 
The Nanjing 
University Legal 
Aid Program for 
Migrant Workers 
City Suzhou, Jiangsu 
Province 
City XH, Zhejiang 
Province 
Yiwu and 
Yongkang in 
Zhejiang 
Province 
Suzhou, Jiangsu 
Province 
Shanghai Kunshan and 
Nanjing in Jiangsu 
Province  
Office 
Location 
Urban Village Urban Village Urban Village Commercial 
Building 
Commercial 
Building 
Commercial 
Building 
Registration 
Type 
Commercial Entity Commercial Entity Commercial 
Entity 
Commercial 
Entity 
Commercial 
Entity 
Offshoots of 
academic 
departments 
Activity 
Type(s) 
Cultural activities, 
training 
workshops, visits 
to injured 
workers, small 
group activities for 
female workers, 
legal education 
Cultural activities and 
entertainment, 
training workshops, 
social activities, 
mutual-help 
programs, 
consultation for labor 
arbitration, legal aid 
Legal aid, 
education in 
occupational 
safety 
Legal aid, 
promoting 
corporate social 
responsibility, 
policy advocacy 
Hotlines, 
labor law 
education, 
charitable 
activities 
Legal aid and 
consultation  
Source(s) of 
Funding 
International 
donations, state 
patronage, self-
raised funds 
International 
donations, corporate 
donations, state 
patronage 
International 
donations 
International 
donations 
International 
donations 
University funding, 
state patronage 
Year of 
Establishment 
2008 2008 2009 2006 2011 2007 
Founder(s)  Migrant Workers Migrant Workers Migrant 
Workers 
A labor NGO 
based in Beijing 
A labor NGO 
based in 
Beijing 
Academics 
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7.1. Organization history 
 
ABC is a community-based non-governmental labor organization that provides support to communities 
of migrant workers.  A former garment worker from Jiangxi Province, XWC, founded the organization in 
2006 (Chen 2009; Wu 2012).  ABC offers social services and legal advice to migrant workers from 
different industries, including the garment sector; advocates for changes in labor laws and policies; and 
helps build sympathy of the larger community for migrant workers.  It is noted that from the start, ABC 
targeted migrant workers, not specifically garment workers but given the high concentration of garment 
workers in the YRD, it does reach out to many such workers.  However, garment workers only make up a 
minority of its core membership, since the grueling work schedules in the apparel industry make it 
difficult for workers to participate in outside organizations.  Yet, ABC is still worth examining because it 
is the closest form of a workers’ organization that advocates on behalf of subcontracted and home-
based workers in the garment sector.  The example of ABC indeed shows both the significant constraints 
on Chinese grassroots labor NGO, and how such a NGO can contribute to monitoring working conditions 
and defending workers' rights and labor standards.  
 
 After completing junior secondary education in 1993, XWC has left his hometown to make a living as a 
migrant worker in city XH.  Like millions of his counterparts in Mainland China, XWC worked under 
exploitative conditions, including excessive working hours without sufficient rest, underpaid work, 
dangerous working conditions and poor accommodations.  These personal experiences made him realize 
the social and institutional injustice encountered by migrant workers.  Being motivated by a sense of 
civic righteousness to improve the existing labor and social protection institutions for migrant workers, 
XWC has devoted himself to the labor NGO activism.  He quit his job and took a computer class after the 
Lunar New Year holidays in 2006.  Being equipped with essential IT skills, XWC created a website named 
ABC in two months.  Once the website launched on July 1st, 2006, it quickly gained popularity among 
local garment workers and other migrant workers, with over 1,000 visitors per day.  XWC met his first 
labor-activist companions through the site.  A series of large-scale cultural events, like The Grassroots 
Cultural and Arts Festival and Mingong Spring Festival Gala, were held in 2007, with the aim to eliminate 
discrimination against migrant workers.  
 
However, XWC quickly learned about the limitations of the Internet platform in improving the actual 
work experiences of migrant workers (including garment workers), many of whom live in poverty and 
without access to the Internet.  This lack of access to the Internet led XWC to establish a service facility 
in city XH.  In 2008, XWC and his companions used their savings to rent a 50 square meter flat to set up a 
workers’ center, named, ABC:  Migrant Worker Cultural Centre.  They registered their organization with 
the Bureau for Industry and Commerce as a commercial entity.  
 
In 2010, ABC received a considerable amount of publicity when BYT magazine, the official Xinhua News 
Agency’s most popular publication, published an article about the organization.  The article claimed that 
ABC had demonstrated a successful model for tackling social problems associated with migrant workers.  
This news report by such a prestigious magazine can be a reason for why there has been a friendly 
relationship and collaboration with the state.80  After the release of the news story, ABC caught the 
attention of the State Council of P.R. China.  The State Council then issued instructions and requested                                                         
80 National media are tightly censored by the party state in mainland China. Thus, being reported and 
acknowledged by the central government-owned media, like Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily implies that 
the entity has passed the political correctness test and encourages local officials to collaborate with the 
organization.  
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the corresponding departments and government agencies to conduct field studies to identify the 
successes of the organization.  With the acknowledgement from the Central Government, the local 
authorities have changed their attitudes towards the organization and state resources have been 
continuously allocated for ABC’s work.  An example of these resources is free office space of 
approximately 300 square meters in a two-story community building that is located in the same 
neighborhood of the original center.  The organization does not run this new activity venue under the 
name of ABC.  Instead they call it the New City XH People Volunteer Service Center, which is affiliated 
with the JB District Trade Union.   
 
At present, ABC has 4 full-time staff (namely XWC, YXG, LH and LL), around 30-40 regular volunteers and 
more than 700 occasional volunteers.  The center now offers a wide range of services for garment 
workers in JB Town of city XH.  These services include cultural activities and entertainment, training 
workshops, social activities, mutual-help programs, consultation for labor arbitration and legal aid.  The 
center also conducts research on working conditions of migrant workers and engages in public policy 
advocacy.  
 
Photo V.7.1. The Workers’ Centre located in the JB District of city XH 
 
 
7.2. ABC and workers’ rights 
 
ABC aims to provide workers with a feeling of home.  Slogans such as, “Our common home, and our 
shared dream” and “After whole day’s work, get back home to take a rest.  Reading books, listening to 
music, and chatting with each other...would bring your tired mind warmth and happiness” are used to 
help create a feeling of home among the workers. 
 
In addition, staff members also feel that their experience at ABC feels like home.  LH, a staff member, 
was attracted to the organization largely because of this reason.  LH shared during an interview that 
“Brother XWC shares with us many of his working experiences; the atmosphere is warm and nice.  We 
are like brothers and sisters.” 
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However, unlike migrant worker NGOs in the PRD that have prioritized protection of rights, ABC has not 
participated in, or launched large-scale workers’ right protection activities.  The organization places 
most of its resources and focus on organizing literary and artistic activities and the provision of 
occupational trainings.  Little has been done with regards to labor rights.  Mostly what has been 
achieved is the enhancement of workers’ legal knowledge and mediation.  Although, the organization 
does forward complaints to the local government and works with the local labor inspection team to 
assure that complaints are addressed. 
 
Photo V.7.2.  New City XH People Volunteer Service Center 
 
 
Photo V.7.3.  Worker volunteers performing 
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Photo V.7.4.    Computer training courses for workers 
 
 
Why does ABC not focus on worker rights protection through the legal channels?  We believe there are 
two reasons.  First, the factories in the PRD are different from the factories in city XH:   
 
In city XH, most factories are small-sized factories and workshops.  Mediation will be a 
better way for right protection when compared with lawsuit.  There will be a risk of 
receive no compensation if the whole set of legal procedures is run as some small factory 
owners may close the factory in order to escape from the large amount of compensation.  
(Interview with YXG, ABC’s legal coordinator) 
 
Second, ABC was funded with the purpose to provide migrant workers with a platform to connect with 
each other and have their lives enriched, instead of assisting workers in protecting their rights.  The 
organization only provides workers a chance to express their concerns based on this platform.  “The 
voices of our workers can be transmitted to and heard by the government.  Government responses on 
labor policies can also be transmitted to workers.  This way, we can cooperate to push our society in 
improving workers’ conditions” (Interview with LH).  Therefore, when the organization is consulted on 
labor disputes, the disputes are usually directed to the JB Branch of the City XH Labor Security 
Supervision Team, so as to solve the disputes through official channels.  
 
The founder of ABC gave his own explanation on the organization’s position: 
 
I do not support that we protect workers’ rights through legal actions.  It is in fact a dead 
end. It can be explained using a metaphor of Chinese and Western medicine.  Helping 
workers through right protection activities and lawsuits can be considered as taking 
western medicine.  The symptoms or problems can be lessened or solved; yet, only 
particular patients would be beneficial from western medicine.  On the other hand, 
cultural activities, unifying workers and other networks developed by our organization 
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can be compared with Chinese medicine and health care products, though unable to 
solve the problem directly, teach workers the ways to protect their own rights. 
 
If we focus only on rights protection activities, barely a telephone and an office would be 
enough.  It will be my serving other workers instead of mutual assistance of workers. 
 
I have always believed that everyone his own aspirations. I admire with my whole heart 
those insist on rights protection, such as the great contributions made by organizations 
in the South, yet, I simply cannot violate my aspiration. 
 
Now, I can gather 700 to 800 workers, we want to make out organization a "branded" 
organization.  If we worked on rights protection issues, I would never be like that. In fact, 
many Southern rights protection organizations do not focus on their brands, some even 
have their offices hidden. 
 
If the huge number of labor organizations in Guangdong bring about improvement in 
workers’ working conditions, then we should learn from their past experiences.  Yet, why 
are working conditions in Guangdong still poor despite the years of effort made by labor 
organizations?  
 
Photo V.7.5.  Annual sum-up meeting 
 
 
The ideas of XWC have significantly helped shape the attitude of ABC’s staff members.  YXG (quoted 
above), who is currently responsible for legal consultation and promotion of legal knowledge at ABC, 
had been a committee member of Pearl River Worker, an organization in Guangdong.  According to her, 
Pearl River Worker aimed to help workers write legal documents, file lawsuits, and provide legal 
consultation.  YXG dealt with an average of over 100 lawsuits per year, which in turn created a tense 
relationship between the organization and the local government.  In the political context of China, YXG 
can be described as someone who was once a relatively radical activist for labor protection. 
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However, since she started working at ABC, YXG only consults approximately 20 workers and files a 
mere 3 to 4 lawsuits.  Due to the small scale of factories in city XH, she usually advises workers to 
resolve labor disputes through mediation rather than through legal means. 
 
There is room for improvement in understanding workers’ concerns.  Currently, the workers’ needs are 
brought to light through four full-time garment workers who serve as observers:   
 
The other important channel is the participation of core worker members in the 
organization’s activities because they are frequent participants in workers’ activities, and 
can represent workers.  Core worker members usually have better understanding of 
front-line workers’ concerns. (Interview with LH)  
7.3. The quest for political legitimacy—organizational survival in Mainland China 
 
In China, political legitimacy is critical to the continued existence and growth of any social organization 
(Gao 2000).  An intermediate organization is politically legitimate when its missions and activities 
conform to officially endorsed political norms.  This means that the organization has to behave in a 
politically correct manner, so as to gain the authorities' acceptance.  The survival and development of 
grassroots NGOs rests upon their relationship with the party state.  NGO activists have to build and 
maintain trust of government officials and party cadres for survival.  This is particularly true for NGOs 
that are involved in politically sensitive areas, such as advocacy of labor rights.  Due to strict state 
control or state co-optation of labor NGOs, only the government has tolerated those NGOs that provide 
social services.  As noted above, about ten pro-labor rights NGOs in Shenzhen were suppressed and 
forced to close their workers’ centers in the first half year of 2012. 
 
Gao (2000) opined that the current registration system (also known as the “dual management” system) 
is in fact, an examination of political acceptability.81  Once the organization is recognized by the party 
state, it can obtain legal status and register as a “non-government non-profit unit” (Minban Feiqiye 
Danwei).  This status is significant to organizational development in two ways.  First, a legitimate status 
greatly reduces the financial strain as it allows the organization to obtain resources and support from 
multiple sources including government agencies and local foundations.  And second, the organizations 
with legal status face less rigorous government scrutiny and therefore are less likely to be shut down.  
For those organizations without legal status, two strategies are commonly applied to relieve the 
suspicion of the state.  First, organizations deliberately use “politically correct” content and messages.  
Second, they cultivate social legitimacy by building public support.82 
 
7.3.1. How ABC gained legitimacy 
ABC failed to register as a “non-government non-profit unit” in its initial phase of development.  The 
organization had no choice but to register as a commercial entity.  With the ultimate goal of gaining 
political legitimacy, the main strategy applied by ABC was to heighten its social legitimacy through 
different types of volunteer activities and altering a negative public mindset towards migrant workers                                                         
81 The registration system for social organizations in Mainland China is known as the "dual management" system. 
Under this system, organizations are first required to obtain the sponsorship of a “professional leading agency,” 
such as a government ministry or provincial government agency.  Organizations then seek registration and 
approval from the Ministry of Civil Affairs or a local civil affairs bureau. 
82 Gao (2000) suggested that there are three sources of “social legitimacy”, namely (i) local traditions, (ii) common 
interests shared by local people and (iii) social norms and consensus.  
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through various media reports.  Since its establishment, ABC has maintained friendly relationships with 
national media and local press like the City XH Daily Newspaper and QJ Evening News.  The organization, 
thus, has received high media coverage.  Some large-scale cultural events, for example, The Grassroots 
Cultural Festival, were broadcasted live on a local TV channel.  The social legitimacy enjoyed by ABC has 
further increased since BYT magazine published an article about the organization in 2010.  With 
acknowledgement of state media as well as the central government, ABC has earned some political 
legitimacy, facilitating relationship building with the local party cadres and union bureaucrats.  In short, 
the heightening of public sympathy for migrant workers and grassroots organizations in recent years has 
reduced the risks of government repression and favored resource mobilization.  
 
Photo V.7.6.  Street-cleaning volunteers organized by ABC 
 
 
7.3.2. Non-confrontational policy 
Different from most labor NGOs in the PRD, ABC has placed less emphasis on rights-defense and has 
adopted a non-confrontational policy.  This is in part because authorities at various levels have in fact 
attempted to pressure and co-opt ABC into maintaining a cooperative rather than critical stance, as 
discussed further below.  Defending rights and promoting workers’ interests through rallies, 
demonstrations and labor strikes are not considered by the organization because they do not want any 
direct confrontation with the authority. 
 
We would like to present an image that we are on the same footing with the 
government.  It is probably the only way to build support from the officials. Indeed, 
collaboration with the party state could be seen as the determinate factor of successful 
campaign as well as mission fulfillment. (Interview with XWC) 
 
The non-confrontational policy can be identified in ABC’s letter to the City XH Municipal Party 
Committee:   
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The issue of residence permit (Juzhuzheng) [to rural migrants] in city XH could be 
regarded as a critical step to eliminate the urban-rural differences.  Although the 
difference between residence permit and temporary residence permit (Zanzhuzheng) lies 
in a single word, the newly-issued permit is significant to migrant workers as this implies 
the transitions from passer-by to hosts, from farmers to citizens, from outsiders to 
insiders and from excluded to integrated.  As regards socio-economic development of 
city XH, the issue of residence permit implies an inclusive attitude of the municipal 
government that let thousands of ‘New Citizens of city XH’ to contribute to the 
construction of ‘innovative province.’  The effectiveness of the government’s policies 
indeed rests upon the efforts of migrant workers. We, the migrant workers, should equip 
ourselves.  The Grassroots Cultural Festival initiated by our organization could be seen as 
an experimental attempt to enrich the cultural lives of the migrant workers.  It is a very 
good platform for us to advance ourselves.  Our personal development should be 
accomplished through first literature and cultural activities, and then career planning, 
pioneering and life planning. 
 
As shown above, ABC has committed to a non-confrontational approach in order to facilitate personal 
growth of migrant workers as well as rural-urban integration.  The organization is inclined to empower 
migrant workers to develop their skills and advance their careers, rather than openly confront the party 
state and employers in labor disputes, in particular rights disputes, on behalf of workers.83  It believes 
that confrontational actions may undermine its political legitimacy and alienate allies among state elites.     
 
7.3.3. Close contacts with government officials and trade union cadres 
 
Photo V.7.7.  A visit paid by party cadres 
 
 
                                                        
83 Labor disputes in general could be categorized into two types:  rights disputes and interest disputes.  The prior 
refers to those incidents arisen from infringements of labor laws and the latter involves wage levels and conditions 
of employment.  As suggested by Chen (2010), Mainland China has established a legal framework for coping with 
rights disputes.  In contrast, there are no institutional mechanisms to handle interest-based disputes.  As a result, 
interest disputes have often led to a series of strikes and they have been resolved through non-judicial processes 
like conciliation and mediation. 
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In order to obtain the state’s blessing, ABC has made an effort to maintain a close and collaborative 
relationship with local government and official trade unions.  Staff members pay visits to various 
departments and trade unions to collect their opinions on organizational directions and activities.  They 
also invite officials and party cadres to take part in various activities held by the organization.  It is 
believed that the frequent contact and communication would provide government officials better 
understanding of the organization.  This helps reduce distrust and gain some support from open-minded 
state elites: 
 
Some local government officials indeed showed strong support for the Grassroots 
Cultural Festival and Spring Festival Gala for Migrant Workers.  Although this support 
was lip service in the names of individuals and no financial assistance was provided, they 
were still helpful in gaining large event approvals. (Interview with XWC)   
7.3.4. Loss of autonomy in return for political legitimacy? 
ABC has successfully developed collaborative relationships with the officials and the party-state-led 
trade unions.  Such a partnership with the authority has greatly facilitated resource mobilization for 
organizational survival and growth, but would undoubtedly place a significant threat to its autonomy.  It 
is found that the party-state has attempted to co-opt ABC by turning the organization into a volunteer 
service center under the district trade union.  By doing so, mass organizations controlled by the party 
could have a hand in supervising ABC’s activities and financial status.  The street-level bureaucrats also 
urged the leaders of ABC to not accept external subsidies from Oxfam Hong Kong and help workers who 
are involved in labor disputes.  In response, a decentralization strategy has been applied by the 
organization to maintain its independence and autonomy:   
 
The bottom line of cooperation with the state is preservation of our own brand, i.e. ABC.  
Although we receive support from the state, we would never change our mission and 
give up organizational identity.  We continue to rent a flat and run the workers’ center 
even though the government has provided us a spacious activity venue.  Some blamed 
me for wasting money to rent an unnecessary place.  Yet I insist that we should have a 
place that is owned and controlled by us. (Interview with XWC) 
 
The organization, thus, has dispersed its functions and people away from a central location to two 
different entities, namely ABC and the New City XH People Volunteer Service Center.  The latter is the 
venue for less sensitive activities like computer training courses and art and cultural events.  The prior is 
mainly used for the supervisory board meetings and events that might lead to ill feelings among officials, 
such as legal consultation and worker education.   
7.4.  Labor standards monitoring and enforcement  
7.4.1. Facilitating the state inspectors in the enforcement of labor laws  
The main strategy adopted by ABC to defend labor rights of garment workers in the region has been to 
collaborate with JB Labor Supervision Team and the XH City Federation of Trade Unions (the local 
branch of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions).  The organization believes that a partnership with 
the state agents is far more effective and feasible than other possible strategies, like strikes and protests, 
in China’s oppressive political climate.  XWC suggested, “Labor disputes could be better resolved 
through institutional channels.”  Therefore, the staff of ABC is seldom directly involved in disputes 
between employers and workers.  They position themselves as facilitators, pushing the government 
inspectors to process the workers’ complaints seriously:   
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What we can do is to urge full efforts of the government inspectors to enforce labor laws 
and other regulations.  Indeed some senior officials of Bureau of Labor and Labor 
Security Supervision Team are sympathetic towards workers. However, at street level, 
the local cadres are indifferent to the sufferings of workers.  Thus, we always 
communicate with the street-level bureaucrats and inspectors, pushing them to work 
hard for workers’ fundamental rights.  Alone we can do so little.  The results of their 
active work would certainly far exceed the maximum effects that we can reach.  
(Interview with XWC) 
 
Due to ABC’s positioning as facilitator, the organization mainly deals with rights disputes that rely on 
legal procedures to reach settlements.  When the staff receives complaints of labor law infringements, 
the organization provides legal advice and helps workers gather their evidence.  They then transfer the 
cases to the government inspectors.  Table V.7.1 summarizes several labor disputes that were processed 
by ABC between 2010 and 2012.  
 
Table V.7.1.   Selected cases of labor disputes involving garment workers that were processed by ABC 
between 2010 and 2012 
Case Year Type(s) of 
Work 
Cause of Dispute Action(s) Taken by the 
Workers 
Dispute Resolution 
1 2010  Sewing 
buttons 
Industrial injury and 
reallocation of 
factory 
First sought NGO’s legal 
advice and then made a 
complaint to JLSS 
Compensation of RMB 
4000 
2 2011 All Factory closure First sought NGO’s legal 
advice and then a 
collective complaint to 
JLSS 
Compensation 
calculated at minimum 
wage rate in city XH 
(RMB 1310 per month) 
3 2011  Stitching Actual salary paid 
less than stipulated 
amount; deduction 
of one-month salary 
when quitting a job  
First sought NGO’s legal 
advice and then made a 
complaint to JLSS 
Labor Supervision Teams 
shirked their 
responsibility as the 
factory owner has close 
relationships with local 
officials; unable to get 
one-month salary back  
4 2012 Technical 
advice 
No employment 
contract and social 
insurances; being 
dismissed without 
reasons; wage 
arrears of RMB 9000 
First sought NGO’s legal 
advice and then made a 
complaint to JLSS; 
mediation made by JLSS 
Successful in getting 
back salary  
5 2012 Receiving & 
dispatching 
materials  
Fired after one-
month probation 
First sought NGO’s legal 
advice and then made a 
complaint to JLSS 
Compensation of RMB 
1500 
6 2012 Feather 
filling 
Dismissed without 
reasons; no 
employment contract 
and social insurance  
First sought NGO’s legal 
advice and then 
negotiate with the 
management 
Compensation of RMB 
2000 
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7 2012 Stitching Dismissed due to 
refusal to work 
overtime 
First sought NGO’s legal 
advice and then made a 
complaint to JLSS 
Full payment of salaries; 
no extra monetary 
compensation 
 
As shown in Table V.7.1, most requests received by ABC from garment workers were about the violation 
of labor laws by employers, such as wage arrears and dismissal without reason.  With the intervention of 
JLSS, a majority of the cases were resolved through monetary compensation, even for those workers 
without employment contracts and social insurance in garment workshops (cases 4 and 6).  In case 3, 
the victim did not get his salary back because the government inspector is closely aligned with the state 
and employers.  It is noted that the organization has successfully pressed the state inspectors to 
undertake investigations at garment workshops.  Thus, the role played by ABC in enforcing rights of 
informal workers should be acknowledged, particularly when the state inspectors rarely take the 
initiative to monitor the labor standards of garment workshops wherein most employees are informal 
workers.  
 
Some local bureaucrats and trade union cadres acknowledge the facilitator role of ABC in monitoring 
and enforcing labor standards.  During the interviews, several bureaucrats admitted the government 
agents’ limitations in the enforcement of labor laws.  For instance, one of the leaders of Zhejiang 
Provincial General Trade Union said:   
 
Although the trade union network in Zhejiang has been developed quite maturely, there 
are still blind spots in services provided by trade union organizations.  The grassroots 
labor organizations, like ABC, have contributed significantly in filling the service vacuum.  
They do not only promote the interests of migrant workers, but also provide an 
alternative solution to the management problems of the migrant labor. 
 
In short, the partnership between ABC and JLSS has provided a feasible solution to the limitations of the 
latter in labor standards enforcement, including limited resources for full monitoring and the passive 
nature of the complaint-initiated inspection system.  The organization has contributed to the protection 
of labor rights as it has lifted barriers to effectively filing and addressing complaints helped inform 
workers of labor laws and transferred their cases to government inspectors.  
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Photo V.7.8.  A screenshot of the official website of “Reflecting the Culture of Overtime Work” 
Campaign 
 
Source:  The official web site of ABC 
 
7.4.2. Lobbying campaigns for labor rights  
Although ABC has never openly confronted the state and employers that does not mean that the 
organization has played no role in interest disputes.  Indeed the organization has devoted great 
attention to media advocacy and campaigning.  It aims to become a voice of migrant workers so they 
can tell the wider society about their working and living conditions.  According to LH, “We would like to 
provide a platform for the workers to share their living experiences and opinions towards various issues.” 
 
Since its establishment in 2006, ABC has initiated several research projects and campaigns for higher 
wages and better conditions of employment [e.g. “Return Sunday Days Off to Me” (Huanwo Xingqitian) 
and “Reflecting the Culture of Overtime Work” (fansi jiaban wenhua)].  ABC has also initiated a study on 
prolonged overtime and an unfair piece-rate system.  In 2010, they released a report titled, 
“Investigation and Analysis of Rights Infringements of Garment Enterprises in city XH.”  It states that 
overtime work is a serious issue in XH’s garment factories.  Workers usually work from 8:00 am to 10:00 
pm.  Sometimes they even work from 8:00 am to 12:00 am.  Leading up to production deadlines, 
workers have to work overnight.  Most of the factories do not give workers overtime pay (ABC 2010).  
 
The organization has since made every effort to disseminate its research findings and investigations to 
the general public.  They have done so by writing policy recommendations and letters to officials and 
participating in public forums and TV shows as guest speakers.  
 
7.5. Preliminary assessment of the impact of the organization 
GH is the first attempt at garment worker efforts against exploitative working conditions in the region, 
although it is important to note that only a minority of the actual members are garment workers.  To a 
certain extent, this labor NGO has contributed to labor standards enforcement and worker protection, 
including for subcontracted workers at lower-tier suppliers.  As a substitute to the party-state-led trade 
unions, the organization has been representing the interests of garment workers and has become 
involved in rights and interests disputes in the YRD’s garment sector.  ABC has pushed the state 
inspectors to investigate non-compliance by garment factories and workshops.  Also its policy advocacy 
and framing process has aroused public sympathy towards migrant workers, providing a favorable 
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environment for improvement in working conditions.  When being interviewed, the staff members of 
ABC introduced their achievements in promoting labor welfare:   
 
Before the establishment of ABC, most garment workers in the town only had one or two 
days off a month.  Then, after a two-year effort of the our organization to make appeals 
in the press, educate the workers and negotiate with the local government and 
enterprises, the employees of garment factories could take at least one day off per week 
now. 
 
However, from our point of view, the labor NGO approach cannot currently function as a good substitute 
for trade unions and state inspectors due to various reasons.  First, labor NGOs have limited ability and 
not much will to reach out to large numbers of workers, and to take on a major role in assuring labor 
standards.  Indeed, labor NGOs outside the PRD (including those in the YRD) tend not to emphasize 
monitoring or enforcing labor standards, due to government pressure and self-imposed limits aimed at 
surviving in a difficult political environment.  Moreover, community-based labor NGOs are undeveloped 
and there are less than 10 in the YRD.  Thus, the networks of labor NGOs could never have the reach of 
the trade union system, which extends to every enterprise and community.  In addition, financial strains 
faced by labor NGOs have greatly impacted their effectiveness in monitoring labor standards in the 
region.  For instance, only one full-time employee staffs the legal team of ABC.  With a limited capacity of 
legal staff members, the organization is not in a position to extend its legal services to other urban 
villages in city XH.  Furthermore, XWC has stated that they do not plan to extend ABC’s services to other 
locations because they are preoccupied with organizational development.  One of the founding 
members has established a new but similar labor NGO in Changsha, the capital city of Hunan Province.  
However, this team can only conduct outreach occasionally.  Without the capacity to reach all informal 
workers in the region, it is argued that the impact of labor NGOs is minimal, failing to constitute a 
significant challenge against the process of informalization.  
 
Secondly, the exploitative working conditions of garment workers in the region have greatly discouraged 
their participation in labor NGOs.  Although former garment workers founded ABC, the majority of its 
core members do not work in the apparel industry.  This is because the leisure time of garment workers, 
particularly those workers on production lines, is very limited.  The long working hours and lack of 
layoffs have greatly reduced their engagement in labor NGO activities. 
 
In conclusion, labor NGOs in the region could play a role of facilitator, supplementing the state 
inspectors and trade unions in defending the rights of migrant workers.  Their network of informal 
workers and legal assistance services could help to overcome problems associated with a complaint-
based regulatory system that is highly dependent on workers with knowledge of the application of legal 
provisions and willing to complain.  However, due to limited resources; an oppressive political 
environment; weak and passive labor inspection infrastructure; and long working hours for garment 
workers, at this time labor NGOs fail to constitute a significant challenge against infringement of labor 
laws in the Yangtze River Delta Region and indeed in most of the country outside of the Pearl River Delta 
Region. 
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VI.     Conclusion and synthesis  
 
In this concluding section of the report, we summarize and synthesize findings from the four countries, 
in five steps.  First, we review the changing structure of production in the four countries.  Second, we 
consider the role played by traditional unions in each country—some of which have begun to 
experiment with nontraditional forms of organizing.  Third, we scrutinize two sources of regulation 
external to the sector:  government agencies, and NGOs that do not directly involve workers (and often 
seek to mobilize international pressure through various channels).  Fourth, and most crucially, we 
examine alternative forms of worker organization.  Steps 1 through 4 all look at what is in these 
countries, but in step 5 we reflect, based on the evidence accumulated, about the possibilities that 
worker organization holds for monitoring and enforcement of labor standards in subcontracted and 
home-based work in the apparel and textile sector in the four countries, and by extension in the rest of 
the world. 
 
1. Structure of the industry and organization of production 
 
In all four countries, as in most of the world, over the last few decades the textile and apparel industry 
has shifted toward more extended supply chains and greater reliance on casualized labor, including 
small-scale and even home-based production units.  Such flexibilization has increased employment 
insecurity for all workers in the garment and textile industries across the four countries—but with 
variable timing across the countries, and with a partial reversal in the case of Brazil.  As the 
manufacturing of garment and textiles is further segmented into various levels of contracted workers (in 
shop and home), working conditions and employment security have become worse.   
  
The change is perhaps most dramatic in the apparel and textile subsector, since in all four countries—
again, as elsewhere in the world—industrialization in this subsector was initially characterized by 
vertical integration and scaling up into large production units carrying out multiple steps of the textile 
production process.  But in all four countries the apparel subsector still shows a greater degree of 
subcontracting and reliance of micro-, often home-based units for production.  Two main shifts drove 
this change.  The first is globalization of production, primarily dominated by brands and retailers based 
in the richer countries (especially the US, Western Europe, and Japan).   The second is a set of country-
specific shifts toward more neoliberal economic policies:  reduced trade protection, in some cases 
reductions or termination of government subsidies to producers, and in China a radical reduction of 
state-owned production in favor of private ownership including an important share of foreign ownership.  
These two large-scale shifts, in turn, combined with two persistent issues.  The first of these long-
standing problems is a lack of universal legal protections for workers (or protections tailored to the 
needs of workers—see e.g, Brazil’s home-based workers).  Finally, there are insufficient resources for a 
labor administration that provides coverage and services (e.g., monitors and enforces labor law) for all 
workers.  Of course, the turn towards neoliberalism itself involved loosening existing labor regulations 
and in some cases easing up on enforcement, which exacerbated these two standing issues. 
 
In Brazil, textiles and apparel production is principally destined for a domestic market.  Liberalization, 
deregulation, and economic stagnation from 1980 to 2002 translated into a growing proportion of 
informal workers without the carteira work card and thus lacking standard workplace rights and benefits.  
In the textile and apparel sector, the result was a shift toward low-cost, low-quality production.  This 
shift involved increased subcontracting and a shift of production from the more formal fábricas 
(factories) to fabrícos (home-based workshops with employees) and thence to facções (tiny survivalist 
production units that sell to the fábricas and fabrícos).  In the overall economy, the employment share 
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of home-based work per se declined, but in the needle trades home-based work flourished and even 
increased.  Beginning in 2002, however, a combination of the global commodities boom and the election 
of Workers’ Party presidents committed to supporting workers’ rights turned around the informality 
trend in apparel and textiles, increasing the percentage of workers holding the work card, while 
reducing the home-based work’s share.  Observers in the Caruaru region of Pernambuco noted the 
same pattern.  Women remain particularly concentrated in the self-employed and unpaid family worker 
categories, and most underrepresented in the categories of employer and wage worker with work card.  
Black (prieto) and brown (pardo) workers are overrepresented in the self-employment categories; 
brown workers are also concentrated among wage workers who lack the work card, but black workers 
are not. Brazil’s laws in principle extend equal labor protections to all employees, including 
subcontractors, and hold companies at the top of the supply chain responsible for subcontractor 
violations.  The federal government has allocated funding for labor inspections to enforce these 
standards.  However, this funding is predominantly used for addressing extreme labor violations such as 
child labor and forced labor.  Government support programs such as SENAES and SEBRAE have been 
implemented to support subcontracted workers.  But the SENAES is undergoing structural changes as a 
result of a new law while family entrepreneurs are resistant to SEBRAE. 
 
In South Africa, the 1994 end of apartheid and the economic isolation was quickly followed by the 
neoliberal GEAR economic program, removing trade protections from the textile and garment sectors 
along with others.  In apparel, production rapidly shifted from vertically integrated “full package 
manufacturers” (FPMs) to subcontractors known as “cut, make, and trims” (CMTs), which range from 
larger and more formal enterprises to smaller, informal ones, including home- and garage-based and 
even sidewalk-based production units that can be best characterized as “survivalist.”  Among the CMTs, 
especially at the less formal end of the spectrum, jobs are often characterized by irregular hours, failure 
to pay minimum wage (along with non-payment of any wage when the supplier fails to meet the terms 
of the contract), and the absence of standard benefits (including legally required provisions such as sick 
and holiday pay and overtime premium).  Women of color are particularly overrepresented in the most 
marginal subcontracted and home-based jobs.  South Africa’s Labor Relations Act and Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act were revised to include informal workers, but they remain largely unenforced.   
There are not enough labor inspectors employed by Department of Labor to ensure that workshops in 
the entire sector are registered and in compliance with labor regulations.    
 
India saw gradual technological displacement of handlooms, but overlaying this have been two waves of 
change in the organization of the textile and clothing industry.  In the first several decades after 
independence, 1947-91, employers reacted to post-independence labor and tax laws by shifting from 
production by large, vertically integrated mills to subcontracting by smaller, including home-based, 
powerlooms.  Beginning in 1991, India took a neoliberal policy turn that promoted export-oriented 
production, established Special Economic Zones, and further reduced worker protections.   Within the 
export market, this led to expanded use of subcontracting and thus of contract workers (the Indian term 
for employees of subcontractors; women predominate in this group) and piece-rate workers (mainly 
men), but not home-based work.  Production for the domestic market also saw expansion of contract 
and piece-rate employment, but also home-based work. 
 
Beginning in the late 1970s and accelerating ever since, China’s economic policy emphasizes 
marketization, privatization, and private foreign direct investment in industry, with a particular 
emphasis on export-oriented activity.  In textiles and clothing, this set of changes has yielded multi-tier 
subcontracting, in which the lower tiers can be classified at workshops rather than factories.  Even 
within the upper tiers, some workers labor under contractor management, as part of a self-managed 
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contracting team, or as individual outsourced workers (analogous to contract workers in India).  Home-
based work is limited to the low end of domestic production plus highly labor-intensive processes not 
susceptible to automation.  Our survey evidence from the Yangtze River Delta suggests that workshop 
workers (who include those based in homes) typically have no written contract, are far less likely to have 
access to social insurance, and suffer from less safe working conditions and Labor Law and Labor 
Contract Law are supposed to cover all workers, including home-based workers.  But as the global 
economic crisis hit, the federal government has become less supportive of these laws and local 
governments have found ways of reducing the impact of these laws on the local economies.  Local labor 
inspectors are ineffective in monitoring work conditions and defending workers’ rights because there 
are only six full-time officers for a district with more than 100 thousand workers, and because inspectors 
play a limited, reactive role.  Lack of financial resources and a complaint-based system pose a challenge 
to adequately carrying out investigations and enforcing labor laws.  
 
Overall, with the recent partial exception of Brazil, our findings indicate that the organization of 
production is spreading out into networks of subcontracted workshops and home-based work.  This 
increases the challenge of enforcing existing labor laws or organizing traditional unions due to the 
dispersal of small workshop and home-based work across a wide geographic area; lack of registration 
with labor entities; easy evasion of compliance; and greater ambiguity about what constitutes an 
employment relationship.  
 
 
2. The role of traditional unions 
 
Traditional trade unions in South Africa, Brazil, India, and to some extent China have in general 
recognized the problems posed by multilayer subcontracting, home-based work, and consequent 
informalization in the clothing and textile sector.  This recognition has generated some important 
experiments, but to date no broadly effective and scalable approaches to bolstering labor standards in 
these jobs.   
 
Formal unionization in the textile and garment industry in Brazil has been running in the range of about 
one worker out of eight, a few percentage points behind the economy-wide average.  Unionization has 
been concentrated in larger companies, so that subcontracted and home-based workers remain largely 
outside unions’ grasp.  However, there are examples of unions that have successfully organized and 
defended home-based workers.  The National Federation of Clothing Workers (CNTV) and its affiliated 
unions have worked with government inspectors to uncover and sanction workshops that violate labor 
law, and campaigned to inform home-based workers of their rights.  The São Paulo and Osasco 
Seamstresses’ Union, established in the 1940s, has also worked with government inspectors to uncover 
and put an end to some instances of highly exploitative home-based work by migrant workers in small 
workshops.  In addition to calling in inspectors, they have used brand reputation leverage on Zara and 
the Gregory brand (the latter less well known in the US).  They have also directly organized home-based 
workers.  The Ibitinga Needle Workers Union, in a more remote area of São Paulo state, was organized 
in 1987 by workers themselves, and in 2001 won a contract with local shops that specified that 
subcontracted and even home-based workers would be issued the labor cards that put them “on the 
books” and give them access to benefits.  Despite such notable successes, Francisca Trajano, President 
of the CNTV, acknowledged that reaching home-based workers is “difficult,” and such examples remain 
exceptional.  DIEESE, the Inter-Union Department of Economic and Social Studies (an inter-union 
research institute), has carried out further experiments, but these depart sufficiently from standard 
union actors and practices that we consider them separately under “alternative forms of organization.” 
124 
 
 
In South Africa, the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is politically powerful by 
international standards, forming part of the governing triple alliance along with the African National 
Congress (ANC) ruling party and the South African Communist Party.  However, loyalty to the ANC 
despite the latter’s embrace of neoliberal reforms has limited COSATU’s room for maneuver, in contrast 
with its militant promotion of workers’ economic interests during the earlier battles to end apartheid.  
The liberalization of the South African economy has dramatically undermined unions’ economic power 
in many industries, among them textile and apparel by reducing trade protections and restrictions on 
price competition. The unions’ political power has also diminished, though more gradually, as the ANC 
has built more alliances with capital rather than labor.  Ironically, COSATU’s nominally important role 
within the ANC government has limited labor’s role in influencing labor and economic policy from the 
outside.  The ANC government has appointed labor union officials to government posts, thinning unions’ 
base of experienced leaders, and heightened pressure for unionists to accommodate, rather than 
challenge, their former colleagues.  Furthermore, the political parties like the ANC have widely utilized 
worker organizations like SASEWA to gain access to areas where the party does not have membership, 
but often without any quid pro quo.  As one interviewee from Sarah Mosoetsa’s research stated, “The 
ANC was only campaigning and never helped us in anyway.  Our organization fell apart after this ANC 
campaign.  They did it for themselves and did not help us in anyway.”   
 
COSATU has affirmed the growing importance of informal work and their need to organize this 
workforce.  The South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU) has done more than most 
COSATU affiliates to attempt to undertake such organizing, but their degree of success has been limited 
at best.  Our research team identified four key obstacles to this organizing:  the ability of small 
enterprises to easily close and reopen, the blurring of the employer-employee relationship, many 
homeworkers’ resistance to unions (in part because they fear unionization would threaten the 
advantages of home-based work for them), and the irregular work schedules that make it difficult to 
contact or even locate workers.  SACTWU’s initial 1999-2001 push to unionize subcontracted workers 
resulted in a disappointing 148 new members, leading SACTWU to back off the effort.  The union has 
had some success in organizing CMTs, at least the larger and more visible ones.  The success to date, 
however limited, can be attributed to four SACTWU strategies specifically targeted at subcontracted and 
informal workers.  On the employer side, SACTWU has offered assistance to owners and managers of 
CMTs to induce them onto the “high road” of respecting labor standards.  On the worker side, SACTWU 
has promoted a broader range of benefits to include some of greater interest to informal workers.  It 
has also built connections with community organizations such as churches and has created an Associate 
Member category available to all, including home-based workers.  SACTWU, like Brazilian unions, has 
also worked with government inspectors through the Bargaining Councils to expose and sanction 
employers not complying with legally mandated standards.  However, SACTWU leaders believe that for 
the large number of small, noncompliant producers, the only viable source of power is moral pressure 
on retailers to cut ties with these producers—a strategy that has not been implemented. 
 
In India, three groups of unions coexist.  Traditional, party-affiliated unions have been around the 
longest, in some cases since before the country’s independence, and play a mixed economic and 
political role.  Independent unions have emerged much more recently, and have done more to reach out 
to contract workers.  Finally, a relatively new breed (though older in its origins than the independent 
unions) is independent organizations specifically aimed at organizing informal workers, such as the Self 
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA).  A number of this last group of organizations, including SEWA, 
are formally registered as trade unions under Indian law, but they are sufficiently different from the 
standard conception of a trade union that we will consider them separately in the next section.  Multiple 
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parties plus the growth of independent unions and informal worker unions have resulted in a 
proliferation of union federations and unions. 
 
Traditional Indian unions in the textile and apparel sector have been considerably less militant since 
their defeat in the 1982 Mumbai strike, and like unions in most other countries have been fighting an 
ever increasing defensive battle in the face of neoliberal reforms that have placed downward pressure 
on labor standards in the industry.  Adoption of such policies by the state has supported the increase in 
the flexibilization of labor and further diminished the power of workers.  Their main demands on the 
industry amount to demanding that informal workers be formalized.  They remain overwhelmingly 
based among the formal workforce, but some traditional unions have recently begun organizing 
unregulated contract workers who are located on the factory premises, especially in export-oriented 
plants.  As they have felt compelled to reduce strikes and workplace-based actions, they have shifted 
toward a strategy that starts with petitioning the employer to meet legally required standards, then 
escalating complaints to government enforcement agencies (as in Brazil), along with political 
mobilizations for stronger labor standard laws, such as a single national minimum wage across sectors 
and across India’s states. 
 
Independent unions in India engage in some of the same strategies as traditional ones (including the 
petitioning-to-complaint sequence), but have in some cases developed broader organizing and 
bargaining strategies that appear to be more effective at reaching contract workers.  Anannya 
Bhattacharjee, leader of two independent textile unions, described a strategy that includes cultural work 
and pushing for civil rights and civic amenities; the Munnade union has made a micro-savings program a 
cornerstone of organizing.  Importantly, and unlike the traditional unions, they recruit members in the 
communities where they live rather than just through the workplace itself.  They also have tried to exert 
pressure through global brands as pioneered by the global anti-sweatshop movement, and have 
launched somewhat broader public policy campaigns—for example a campaign for an Asia Floor Wage 
in apparel in addition to the national minimum wage demanded by traditional unions.   
 
In China, the one legally sanctioned union federation, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
is closely tied to the state, ruling party, and enterprise management, limiting its effectiveness in 
advocating for workers.  Our team found a significant division between union organizations at the 
workplace level and higher (metropolitan, provincial) levels of union organization.  At the higher levels, 
some leaders are relatively pro-worker, leading to innovations such as the laibowan (Labor One) blog 
offering resources for workers.  But supportive leaders at a higher level have little effect, since the local 
leaders who actually implement, or not, union policies, are invariably closely tied to management in the 
garment industry.  Indeed, local union leaders are often themselves mid-level managers in the 
company—named by the company to their union posts with union assent.  Thus, while unions have 
achieved limited gains in making labor standards stick in subcontracted apparel and textile work in the 
other three countries, in China they are largely irrelevant to defending worker interests in the sector. 
 
 
3. The role of government regulations and inspections 
 
As the examples of union activism from Brazil and India signal, government regulation and the 
monitoring and enforcement apparatus dedicated to it can be important in improving standards for 
workers at the bottom of garment supply chains.  However, as with unions, inspectors’ ability and 
sometimes will to reach down to the smallest shops is understandably limited.  In addition, while 
loosening of labor regulations can open the door to informality, tightening regulations can lead 
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increased numbers of employers to evade those regulations—and can simply change the boundaries of 
the concept of informality—also feeding growth of informal employment (Castells and Portes 1989, de 
Soto 1989).   
 
Brazil’s ratio of inspectors per 100,000 workers in the early 2000s, at 2.5, was quite low by Latin 
American standards.  The Workers’ Party governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, in power 
since 2003, have escalated the activities of the inspectorate, but quite appropriately have focused on 
the worst violations of labor standards, including forced labor and child labor.  In the garment sector in 
particular, evidence from our fieldwork and from the literature points to some successful use of 
inspections to bring subcontracted and even home-based workers jobs back into formality and 
compliance with basic Brazilian labor laws, in both wealthy São Paulo state and in the Caruaru region of 
poorer Pernambuco.  However, successes remain isolated, and our fieldwork in Caruaru yielded 
characterizations of enforcement actions as “rare” and “ineffective”.  Moreover, Roberto Pires’s (2008) 
cases of the footwear sector in localities in Minas Gerais and Bahía (also poorer states) illustrate that 
among marginal producers, a sanctions-only approach to inspection can have the perverse effect of 
driving small workshops to outsource to home-based workers in order to evade enforcement.  Similarly, 
our team’s Caruaru interviews revealed a fatalistic attitude among regional union officials that attempts 
to rigorously enforce labor standards would just result in mass layoffs rather than improvements in 
standards. 
 
Two new policy developments in Brazil have the potential to bring more enterprises within the 
regulatory net.  First, a 2009 law established a new category of business, the Microenterprise Individual 
Entrepreneur (MEI), comprising of businesses with a self-employed person and up to one other 
employee.  The law simplifies taxation for these micro-units and gives the self-employed entrepreneur 
(and employee, if any) access to social security.  Three million MEIs have incorporated since 2009.  MEI 
status does not require employer compliance with labor standards other than incorporation in the social 
security system—but at least it renders microenterprises visible to the government.  Second, an indirect 
effect of stricter state-level tax enforcement on large businesses such as retailers sitting atop garment 
supply chains has been greater pressure on those businesses to document where purchased goods 
come from.  To some extent this mandate ripples down through chains of subcontractors by exposing 
their conduct to public scrutiny. The effect is beginning to be felt even in production clusters like the one 
in Caruaru where there are few large businesses based in the region itself. 
 
South Africa’s 1995 Labor Relations Act and 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the laws 
protecting associational rights and setting basic standards, initially only covered registered employees 
with a written employment contract, thus omitting most subcontracted and home-based workers.  In 
2002, both laws were beefed up to presume that workers are employees unless proven otherwise, to 
allow the Ministry of Labor to designate any group of workers as employees covered by all labor laws, 
and allowing business-labor sectoral Bargaining Councils to extend their terms to all workers in the 
sector, including informal ones.  The Bargaining Council is the main regulatory instrument, setting 
baseline standards (including minimum wages) for a sector in a given geographic area, with government 
inspectors responsible for enforcement.  However, in the garment industry most enterprises, especially 
smaller ones, do not register with the council and consequently make it difficult for the inspectorate to 
monitor unless a complaint is brought.  Even among businesses registered with the Councils, many do 
not comply with the agreements.   In particular, very few home-based producers register with the 
Bargaining Councils.  
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Additionally, the Bargaining Councils’ mandate only includes firms with more than five workers (though 
all firms are still in theory required to register in order to receive a size exemption).  And though the law 
requires companies to get Council permission for subcontracting and makes firms that use labor brokers 
jointly responsible for labor standards with the broker, these provisions are widely ignored.  Employers 
are often forewarned of inspector visits, and can forestall regulatory action by telling workers to stay 
away from work or lie about their employment relationship.  A final impediment to rigorous 
enforcement is the small number of government inspectors.  Until 2002, the Bargaining Councils only 
covered urbanized areas, but in that year SACTWU won a demand for coverage of the entire country.   
However, nominal coverage required by law has not translated into effective enforcement. 
 
Our team’s fieldwork in South Africa found widespread compliance with the regulations in FPMs, but 
widespread flouting of the law, even on basic matters such as wages and hours, in the smaller CMTs, 
and essentially no compliance in home-based work.  The number of noncompliant production units has 
grown in recent years, and foreign-owned, export-oriented companies have expanded in geographic 
areas outside the reach of the Bargaining Councils.  Noncompliant units have in many cases felt 
sufficiently bold to deny access to government or Bargaining Council inspectors. 
 
In India’s federal system of government, there are various layers and elements of inspection 
infrastructure, including both state and national systems.  A series of key national laws set the basis for 
regulation in the country; enforcement, however, occurs at the state level and thus varies widely across 
the country.  The 1947 Industrial Disputes Act governs layoffs and closures and a set of 1948 laws 
regulate wages, benefits, and health and safety—but these laws all exclude contract workers and small 
establishments.  The 1970’s Contract Labor Act extended key wage and health and safety provisions to 
contract workers, but is little enforced and widely ignored.  In addition, the Contract Labor Act only 
applies to the direct employer, so it does not hold companies higher in the supply chain responsible for 
offenses by subcontractors.  As in Minas Gerais and Bahía, one perverse result has been the generation 
of long supply chains in which buyers distance themselves from illegal conditions, which are pushed to 
largely invisible enterprises at the end of the chain.  The 1986 Child Labor Act bans employment of 
children in factories, another requirement that can be evaded through subcontracting.  In general, 
national government is seen by textile and garment unions as promoting informal work rather than 
curbing it. However, some Indian states, in large part under pressure from worker organizations, have 
recently set up tripartite Welfare Boards for informal workers.  The Welfare Boards, organized by sector 
and funded by contributions from employers, worker organizations, and government, provide a forum 
for discussion of industry conditions and a sector-wide source of benefits not dependent on individual 
employers.   
 
In some cases government regulation has been supplemented by NGOs, of which the best documented 
is the Rugmark certification aimed at driving child labor out of rug manufacture; impacts have been 
limited.  The intention of the Asia Floor Wage Campaign is to couple bottom up pressure with 
international pressure channeled through global North retailers and brands.  So far it is too early to 
point to substantial results of this campaign. 
 
China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law requires employers and employees to sign labor contracts, but our 
survey shows that contracts are only common in first-tier factories, not in workshops.  Even if workers 
have signed a contract it is not guaranteed that the employer will provide a copy of the contract to the 
worker.  This makes it difficult to demonstrate that there is an employer-employee relationship, even for 
workers in first-tier, large factories, leading to difficulties for workers who want to report any violations.  
Our team’s visit to a Labor Supervision Team, the community-level labor inspection unit, in Hangzhou, 
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found the inspectors under-resourced and reactive, even passive, rather than proactive in their 
approach.  Both the Labor Law and the Labor Contract Law apply to all employees, regardless of the size 
of the enterprises or the site of work (home-based employees are included).  But the key aspect of the 
laws is to prove that an employer-employee relationship exists.  Since home-based enterprises are not 
registered and there is no written contractual agreement it is difficult to prove the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship.  Thus, inspectors chose not to visit small, especially home-based 
enterprises, essentially giving up on investigating the smallest units.  Furthermore, the inspectors’ 
ideology of “neutrality” relative to the interests of workers and employers meant that they waited for 
workers to complain, rather than making any efforts to inform workers about mandated labor standards 
or their avenues of resource in the case of violations.  Interviewees from the ABC (name withheld) labor 
NGO in Hangzhou stated that, as in the case of the unions, senior officials are more sympathetic to 
workers, but the street-level bureaucrats are “indifferent.”  Supplementing government regulation 
activity, some Chinese textile and clothing manufacturers have participated in social responsibility 
certification programs such as SA8000 and CSC9000T (the latter specific to Chinese textiles), but these 
CSR programs have only been effective in eliminating child labor, and have not improved other core 
labor rights—notably the right to organize and bargain collectively.  So neither government 
inspectorates nor international standard-setting have been very effective in improving working 
conditions in the sector. 
 
Overall, the track record of government regulation and inspection in textile and apparel manufacturing 
in the four countries is discouraging.  However, government inspectors remain an important tool for 
unions and other worker organizations, which on their own have little economic leverage over 
employers.  India’s Welfare Boards are also an important innovation well adapted to fragmented 
industries like garment production. 
 
Another option when national regulatory mechanisms are insufficient is to bolster labor standards 
through international pressure mobilized by NGOs.  Though in principle international NGOs and agencies 
can provide another level of protection by stirring consumer outrage and threatening company 
reputations (or conversely by appealing to corporate codes of conduct and social responsibility policies), 
such groups generally do not have a base comprised of workers and if they do, staff leads the 
organizations with little or no democratic member power.  This leads to misidentification of the needs of 
workers and can often result on ineffective campaigns that are staff-led rather than member-led and 
have difficulty reaching most workplaces.  Thus, inspection, whether at the national or international 
level, is most effective when active worker organizations exist to identify abuses, bring in inspectors, and 
follow up on the ground, and for example, the Rugmark campaign to root out child labor in Indian rug-
making without this kind of organizational base appears to have had limited impact (Seidman 2007). 
 
 
4. The role of alternative organizations of informal workers 
 
In the absence of potent regulation or sufficiently broad and deep union organization in subcontracted 
and home-based garment and textile work, NGOs, unions themselves, and independent groups of 
workers in the four countries have experimented with alternative forms of organization.  The extent of 
these groups’ inroads varies widely across the countries, but in all cases they show at least some 
promise. 
 
Brazil has seen two main experiments of this type.  One is the establishment of worker cooperatives.  
Unions have played an active role in organization and support of cooperatives.  The UNISOL Cooperative, 
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actually a consortium of coops comprising 50,000 members, including textile and apparel coops, was 
organized by several major unions in 2000.  Also in 2000, Brazil’s major union federation, the Unified 
Workers Central (CUT), established the Solidarity Development Agency (ADS) to support local economic 
development, including worker-owned enterprises.  One of the earliest actions of the Lula 
administration, in 2003, was the establishment of the National Secretariat for the Solidarity Economy 
(SENAES), which among other things supports cooperatives, including UNISOL.  However, the succeeding 
Dilma government eliminated SENAES and folded its functions into a newly created Secretariat for Micro 
and Small Businesses (SMPE) in early 2013.  Solidarity economy activists decried the shift, but it remains 
to be seen to what extent this will decrease support for worker ownership. 
 
The second Brazilian experiment is the set of pilot projects by DIEESE, the inter-union think tank, to 
develop grassroots initiatives to bring together employers and workers in industries dominated by 
informal work to plan sectoral upgrading that would also involve job upgrading.  These pilots include 
one in the garment sector in the Caruaru region of Pernambuco.  The approach is informed by unions’ 
assessment, already noted, that standards enforcement without business upgrading to improve earning 
potential would just put the employers out of business—along with a regional workforce little aware of 
unions or government regulation (and more likely to view government inspection as a threat to their 
livelihoods than as a source of support for rights).  Now three years old, the Caruaru Social Dialogue has 
focused on carrying out information-gathering and dialogue, rather than forming organizations to 
advocate for workers.  The project echoes the strategy of the working group on the informal economy 
within the Lula government’s 2003-04 National Labor Forum, which brought together organizations of 
small producers and subcontractors as well as unions, worker cooperatives, and other worker 
organizations.  However, the Social Dialogue has also worked with some socially oriented state and 
municipal agencies to raise worker consciousness—at times encountering resistance from more 
powerful local government agencies wedded to business elites.  Our team assessed the Social Dialogue 
as having positive potential, but concluded that significant sectoral upgrading would depend on 
government investments in physical and business-support infrastructure at a significant scale.  In the 
short to medium run, they concluded, formalization of garment jobs would be most feasible through the 
frameworks of MEIs (Microenterprise Individual Enterprises) and cooperatives.  
 
In South Africa, the chief current innovation is the South African Self-Employed Women’s Association 
(SASEWA), modeled on India’s SEWA and built on the ashes of the earlier Self-Employed Women’s Union 
(SEWU) that was established in 1994 but collapsed in 2004 due to internal capacity issues.  SASEWA, 
based in Durban (as SEWU was) includes a heterogeneous mix of sectors, but among them are self-
employed dressmakers.  SASEWA’s work to date has focused on providing business assistance to self-
employed women, building toward a funeral insurance scheme, and providing a forum for the women to 
define and strategize around shared problems.  It has joined up with ten other street vendor 
organizations in the Ubumbano coalition to increase its clout. 
 
In addition, the ANC government has promoted formation of cooperatives among self-employed 
workers and small producers, and workers have also organized independent, more grassroots 
cooperatives.  In a rather different vein, the COSATU union federation actually attempted a national-
scale social dialogue/sectoral upgrading project akin to Brazil’s DIEESE pilot in the early 1990s, the 
Industrial Strategy Project proposing a shift to “quick-response” production systems.  However, 
employers rejected the initiative and opted instead for subcontracting.  There has been no similarly 
ambitious undertaking since.  
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Alternative organizations of informal workers in India are the most developed in the world.  SEWA, 
centered in the state of Guajarat, is the flagship organization on this terrain, with more than one million 
members including 40,000 home-based garment workers.  SEWA was established as a trade union in 
1972 and graduated to union federation status in 2011, but functions quite differently from traditional 
trade unions.  The organization has successfully coordinated piece-rate bargaining by self-employed 
producers.  The organization has also built input-buying cooperatives and purchasing intermediaries that 
buy and resell women’s output (including through two retail shops owned by the Trade Facilitation 
Center intermediary), offering alternatives to high-priced suppliers and rapacious middlemen.  Perhaps 
most importantly, it has won the establishment of Welfare Boards.  The benefits provided by Welfare 
Boards in the garment sector are limited (for example a sewing kit, limited medical assistance, and 
identity cards), but highly significant to home-based workers.  However, SEWA does not organize 
factory-based contract workers, only home-based workers and related trades (self-employed women 
who scavenge fabric scraps from the mills or transport garments). 
 
SEWA also launched HomeNet South Asia, a South Asia-wide network of SEWA-like homeworkers’ 
organizations, with affiliates in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan, as well as 29 organizations in 13 of 
India’s 28 states (India also includes seven non-state territories), as well as a link with HomeNet 
Southeast Asia (encompassing organizations in Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand).  
HomeNet provides a larger platform for advocating for home-based workers and extends well beyond 
SEWA’s geographic concentration in the state of Gujarat, but SEWA remains by far the strongest 
organization within the network. 
 
Another organization that includes men as well as women, and extends to informal workers in small 
employment units as well as the self-employed, is the Mumbai-based Labor Education and Research 
Network (LERN), established as a NGO in 1998.  While LERN originated as a research and advocacy 
organization, in 2009 LERN registered the Women Workers Organization (MKS) as a trade union, which 
has since affiliated with the SEWA union federation and HomeNet.  MKS is active in Maharashtra state 
(where Mumbai is located); so far it has organized a relatively modest 6000 workers.  Among MKS 
members are home-based garment workers.  MKS helps workers get identity cards, which in turn entitle 
them to food rations and other public benefits.  They bargain with contractors for higher wages and for 
half-pay for rejected pieces of work.  The union also provides skills training, ranging from literacy to 
basic computer skills.  MKS carries out community organizing in the women’s home communities and 
presses community-based demands for services on the local state, but does not appeal to government 
labor authorities because the labor laws don’t apply to their membership.   
 
In China, labor NGOs formed in reaction to traditional unions’ failure to defend workers’ rights.  They 
first emerged in the southeastern Pearl River Delta, then moved north and west to other areas including 
Beijing and Shanghai.  Organizations must be sponsored (not just approved) by a government agency in 
order to register as NGOs, so many organizations that are in reality NGOs are compelled to register as 
businesses instead, affording them many fewer protections.  In addition, the Chinese government began 
cracking down on labor NGOs in 2008, even closing about 10 NGOs based in Shenzhen (in the Pearl River 
Delta) in 2012.  The result has been to largely limit labor NGOs to services (including helping workers 
pursue arbitration or litigation to resolve complaints) rather than organizing.  Thirty to thirty-five labor 
NGOs were inventoried in the Pearl River Delta in 2008, but our team was only able to identify six such 
organizations in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD), despite the fact that the region includes Shanghai and 
other major cities.  The YRD NGOs run hotlines, provide legal aid, and advocate for victims of industrial 
accidents.   
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The team concluded that ABC, based in Hangzhou, is the only of the six YRD labor NGOs currently 
organizing workers to stand up for their rights. But even ABC has emphasized training and cultural 
activities, has limited legal advocacy to a low level (20 legal consultations and 3-4 lawsuits per year, with 
other complaints pursued through mediation), and has striven to maintain close ties with government 
agencies and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.  They typically forward worker complaints to the 
Jiubao Labor Security Supervision Team, the official government inspection agency, and press the 
inspectors to follow up and take action.  This is the agency our researchers characterized as passive, but 
the addition of a well-informed worker organization to a reactive inspectorate can greatly increase the 
inspectors’ impact.  Despite the mild tone of ABC’s communication with government agencies, the NGO 
has tackled highly contentious issues, for example, pressing Hangzhou municipal authorities to allow the 
rural migrants making up the garment workforce to register as urban residents, entitling them to 
benefits and services ranging from social insurance and health care to schooling for their children.  This 
petition has parallels with SEWA’s establishment of the Welfare Boards, giving workers access to social 
benefits (in this case at the community rather than sectoral level) while not making demands directly on 
employers.  These forms of voice are based on moral suasion rather than political or economic power.  
ABC’s self-limiting agenda responds to government suspicion of independent organizing.  It also 
corresponds to the culturally centered vision of ABC founder XWC.  But even staff member YXG, who 
comes from a more radical activist background in a Pearl River Delta NGO, acknowledged that given the 
small size of most YRD garment enterprises, lawsuits resulting in large settlements would probably just 
induce employers to close operations, leaving workers with nothing. 
 
The other five NGOs, like ABC, focus on the provision of services and some advocacy and none of them 
actively organize for collective action.  Sozhou Migrant Workers Home, founded by migrant workers, 
operates in the Sozhuo and Jiangsu provinces, and is similar to ABC.  Its services include organizing 
cultural activities, training workshops, visits to injured workers, small group activities for female workers, 
and legal education.  Xiaoxiaoyu Labor Services is another organization founded by migrant workers, and 
as its name implies, it also provides services (legal aid and education in occupational safety).  Similarly, 
the Sozhou branch of Action Public Interest Hotline, a Beijing-based labor NGO, provides some services, 
promotes corporate social responsibility, and conducts some policy advocacy.  The Little Bird Hotline has 
hotline services for workers, provides some legal education and organizes charitable activities.  Lastly, 
The Nanjing University Legal Aid Program for Migrant Workers, an organization founded by university 
scholars, serves as a consultation and legal aid institution.  All organizations except The Nanjing 
University Legal Aid Program rely on international donations.  Their activities are highly scrutinized by 
the government, thus they are limited to just providing services.  The university program receives its 
funding from the university and the state.  
 
Alternative forms of organization thus sweep out a spectrum across the four countries.  In India, SEWA 
and kindred organizations have achieved impressive scale and results—though still small deficiencies.  
Brazil’s experiments are smaller still, but enjoy valuable support from a national government led by the 
Workers’ Party and from powerful unions.  Alternative organizations remain embryonic in South Africa, 
with limited government and union support (notably government assistance in establishing worker 
coops) but at least no official opposition.  In China, labor NGOs have encountered suspicion and even 
hostility from the government and unions, and the ongoing government crackdown has made it harder 
than ever for the organizations to go beyond service to organizing. 
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5. What could be done to monitor and enforce labor standards in these settings? 
 
We close this report by briefly summarizing the action takeaways.  We group these final conclusions in 
four categories:  (1) Form, (2) Content, (3) Limits, and (4) Potential. 
 
5.1. Form 
 
The institutional configuration of the four countries separates them into sets of three and one, and 
within the set of three there are distinct national trajectories determined by the dispositions and 
capacities of key actors.  In Brazil, South Africa, and India unions are politically and to some extent 
economically powerful, in the context of multiparty democracies that allow varied channels for political 
pressure.  In Brazil and South Africa, unions' strength ironically leaves less institutional space for 
informal worker organizations, consistent with what Paret (2012) has reported about differences in 
labor organizing between Johannesburg and Los Angeles.  In India, because formal unions' reach only 
extends to the small minority of workers who are formalized, the space for informal worker organizing is 
much larger.  The structural problem confronting traditional unions in all three countries is that 
traditional union strategies are poorly suited to organizing subcontracted and home-based work.  
Brazilian unions have been more open to supporting and even launching new organizational projects 
such as worker cooperatives and the garment sector Social Dialogue in Caruaru, so unions themselves 
have begun the experimentation necessary to defend labor standards in subcontracted work.  In India, 
only a few of the traditional unions have innovated on this frontier, but independent unions and 
organizations of informal workers have begun taking up the slack and winning demands from the state, 
including the crucial demand for Welfare Boards.  South Africa presents perhaps the most difficult 
situation of the three:  SACTWU, despite explicitly recognizing the problem confronting them, has 
proven less creative and less effective than Brazilian counterparts in reaching out to and mobilizing 
marginal workers in the textile and garment industry, but so far vital and large-scale movements of 
informal (including subcontracted and home-based) workers have not yet taken hold. 
 
In China, unions have more limited political and economic power and are largely directed to serving 
management rather than worker needs.  A labor-repressive state has sharply limited the space for labor 
NGOs and especially for organizing activity by such organizations.  As a result, effective organizations of 
migrant workers (inclusive of garment and textile workers) that go beyond services to worker are the 
exception.  We found only one example, generating mixed results, in our Yangtze River Delta study 
region (U.S. Department of State 2012).  
 
5.2. Content 
 
In our countries, the relevant actors have used seven main channels to improve labor standards in a 
subcontracted and home-based textile and garment workforce.  The first three seek to extract 
concessions from employers.  First, worker economic bargaining power, as in a traditional trade union 
model, is rare, but sometimes comes into play.  For example, SEWA and MKS in India have been able to 
negotiate higher piece rates with contractors (even mounting successful strikes on occasion), and South 
Africa’s SACTWU and India’s independent garment and textile unions have been able to win some 
concessions from larger subcontractors or for contract workers of larger employers.  The second 
strategy, mobilizing consumer awareness or corporate sensitivity about brand reputation, has been 
deployed, but with limited effects in our case study countries.  Third, regulatory oversight can be 
effective when government inspectors work in tandem with alert and sophisticated worker 
organizations, and both unions and other forms of organization have made good use of this leverage.  A 
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more limited, but important version of this channel is to educate workers about their rights and about 
procedures for making complaints, helping them to individually advocate for themselves.  The Asia Floor 
Wage Campaign aims to combine all three weapons of economic bargaining power, consumer pressure, 
and regulation, and it will be interesting to see how this hybrid strategy develops.   
 
Two other avenues seek to help workers without struggling to change employer practices.  The fourth 
approach is to provide a social safety net or useful services of some kind to these vulnerable workers.  
This can take various forms.  Self-funding (perhaps with help from outside donors) is one option for 
services, as in the case of ABC’s cultural activities or SASEWA’s attempt to organize a funeral fund.  
Another option is helping workers get access to established government benefits or services, as when 
MKS helps workers secure identity cards, and thus access to public benefits including food rations, or 
when ABC advocates for urban residency rights for its rural migrant constituency.  India's Welfare 
Boards combine worker and government contributions with employer fees.  Fifth, organizations may 
help workers develop the skill base needed to move to better jobs.  ABC in China, SEWA and MKS in 
India, and SASEWA in South Africa all provide training and/or scholarships to constituents.   
 
The last two strategies target economic development, by two routes that may overlap.  The sixth job-
improving instrument is to work with employers to upgrade the sector and with it, the economic 
possibilities for workers.  This can include a sector-wide Social Dialogue like that being promoted by 
DIEESE in Caruaru, simply offering individual employers inducements and assistance for moving to “high 
road” business organization as SACTWU does, or giving self-employed workers themselves business 
advice and support as SASEWA, among others, does.  The seventh and final possibility is to organize 
cooperatives to help workers reap economies of scale without requiring major investments by the 
workers themselves or disrupting some of the advantages of self-employment and home-based work in 
terms of flexibility and self-direction.  Coops can include worker-owned production units like the UNISOL 
coops in Brazil, or market power-enhancing intermediary “upstream” purchasing consortia for needed 
inputs or “downstream” selling consortia as developed by SEWA. 
 
Most of the organizations captured in our country case studies employ multiple strategies from this 
repertoire.  SEWA, the strongest of the bunch, makes extensive use of all of them, except consumer-
based pressure and sectoral upgrading.  Even SASEWA, a sapling by comparison with SEWA’s banyan 
tree, provides small business assistance, scholarship help, and pressure on municipal authorities to 
respect worker needs, and is working on funeral insurance and providing self-employed women a forum 
for dialogue that presumably will generate further lines of action—though all of these activities are so 
far limited in scale and scope. 
 
5.3.  Limits 
 
Though the menu we have just recounted may sound ample, a set of daunting economic, social, and 
political constraints limit what the various actors have accomplished, and are likely to accomplish in the 
near future, in making work in this sector more decent.  The economic constraint is quite 
straightforward:  the economic pressures faced by employers of, and purchasers from, subcontracted 
and home-based garment and textile workers.  Though anti-sweatshop activists like to point out the 
small percentage of final garment prices accounted for by labor costs at the bottom of supply chains, the 
current competitive organization of the market (and for that matter of financial markets shaping the 
decisions of the brands at the top of the supply chain) pits producers in a growing number of countries, 
including very poor ones like Bangladesh and Vietnam, against each other in defense of market shares, 
leading to extremely thin profit margins.  As a result, the actual frontline businesses setting 
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compensation levels or purchase prices for these marginal workers can ill afford cost increases—unless 
national or global brands were to jointly agree to pay for labor cost increases, which has so far been a 
rare event (but with some noteworthy successes, like that of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers [2013] 
in the US tomato market). 
 
Attempts to boost labor standards also face two main social obstacles.  One is the economic fears and 
aspirations of many of the workers.  Based on the economics just cited, workers in the precarious jobs in 
question quite reasonably fear that placing demands on employers or purchasers will lead the 
businesses to close up shop or relocate—but these fears are often exaggerated due to workers’ limited 
knowledge of the industry as a whole.  On the aspirations front, to the extent that subcontracted 
workers see a brighter future for themselves, they tend to define that future in terms of being able to 
move up the supply chain—and become small employers or middle-people rather than remaining 
subordinate to them.  Again, this aspiration is in many ways a perfectly rational response to the cramped 
world they know (though not a realistic prospect for many of them), but it is a barrier to mobilizing them 
to improve job quality.  A second social roadblock is the limited and on the whole declining resources 
disposed of by the institutional actors most likely to take action to improve the jobs in question:  activist 
unions, regulators, and pro-labor NGOs. 
 
Politically, the four national environments are quite distinct, but most are not particularly conducive to 
political action to dramatically upgrade the jobs of subcontracted worker.  China has adopted new laws 
that formalize worker protections, but given the strict limits on independent action by workers and their 
advocates, the laws and worker rights proclaimed as part of Chinese socialism are implemented spottily 
at best.  South Africa and India (in the latter case particularly states with competitive electoral contexts) 
have some political ambit for advocacy for an expanded safety net, but little for thorough enforcement 
of labor standards. Evidence on the degree and nature of labor standards enforcement suggests that to 
some extent, both national governments (and many states and localities) have implicitly embraced what 
Judith Tendler (2002) calls the “devil’s deal”:  allowing small businesses to flout labor laws as a sort of 
low-cost welfare program for people who would otherwise be unemployed.  Brazil is the greatest 
success story overall:  over the last ten years, a combination of economic growth and national 
governments willing to tighten regulation and support unionization rights (up to a point) have turned 
the tide back in the direction of greater labor formality, including in textiles and apparel.  It is less clear 
what this policy mix will yield (and how politically sustainable it will prove) as Brazilian growth slows, as 
it has done in the last couple of years.  Moreover, the Workers’ Party governments have constructed a 
social democratized version of neoliberalism while clinging to central tenets of that policy creed.  In fact, 
in all four countries, neoliberalism remains regnant, even where unions are powerful actors and 
nominally left parties are in power. 
 
5.4.    Potential 
 
We return to our central research question in this project:  how and to what extent can worker 
organization help strengthen monitoring and enforcement of labor standards in subcontracted and 
home-based work in the clothing and textile sector?  Our case studies from Brazil, China, India, and 
South Africa do indicate that worker organizations can contribute in important ways to shoring up labor 
standards.  Organizations’ largest impacts in our case studies came from (1) serving as force multipliers 
for government regulation and inspections; (2) bringing workers’ collective voice into economic and 
political dialogues and decision-making, with local expansions of social welfare benefits as a particularly 
significant payoff; and (3) acting as advocates for, or agents of, sectoral economic development in forms 
ranging from cooperatives to industrial upgrading. 
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The case studies counsel flexibility and a certain amount of humility.  Flexibility—in response to the 
particular national and regional environment in question—is called for regarding whether organizational 
efforts are most effectively undertaken by unions, independent organizations, or a combination of the 
two.  By humility, we just mean that limited expectations are appropriate, proportionate to the limited 
results that have been achieved to date.   
 
Beyond these questions of broad outlook, our examples suggest that creativity by the lead social actors, 
investment in “organizational research and development,” and a long time horizon are keys to success.  
SEWA, DIEESE, and ABC have gotten as far as they have by thinking outside the box.  But creativity has 
limited traction without the “R&D” resources to research a sector and carry out varied experiments.  
And SEWA’s large-scale success is due in important part to more than 40 years in the programmatic and 
organizing trenches. 
 
We know that international solidarity and brand campaigns centered in the global North have been 
sometimes effective in locations ranging from Central America to Bangladesh.  But in the needle trades 
in this specific set of countries, NGO-driven international campaigns have not so far left a major 
footprint.  In Brazil and South Africa this is understandable, since the relevant industries mainly supply 
domestic markets.  The Chinese and Indian garment industries, as major exporters, are in principle more 
subject to international consumer pressure, and the Asia Floor Wage Campaign is designed mobilize 
such pressure as part of a multi-pronged strategy.   
 
Our country case studies paint an overall picture that is neither terribly encouraging nor totally 
discouraging—for these countries and for the wide range of other countries with significant informal 
work in the garment and textile industry (including the United States).  We have not identified any 
prospects for rapid transformation of subcontracted labor in textiles and apparel, but in all four 
countries there are workable handholds and promising experiments.  To the extent that the relevant 
social actors can grasp the handholds and nurture these and other experiments, they will be able to 
exert upward pressure on labor standards.     
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Appendix A:  Brazil  
Table A.1.  Number of registered establishments and employees in the garment sector, by state & cluster 
Item State Cluster name Municipalities Number of 
registered firms 
Employees at 
registered 
firms 
1 BA Rua Uruguai Salvador 805 7,035 
2 BA Moda do Estado da 
Bahia 
Feira de Santana, Amélia 
Rodrigues, Coração de Maria, 
Conceição da Feira, Santo Estevão, 
São Gonçalo dos Campos, 
Conceição do Coité, Santa Luz, 
Serrinha, Tanquinho, Santo 
Antonio de Jesus e Jequié 
946 2,305 
3 CE Polo de Moda do 
Ceará 
Fortaleza 4,896 67,532 
4 DF Vestuário do 
Distrito Federal 
Distrito Federal 643 2,326 
5 ES Noroeste do 
Espírito Santo 
Colatina 427 7,567 
6 ES Grande Vitória Vitória (RM) 1,177 10,655 
7 GO Região do Jaraguá Jaraguá, São Francisco de Goiás, 
Itaguaru, Uruana e Goianésia 
762 5,048 
8 GO Goiânia Goiânia 3,700 24,166 
9 GO Catalão Catalão 92 933 
10 MA Imperatriz Imperatriz, Açailândia, Carolina, 
Estreito, Grajaú, Porto Franco, 
Ribamar Fiquene 
104 466 
11 MA São Luis São Luis 245 825 
12 MG Passos Passos 211 2.611 
13 MG Divinópolis Divinópolis 1,161 10,722 
14 MG Muriaé Araçuaí, Ataléia, Caraí, Carangola, 
Catuji, Coronel Murta, 
Franciscópolis, Frei Gaspar, Itaipé, 
Itinga, Ladainha, Leopoldina, 
Malacacheta, Muriaé, Novo 
Cruzeiro, Novo Oriente de Minas, 
Ouro Verde de Minas, 
Padre Paraíso, Pavão, Ponto dos 
Volantes, Poté, Setubinha, Teófilo 
Otoni, Virgem da Lapa 
709 9,009 
15 MG Formiga Formiga 228 3,837 
16 MG Juruaia Juruaia 117 1,447 
17 MG Uberlândia Uberlândia 457 5,087 
18 MG Juiz de Fora / São 
João Nepomuceno 
Astolfo Dutra, Bicas, Cataguases, 
Descoberto, Guarani, Guarará, Juiz 
de Fora, Mar de Espanha, Maripá 
1,824 27,202 
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de Minas, Rio Novo, Rio Pomba, 
Rochedo de Minas, São João 
Nepomuceno 
19 MG Poços de Caldas Poços de Caldas 100 926 
20 MG Jacutinga Borda da Mata, Jacutinga, Monte 
Sião, Ouro Fino 
1,822 9,107 
21 MG Ubá Guarani, Guidoval, Guiricema, 
Mercês, Piraúba, Rio Pomba, 
Rodeiro, São Geraldo, Silveirânea, 
Tocantins, Ubá e Visconde do Rio 
Branco 
555 6,555 
22 MS Campo Grande Aparecida do Taboado, Caarapó, 
Campo Grande, Dourados, Glória 
de Dourados, Naviraí, Nova 
Andradina, Paranaíba, Ponta Porã, 
Sidrolândia. Três Lagoas 
508 21,474 
23 MT Cuiabá e Várzea 
Grande 
Cuiabá, Várzea Grande 308 2,109 
24 MT Rondonópolis Rondonópolis 82 2,192 
25 PB Campina Grande Campina Grande 327 14,325 
26 PB Guarabira Guarabira 35 1,731 
27 PB João Pessoa João Pessoa 236 7,211 
28 PB Cajazeiras Cajazeiras 39 680 
29 PB Monteiro Camalaú, Monteiro, São João do 
Tigre, São Sebastião do  Ubuzeiro, 
Zabelê 
26 102 
30 PB São Bento Brejo do Cruz, São Bento 167 648 
31 PE Polo de Confecções 
do Agreste 
Agrestina, Belo Jardim, Brejo da 
Madre de Deus, Caruaru, Cupira, 
Gravatá, Passira, Pesqueira, 
Riacho das Almas, Santa Cruz do 
Capibaribe, Surubim, Taquaritinga 
do Norte, Toritama, Vertentes 
3,458 24,449 
32 PI Têxtil e Confecções 
da Região Norte 
Piripiri, Parnaíba 117 865 
33 PR Maringá e Região Cianorte, Ângulo, Astorga, Cidade 
Gaúcha, Floresta, Guaporema, 
Iguaraçu, Indianópolis, Japurá, 
Jussara, Mandaguaçu,Mandaguari, 
Marialva, Maringá (Cidade Pólo), 
Nova Olímpia, Paiçandu, Rondon, 
São Manoel do Paraná, São Tomé, 
Sarandi, Tapejara, Tapira, Terra 
Boa e Tuneiras do Oeste 
2.786 39.373 
34 PR Terra Roxa Terra Roxa 178 2,961 
35 PR Região Sudoeste Ampere, Barracão, Capanema, 
Chopinzinho, Dois Vizinhos, 
398 8,165 
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Francisco Beltrão, Pato Branco, 
Pranchita, Planalto, Realeza, Salto 
de Lontra e Santo Antonio do 
Sudoeste 
36 RJ Nova Friburgo Cantagalo, Cordeiro, Duas Barras, 
BomJardim, Macuco e Nova 
Friburgo 
1,746 20,540 
37 RJ Moda Sul 
Fluminense 
Valença 59 1,339 
38 RJ Moda de Petrópolis Petrópolis 798 10,823 
39 RJ Moda do Noroeste 
Fluminense 
Itaperuna 211 1,972 
40 RJ Moda Niteroi Niteroi 221 1,553 
41 RJ Moda Praia Cabo 
Frio 
Cabo Frio 98 418 
42 RJ Moda São Gonçalo São Gonçalo 502 3,661 
43 RJ Moda de Campos Campos dos Goitacazes 146 955 
44 RJ Terezópolis  100 1,070 
45 RO Cacoal Cacoal 35 842 
46 SC Rio do Sul Agronômica, Aurora, Braço do 
Trombuco, Dona Emma, 
Laurentino, José Boiteux, Mirim 
Doce, Petrolândia, Pouso Redondo, 
Presidente Getúlio, Presidente 
Nereu, Rio do Campo, Rio do 
Oeste, Salete, Santa Terezinha, 
Taió, Trombuco Central, Vitor 
Meireles, Witmarsun 
614 10,422 
47 SC São Miguel do 
Oeste 
São Miguel do Oeste 55 504 
48 SC Joinville Joinville 582 14,516 
49 SC Jaraguá do Sul Jaraguá do Sul 541 23,868 
50 SC Blumenau Brotuverá, Brusque, Camboriú, 
Doutor Pedrinho, Garpar, 
Guabiruba, Ibirama, Ilhota, Indaial, 
Itajaí, Ituporanga, Lontras, Luiz 
Alves, Navegantes, Pomerode, Rio 
dos Cedros, Rio do Sul, Rodeio, 
Timbó, Agrolândia, Apiúna, 
Ascurra, Balneário Camboriú, 
Benedito Novo, Blumenau 
8,487 148,079 
51 SC Chapecó Chapecó, São Lourenço D'Oeste, 
Xanrerê; 
226 1,501 
52 SC Sul de Santa 
Catarina 
Tubarão, Araranguá, Sombrio 867 9,476 
53 SE Confecções e 
Bordados do Sul e 
Itabaianinha, Lagarto, Tobias 
Barreto 
267 2,151 
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Centro Sul de 
Sergipe 
54 SP Americana Americana 1,102 23,624 
55 SP Polos de 
Confecções do Brás 
e Bom Retiro 
São Paulo 19,188 163,700 
56 SP Sorocaba Sorocaba 295 6,537 
57 SP São José do Rio 
Preto 
São José do Rio Preto 587 4,538 
58 SP Ibitinga Ibitinga 743 13,259 
59 SP Araraquara Araraquara 96 6,818 
60 SP Jundiaí Jundiaí 172 4,580 
61 SP Tabatinga Tabatinga 79 1,529 
62 SP Novo Horizonte Novo Horizonte 61 461 
63 SP Cerquilho / Tietê Cerquilho / Tietê 419 8,167 
64 TO Palmas Palmas 63 328 
Source:  (SEBRAE Pernambuco 2013) 
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BRAZIL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1) What forms of organization and working relationship are practiced more frequently in the 
garment sector in this region? In your opinion, it is common to have employees or contractors 
who work from home? 
a. Do you identify supervisory or regulatory instruments of labor relations in the region? Are they 
effective? 
b. Unions are important in the region? Do they contribute to greater regulation of labor relations? 
c. What are the institutions, organizations and political or social movements that work to improve 
working conditions in the region? 
d. What steps, actions, organizations or laws you think would be important to ensure progress in 
labor relations in the garment sector in the region? 
e. Are there experiences in the area of development of worker cooperatives or solidarity economy? 
f. Has the Single Micro Entrepreneur – MEI- category been an alternative to formalize workers? 
 
2) What do employees who work in production activities garments want? There is the desire to 
formalize their labor relationship? 
a. Social protection (pension, unemployment insurance, industrial accident insurance) is 
important? 
b. The opportunity to sell to large companies is a stimulus to formalize? 
 
3) How do you think the region and Garment cluster will be in ten years? 
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BRAZIL:  NOTES ON METHODOLOGY FOR FIELDWORK AND INTERVIEWS 
 
To establish what would be the best work methodology to use in this project, we had to take into 
account the structural characteristics of Brazilian labor institutions and of the country´s garment sector. 
This starting point allowed us to minimize costs and time spent in the field, while we maximized the 
information gathered. 
 
The textile and garment sectors in Brazil are relatively old and well organized, and have made important 
contributions both to the national industrialization process and to employer and worker organizations. 
Brazil has a relatively strong body of labor law and inspection system as well as an active civil society, 
notably trade unions and NGOs working along with social movements to ensure benefits for the working 
class.  Given these characteristics of Brazilian society and its state and civil institutions and civil, we 
decided that the most appropriate research design would be through the establishment of dialogues 
and qualitative interviews with representatives of those institutions, since they are the main 
protagonists of the precarious labor reduction process in Brazil. 
 
Among the institutions that were consulted and whose leaders granted us interviews, we highlight: 
• Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE). DIEESE is an institution 
established by the national union federations during Brazil’s years of dictatorship, and plays an 
important role as a research and training center to advance union capabilities in the bargaining 
processes and in the definition of strategies to enhance workers’ labor conditions.  
• Unified Workers Central (CUT).  The CUT is the largest union federation in Brazil and in Latin America, 
as it brings together over 8000 unions and a contingent of 22 million workers. In São Paulo, includes 
unions related to the textile and clothing industry and has served in an active dialogue with 
employers and employees to resolve the poor working conditions that characterize some of the 
industry’s segments. 
• Chamber of Commerce (CDL) of Santa Cruz do Capibaribe. This is an association of commercial 
enterprsies and small businesspeople, very common in Brazilian cities, which aims to represent the 
interests of these actors in the construction of public policies related to segment. In the case of 
Santa Cruz do Capibaribe, this institution has been an important partner in the “social dialogue” 
forums promoted by DIEESE. 
• Pernambuco´s Union of Seamstresses, a union organized at the state level, but with little 
representation in the companies in the Caruaru Cluster.   It has also been part DIEESE’s Social 
Dialogue. 
• Força Sindical.  The second largest union federation in Brazil, it has approximately 5 million 
members, has done a lot of work organizing garment workers throughout Brazil, and in the case of 
the state of Pernambuco is the federation that houses Pernambuco´s Union of Seamstresses. 
• Caruaru Women’s Department.  This is the body of the municipal government, which, in its mission 
to fight for gender equality, is working with the DIEESE project, since the vast majority of 
homeworkers working in the Garment Cluster of Caruaru are women. 
• Caruaru Department of Social Participation.  Led by a young Brazilian, a former student movement 
leader, this office has been dedicated to broadening participation in shaping public policies of the 
municipality. Also part of the Social Dialogue. 
• Development Office of the Municipality of Santa Cruz do Capibaribe.  This is the local government 
body responsible for planning the counties economic and social dialogue with business. Also 
participates in the DIEESE project. 
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• Roberto Veras, professor at the Universidade Federal de Campina Grande. He coordinates a 
permanent research project on the Caruaru Cluster that has produced a book, several papers and 
supervised several theses on labor in the Cluster. 
 
• Francisca Trajano, President of the National Confederation of Garment Workers-CUT, and president 
of the Seamstress Union of the ABC region in São Paulo metro area. 
 
The list of specific persons interviewed is as follows: 
 
• Bruno Bezerra - Secretary of Economic Development of the Municipality of Santa Cruz do Capibaribe. 
• Elba Ravane - Special Secretary for Women Caruaru. 
• Luana Lais Gonçalves Santos - Association of the Sugarloaf Shopping District (municipality of Santa 
Cruz do Capibaribe). 
• Louise Caroline - Social Participation Secretary, Caruaru municipality. 
• Milena Prado - Technical responsible for the project, DIEESE. 
• Raquel Lindoso –Technical advisor, Caruaru municipality. 
• Aurora Flora Duarte – president of the Pernambuco Seamstresses Union. 
• Roberto Veras, A professor at Universidade Federal de Campina Grande. 
• Francisca Trajano, President of the National Confederation of Garment Workers-CUT. 
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Appendix B:  South Africa 
 
Impact of liberalization policies on production, employment, imports and exports 
  
The outcome of the lowering of tariffs between 1993 and 2001 on textile (49% to 16%) and footwear 
(38% to 27%) was evident in all areas:  production, employment, and exports (Table V.1).  Contrary to 
the predictions of neoliberal policy advocates, there were significant declines in employment, average 
wages, and exports in the industry.  The economic ambitions of an expect-led growth for South Africa 
were fading away.  During 1995-2002, imports in footwear increased from 13% to 47% and in clothing 
imports also increased from 23% to 31% between 1995 and 2002.  Yet, average wages did not increase.  
In clothing, the perceived average wage increase was as a result of retrenchment; not increased wage 
settlements.  Between 1995 and 2002, average wages in footwear also continued to decline, and 
reaching their nadir in 2002 (Table V.1).  The entire industry’s employment levels declined by 37.4 
percent, affecting more than 425,950 workers.  
 
Table B.1.  Output, employment and wages in the textile and footwear sectors in South Africa, 1993-
2002 
 Output (R million, 
1995 prices) 
Employment Remuneration per month, per 
employee 
Year Textiles Footwear Spinning, 
weaving & 
finishing 
Other 
textiles 
Footwear Textile Footwear 
1993 8501 2,564 35,260 30,695    
1994 8858 2,551 35,839 32,053    
1995 9032 2,618 34,641 32,369 27,882 28,742 24,436 
1996 8833 2,229 45,566 32,886 25,088 24,666 24,635 
1997 9370 2,171 42,744 32,713 23,699 25,535 22,802 
1998 8393 2,135 30,169 26,725 22,450 34,230 24,551 
1999 8273 2,213 26,484 26,713 18,748 34,918 23,717 
2000 8399 2,035 25,182 30,258 15,317 34,152 22,225 
2001 8593 1,693 25,110 28,487 12,758 34,052 23,675 
2002 9315 1,676   12,305 28,803 22,109 
        
K/L                 87          28   
Source:  Bezuidenhout, Mosoetsa & Roberts (2006) 
Notes:   Data for 1993 to 1997 are year averages while the data for 1998 to 2001 reflect figures from 
June of each year.  The former homelands were only included from 1996, hence the break shown in the 
series.  Output is in constant 1995 rand millions.  Output:  labor is rand thousands, constant 1995 prices.  
Capital:  labor (K/L) ratio is total fixed assets per employee in rand thousands for 2002. 
 
Between 2004 and 2007, about 38,431 added jobs were lost in the industry (Table V.2).  Given the 
nature of the industry, it was not surprising that job losses in the industry affected women workers the 
most.  But between 2007 and 2010, job losses moderated somewhat, especially in clothing. 
 
 
 
Table B.2.  Joblessness in clothing, textile, leather and footwear sectors, 2004- 2010 
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Sector 2004-2007 
(Jobs lost) 
2004-2007 
% Total 
2007-2010 
(Jobs lost) 
2007 – 2010 
% Total 
Clothing  29,113 76 % 18,291 62 % 
Textile 7,558 20 % 9,165 31 % 
Footwear & 
Leather 
1,132 3 % 1 245 4 % 
Other 632 2 % 826 3 % 
Total 38,435 100% 29,527 100% 
Source:  SACTWU, SALRI (2010) 
 
According to the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU), the moderation of job 
losses in the clothing industry after 2007 can be attributed to:   
 
• The much smaller size of the industry, as a result there were fewer jobs that could be lost than 
was previously the case. 
• Quotas on China were in place in 2007 and 2008. They provided protection to the local industry, 
particularly to the clothing. 
• Local clothing manufacturers broke historical ties with local textile companies and chose to 
source their textiles from overseas instead. 
• Low cost countries like China reached a plateau in dominance in the global clothing 
manufacturing sector, and expanded their activities in heavier and more complex forms of 
industry, including textiles. 
• A stronger commitment from the South African government to implement industrial, trade and 
other measures to support the industry. 
 
The ultimate result of years of trade liberalization was that in 2010, there were less than 1500 
employers in the industry and most of them (68%) employed less than 50 workers.  The industry was still 
concentrated in three provinces, KwaZulu-Natal, Western Cape and Gauteng.  The industry had not 
created much-needed jobs (Figure V.1). 
 
The objective of trade and tariff liberalization on the domestic market had been to increase the level of 
competition and dampen inflationary pressures while fostering manufacturers to become 
internationally competitive as well as encourage exports by reducing the anti-export bias.  However, 
these measures caused an influx of legal and illegal imports that flooded and destroyed the local 
economy.  However, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) opposed action, holding that the 
clothing industry, unlike other sectors, had enjoyed “sustained and extensive protection” with sufficient 
notice and support to adjust to global exposure.84  It was much later (2005 onwards) that the DTI 
introduced measures and a number of incentives to protect the local industry.  To date, recovery has 
been slow and the industry continues to shed jobs.  Furthermore, this industry is still plagued by:    
 
• Limited production, profits and investment 
• Loss of local market share; raw materials increasingly sourced internationally.   
• Dated machinery and designs (thus uncompetitive)  
• Illegal imports continue to flood the economy  
• Growing second-hand market in clothing, undermining the industry                                                         
84 Van der Westhuizen (2006, 8-9) 
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Figure B.1.  Number and size of clothing, textile, leather and footwear enterprises in 2010 (by province) 
 
Source:  DTI 2012  
 
Table B.3.  Informal employment (employees and self-employed) as a percentage of total employment, 
by gender, South Africa 2004 
Employment Category Men Women Total 
Formal employment 68.6% 60.5% 62.8% 
Informal employees 18.7 23.2 22.8 
Informal self-employed 12.7 16.3 14.4 
Total informal 31.4 39.5 37.2 
Total 100 100 100 
Source:  Heintz and Valodia 2008, Tables 3 and 4. 
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Table B.4.  Labor force survey:  Informal employment in the selected sectors (2011-12)85 
Sector Informal Employment 
Oct-Dec 2011 
(Thousand) 
Informal Employment 
April-June 2012 
(Thousand) 
Private Households 
(domestic work) 
1,118 1,153 
Mining 1 1 
Manufacturing  203 171 
Construction  320 292 
Transport 192 187 
Trade  997 1,000 
Source:  StatsSA, Labour Force Survey 2012 
  
Table B.5.  Selected SACTWU’S successful labor court, Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration & National Bargaining Council cases (2008-2012) 
Date Issue Case Details 
March 2012 
 
The right to strike  Seardel subsidiary of Berg River Textiles challenged SACTWU’s 
right to strike action.  The Labour Court’s judgment stated that 
the union (contrary to what the employer argued) need only to 
certify that an attempt has been made to conciliate between 
the trade union and employers by a certain date before a strike 
was to be called.  The outcome of that conciliation was not 
important in the union’s decision to issue a strike notice to the 
employer.   
February 
2012 
 
 
Attempts to close 
the National 
Bargaining Council 
(NBC)  
The Labour Court ruled in favour of SACTWU and the National 
Bargaining Council for the Clothing Industry in a case that 
sought to dismantle the Bargaining Council system.  This was 
the second such attempt by Western Cape manufacturers, Sgt 
Pepper's Knitwear and Abbey Road Fashions to shut down the 
NBC. 
May 2011 Unlawful 
retrenchment 
process 
SACTWU successfully interdicted the employer of Simunye 
Clothing in Newcastle and chairman of the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce from proceeding with the retrenchment of workers. 
The Labour Court ruled that the company is to comply with a 
fair procedure in its retrenchments, that the employer is 
interdicted and restrained from dismissing any of the 
employees without complying with the requirements of the 
Labour Relations Act.  The court ordered the employer to re-
instate any workers already retrenched.  
April 2011 Enforcing collective 
bargaining 
agreements  
SACTWU won a R3 million arrear wage payment settlement for 
clothing workers in the Western Cape for clothing workers who 
embarked on a three week living wage national strike in 
September 2009.  The strike was part of a campaign resist 
employers attempts to cut workers’ prescribed minimum wages                                                         
85 There is no information that compares data in this table with total employment in manufacturing.  Furthermore, 
these data are not broken down in terms of apparel, textile and footwear as separate categories.  
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and social benefits.  Part of the strike fell on 24 September 2009 
(Heritage Day), which was a paid public holiday in terms of the 
industry main agreement.  Employers affiliated to the Apparel 
Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa (AMSA especially in 
the W Cape and KZN), refused to pay workers for the 24th 
September holiday.  They argued that since workers were on 
strike, they had automatically forfeited their right to be paid. 
The National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing 
Industry ruled in favour of the trade union.  
July 2008  Non-compliance 
with collective 
bargaining 
agreements 
 
 
 
 
The Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
ordered a KwaZulu-Natal-based textile company to pay a R17 
million fine for non-compliance with the provisions of the 
National Textile Bargaining Council's wage provisions.  Tai Yuen 
Textiles (Pty) Ltd was found guilty of a wage underpayment of 
393 employees from 12 February 2007 to 27 April 2008, 
amounting to R11.5 million.  In addition, the Commissioner 
found that that the company unlawfully failed to pay provident 
fund contributions and ordered it to pay back almost a R1 
million in unpaid employer provident fund contributions.  The 
company was also ordered to pay the workers just over R1 
million in unpaid annual bonuses, to pay arrear bargaining 
council levies of R49,000, the union's HIV/Aids levy of just over 
R2,000. 
 
Source:  South African Clothing and Textile Union (SACTWU) (2013)  
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Appendix C:  India   
 
Contemporary Data on Indian Textiles 
This section draws from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, 
2008-2009 
 
Table C.1.  National industrial classification of textiles 
Manufacture of Textiles 
(Division 13) 
 
Manufacture of Wearing 
Apparel (Division 14) 
Manufacture of Leather & 
Related Products (Division 15) 
4.53% aggregate GVA  
 
2.10% aggregate GVA .65% aggregate GVA 
9th highest contribution to total 
GVA (of 29 ranked categories) 
 
16th highest contribution to total 
GVA (of 29 ranked categories) 
22nd highest contribution to GVA 
(of 29 ranked categories) 
Spinning, weaving, finishing of 
textiles (group 131) 
Manufacture of wearing apparel, 
except fur (group 141) 
Tanning and dressing of leather; 
manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddler and harness; 
dressing and dying of fur (group 
151) 
 
Manufacture of other textiles 
(group 139)* 
Manufacture of articles of fur 
(group 142) 
 
Manufacture of footwear (group 
152)** 
 Manufacture of knitted and 
crocheted apparel (group 143) 
 
 
*Includes carpets/rugs, rope, twine, netting, cordage, and others. 
**Excludes:  manufacture of footwear of textile material without applied soles, manufacture of plastic 
footwear parts, manufacture of rubber footwear parts, manufacture of wooden footwear parts. 
 
 
Division 13 Division 14 
No. of Factories:  13,360 
 
No. of Factories:  5,761 
Persons engaged:  1,400,207 
 
Persons engaged:  797,878 
Output (Rs. millions) 1,717,001 
 
Output (Rs. million):  537,571 
Input (Rs. millions):  1,439,931 
 
Input (Rs. million):  414,924 
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Group-based Economic Data, All-India 
*Values for GVA and profit in Rs. million 
 
Table C.2. 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Preparation and 
spinning of textile fibers 
(1311) 
3895 118,881.8 -15,223.7 
Weaving of textiles 
(1312) 
2269 53,325.9 2,956.1 
Finishing of textiles 
(1313) 
2960 41,505.9 3,033 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted fabrics 
(1391) 
1264 26,041.3 5,178.4 
Manufacture of made-
up textile articles, 
except apparel (1392) 
724 14,454.6 2,168.7 
Manufacture of carpets 
and rugs (1393) 
341 4,979.2 -290.8 
Manufacture of 
cordage, rope, twine 
and netting (1394) 
569 8,229.2 3,554.5 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (1399) 
681 
 
9,652.3 
 
1,275 
 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (1410) 
3830 98,259.6 17,011.6 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (1420) 
44 674.4 122.5 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(1430) 
1616 23,712.5 3,357.8 
 
Select State-based Economic Data 
*Values for GVA and profit in Rs. million 
 
Table C.3.  Andhra Pradesh 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
360 11,647.3 445.5 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
91 720.1 -309 
Manufacture of wearing 53 1,881.4 288 
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apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
4 -1.4 -26.1 
 
Table C.3.  Delhi 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
24 55.6 3.3 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
76 837.8 29.5 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
427 
 
9,262.6 
 
2,479.1 
 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
14 155.4 30.4 
 
Table C.4.   Gujarat 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
1184 31,731.1 1,514.9 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
306 9,261.7 588.9 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
156 2,306.5 532.7 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
17 174.8 35.9 
 
Table C.5.   Haryana 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
256 5,392.7 1,999.2 
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(131) 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
150 4,821 790.1 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
299 18,513 1,523.2 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
- 
 
- - 
 
Table C.6.   Karnataka 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
148 4,587.4 -927.7 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
92 1,720.8 742.4 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
542 25,842.1 3,481.8 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
5 190.1 -285.1 
 
Table C.7.   Kerala 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
124 236.6 -2,528 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
170 -92.1 -1,861.7 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
24 926.3 82.9 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
20 11.5 6.8 
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Table C.8.   Maharashtra 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
1101 2,4625.6 -5,146.7 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
257 11,538.6 4,690.5 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
657 13,189.8 6,351.3 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
15 26.6 -48.2 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
12 343.1 77.7 
 
Table C.8.   Punjab 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
510 15,008.8 -3,836.7 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
259 5,402.6 1,477.4 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
203 2,081.5 -102.2 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
359 4,970.3 202.5 
 
Table C.9.   Rajasthan 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
963 14,982.2 -1,653.7 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
45 1,123.5 294.2 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
88 1,710.7 324.9 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
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Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
- 
 
- - 
 
Table C.10.   Tamil Nadu 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
3477 43,396.2 -8,170.7 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
1591 70,192.3 2,562.5 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
864 10,302.7 -1,496.8 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
20 196.4 82.4 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
1143 17,429.4 2,868 
 
Table C.11.   Uttar Pradesh 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
284 3,476.1 -872.1 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
286 4,450 1,143.5 
Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
396 8,260.8 2,020.9 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
4 20.6 -9.4 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
21 167.1 68.7 
 
Table C.12.   West Bengal 
Group Factories in Operation Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Profit 
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing of textiles 
(131) 
159 16,316.6 -369.2 
Manufacture of other 
textiles (139) 
95 661.7 -32.9 
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Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except fur 
apparel (141) 
51 1230.8 208.1 
Manufacture of articles 
of fur (142) 
- - - 
Manufacture of knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
(143) 
12 85.3 21.2 
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Appendix D:  China  
 
Socioeconomic Backgrounds of the Survey Respondents 
Places of Origin 
 
Figure D.1.  Types of household registration among garment workers surveyed  
 
 
Figure D.2.  Places of origin of factory workers surveyed 
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Figure D.3.  Places of origin of workshop workers surveyed 
 
 
Most employees in YRD’s garment sector are migrant workers who leave their hometowns for 
employment opportunities.  As shown in Figure D.1, more than 83% of our respondents are non-local 
residents who hold non-local agricultural hukou.  Concerning the places of origin, most migrant workers 
are from rural areas of neighboring inland provinces, like Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei and Henan.  In particular, 
Anhui can be regarded as the largest labor-exporting province in YRD because about 39% of factory 
workers and workshop respondents were born in poor villages in Anhui (Figures V.A.2 and V.A.3). 
 
Sex 
 
Figure D.4.  (Left) Sex ratio of workshop respondents;  
(Right) Sex ratio of factory respondents 
 
 
It is suggested that garment workshops in the region employ more males than females.  In our surveys, 
out of the 218 workshop respondents sampled, 124 (nearly 57%) of them are males while the rest are 
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females (Figure D.4).86  In contrast, majority of factory workers we interviewed are female (about 75%).  
We believe that the employers’ gender preference for women in the recruiting process should be taken 
into account.  The factory owners tend to hire young women from rural areas because they are seen as 
more docile and less ready to protest.  
 
Age 
 
Figure D.5.    Distribution of garment workers by age  
 
 
The factory respondents in the survey were between the ages of 17 and 55.  The average age, mode and 
median of factory workers are 30.61, 20 and 28 respectively.  More than half of the factory interviewees 
were less than 28 years old, indicating that young female migrant workers mainly fill garment jobs in the 
YRD’s factories.  Concerning the age distribution of garment workers, it is found that the number of 
workers does not necessarily decrease in age.  The 41-59 years old group is indeed the third largest age 
group in the garment sector of the region, after the 17-20 and 21-25 age groups (Figure D.5).  Thus, we 
opined that there are two major types of garment workers in the region.  The first type of worker is a 
young migrant fresh out of school still in the process of learning new skills.  The second type of worker is 
middle-aged person who has all-round skills and prefers to work in teams in small workshops because 
they flexible and have “less strict” management styles.  
 
Education level  
As shown in Figure D.6, most garment workers we interviewed are literate and have received some 
formal education.  220 respondents (about 63%) have completed at least junior secondary (junior high) 
school, while about one-fifth of the interviewees indicated that they graduated from senior secondary 
(high) schools or post-secondary colleges.  
 
                                                        
86 As mentioned in the Methodology section of the China report, we interviewed 223 workshop respondents.  On 
the question of sex, there were 5 missing values, hence why we state 218 respondents.  
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Figure D.6.   Distribution of garment workers by education levels 
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